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Almost 20 years after the UK’s first wave energy innovation programme came to an end in the 
1980s, a new programme to accelerate the development of wave energy technology was launched. 
It was believed that wave energy could play a central role in helping to deliver a low-carbon, 
secure and affordable energy system, as well as provide an important boost to the UK economy 
through the growth of a new domestic industry. However, despite almost £200m of public funds 
being invested in UK wave energy innovation since 2000, wave energy technology remains some 
distance away from commercialisation. Consequently, this report examines the extent to which the 
failure to deliver a commercially viable wave energy device can be attributed to weaknesses in both 
government and industry’s support for wave energy innovation in the UK. 
 
A summary of the key findings is presented below.
Executive summary 
Overview and key findings
 n Wave energy’s failure to reach market 
can, in part, be attributed to weaknesses 
in government and industrial strategy to 
support wave energy innovation in the UK, 
most notably a premature emphasis on 
commercialisation and a lack of knowledge 
exchange.
 n These weaknesses have resulted in a poor 
performance against some key innovation 
indicators. Examples include market leaders 
entering administration (e.g. Pelamis), 
a fall in installed and rated capacity of 
devices, and a lack of convergence around a 
dominant device design. 
 n The downturn in UK wave energy innovation 
performance led to multi-national 
incumbents (e.g. energy utilities, Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)) and 
investors withdrawing from the sector. This 
led to a concerted effort from the public 
sector to learn from past policy mistakes via 
knowledge capture initiatives, led primarily 
by the Scottish Government. 
 n Policy learning resulted in a reconfiguration 
of the UK’s wave energy innovation system 
in a bid to address these issues. Changes 
included a re-design of government RD&D 
programmes, the formation of new actor 
networks and the commissioning of world-
class test infrastructure. These changes 
have already yielded some positive trends 
in measurable innovation performance 
(e.g. knowledge exchange), however, the 
full impact of this reconfiguration has yet 
to emerge.
 n Today, the UK is home to an innovation 
system much better placed to deliver a 
commercial wave energy device. However, 
this newly configured system is likely to 
face severe disruption from wider political 
developments such as Brexit’s impact on 
EU RD&D funding and the UK Government’s 
shift away from investing in wave energy.
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 device can be attributed to  
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 innovation in the UK.  
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Rationale
The report responds to a gap in the literature, by providing 
an up-to-date, mixed-method and systematic analysis of 
the UK’s wave energy innovation system, examining its 
structure, performance, drivers and barriers over a 17-year 
period since 2000. The report’s findings are aimed primarily 
at government and industry in a bid to help improve the 
effectiveness of future wave energy innovation support in 
the UK and accelerate the technology’s journey towards 
commercialisation. Importantly, lessons are drawn from 
the case study of wave energy to help inform the design 
and improve the efficacy of energy innovation policy more 
broadly. It is hoped that these lessons will shape the UK’s 
low-carbon energy innovation strategy and help it meet its 
Paris Agreement commitment to limit global temperature 
rise this century below 2oC above pre-industrial levels.
Research questions 
and methodology
The research does not assess the technical feasibility 
of wave energy technology nor consider whether wave 
energy should be a priority for UK RD&D funding. Instead 
it examines the effectiveness of UK innovation support 
between 2000 and 2017, focusing on the following five 
questions:
1. How is the UK’s wave energy innovation system 
structured and how has it evolved?
2. How well has the UK’s wave energy innovation system 
performed and how has its performance changed over 
time?
3. Which factors have supported and undermined wave 
energy innovation in the UK?
4. What actions could be taken by the UK to accelerate 
wave energy innovation in the future?
5. What lessons can we learn from the case of UK wave 
energy innovation to help support innovation of other 
energy technologies?
It utilises a Technology Innovation System (TIS) framework 
to guide the analysis of how the UK’s wave energy 
innovation system’s structure and performance evolved 
during the period since 2000, and crucially the factors 
responsible for shaping these changes. To mobilise 
this framework, the analysis utilises a combination of 
quantitative (e.g. patents, bibliometrics, public RD&D 
grants) and qualitative data (e.g. expert interviews, 
documentary evidence). Innovation performance is 
measured via a set of 22 indicators, measuring both 
absolute and relative changes in wave energy innovation 
performance, the latter situating performance against 
other countries or energy technologies as a benchmark. 
Each indicator is coupled with one of the seven TIS 
functions outlined in Table 1.
 The report’s findings are aimed  
 primarily at government and  
 industry in a bid to help improve  
 the effectiveness of future  
 wave energy innovation support  
 in the UK and accelerate the  
 technology’s journey towards  
 commercialisation. 
(Source: Wikipedia)
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Table 1: Description of TIS functions 
TIS Function Description
F1 – Knowledge 
development
The creation of technological variety achieved by a broadening and deepening of a codified knowledge1 
base via research and development (R&D).
F2 – Knowledge 
exchange
Exchange of information between actors facilitated by inter-actor networks. 
F3 – Entrepreneurial 
experimentation
Entrepreneurs recognise the latent value proposition of emergent technologies and seek to realise this 
potential via commercial experiments. These experiments typically generate a form of tacit knowledge 
and in turn reduce the degree of uncertainty associated with a technology, either through success or 
failure.
F4 – Guidance of the 
search
Pressures that encourage actors to enter a technological field and subsequently guide the stage and 
focus of innovation activities they undertake, such as policy targets and technology roadmaps. 
F5 – Resource 
mobilisation
Mobilisation of financial, human and physical resources critical to the technology innovation process.
F6 – Market formation Mechanisms that create niche markets or ‘protected spaces’ enabling technologies to compete against 
initially superior incumbent technologies in order to boost levels of adoption, such as favourable tax 
regimes or new industry standards.
F7 – Legitimation The act of granting legitimacy to an emerging technology by strengthening its ‘fitness’ with the 
prevailing institutional regime. TIS actors seek to achieve this by shaping existing institutions to 
galvanise support for this new technology amongst actors, for example via political lobbying. 
1 Codified knowledge means ‘reproducible, transparent, accessible knowledge documented or enshrined in blueprints, manuals, or sets of 
 instructions’ (Wilson & Grübler 2014 p.17).
Key findings
Structure and evolution of the UK wave energy 
innovation system
We consider the evolution of the UK wave energy 
innovation system in relation to four structural elements 
of a TIS: actors, institutions, networks and technology/
infrastructure.
Analysis of the wave energy actor landscape identifies a 
wealth of world-class universities, a burgeoning supply 
chain and a wide range of government, NDPB and 
other supporting organisations (e.g. test facilities, trade 
associations) offering support across the entire innovation 
chain. Importantly, we find that many important additions 
have been made to the actor landscape since 2000, such 
as the introduction of new funding bodies with a strong 
focus on mid-stage energy innovation support previously 
missing in the UK (e.g. Energy Technologies Institute 
(ETI)). The European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) was 
also established in 2003, which has played a key role in 
assisting technology demonstration, knowledge capture 
and developing industry standards. However, we also find 
that some actors have exited the sector, most notably 
OEMs and energy utilities during the early 2010s, who no 
longer viewed wave energy as an investment priority. 
Turning to institutions, we find an extremely complex 
wave energy innovation policy landscape, managed 
by numerous different funding agencies across three 
levels of government (Scotland, the UK and the EU). This 
landscape has also been fast changing, with a succession 
of new schemes emerging, each with their own eligibility 
criteria and objectives. An important change has been the 
clear shift from commercially focused, full-scale device 
RD&D programmes in the mid-2000s and early 2010s, 
some with an explicit focus on arrays (e.g. Marine Energy 
Array Demonstrator (MEAD)), to innovation programmes 
supporting early-stage development through to large-
scale prototype demonstration (e.g. Wave Energy Scotland 
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(WES)). Many of these policy changes have unfolded 
against a backdrop of ambitious, high-level energy and 
climate change commitments from government, creating 
an imperative for such action.
With respect to actor networks the research finds a long-
standing presence of scientific and industry networks 
since the early 2000s, whilst networks co-ordinating test 
facility, training and government activities were much 
slower to form. Following the formation of these networks, 
innovation system actors are much better connected than 
they were 15 years ago, offering linkages both nationally 
and internationally. Furthermore, the growth in the number 
and diversity of networks has meant that networks now 
offer excellent coverage across six key intermediary 
functions, ranging from: 1) relationship building, 2) capacity 
building, 3) knowledge transfer, 4) technology foresighting, 
5) RD&D co-ordination and 6) policy advocacy. There is, 
however, some evidence of overlapping networks (e.g. 
trade associations, centres for doctoral training (CDTs), 
signalling some duplication of resources.
Finally, turning to infrastructure, the research identifies a 
very clear progression in the capabilities of wave energy 
test facilities with the introduction of large-scale multi-
directional wave tanks (e.g. FloWaveTT), as well as part-, 
full- and array-scale open-ocean test facilities (e.g. EMEC, 
WaveHub). With regards to technology, the research finds 
that wave energy exists alongside a wide range of mature 
energy (e.g. offshore wind) and non-energy technologies 
(e.g. shipping, aviation, offshore construction), offering 
a small number of valuable opportunities for cross-
fertilisation.
UK wave energy innovation performance
The study finds that UK wave energy innovation 
performance was measurably stronger against most 
indicators in the second half of the period since 2000 (c. 
2008–2016) than the first (c. 2000–2007) both in absolute 
and relative terms but that performance has started to 
decline in recent years across some of these indicators, 
such as number of patents and level of installed capacity. 
Looking across the whole period since 2000, performance 
was strongest in terms of knowledge development (F1), 
knowledge exchange (F2) and resource mobilisation (F5) 
and weakest against entrepreneurial experimentation 
(F3) and market formation (F6), with a mixed performance 
against guidance of the search (F4) and legitimation (F7). 
The UK performed strongly in terms of knowledge 
development (F1), as an international leader in scientific 
publications and wave energy patents. Despite being a 
global leader in wave energy patents the UK did witness 
a significant decline in total patents from 2010 and a 
reduction in its share of global wave energy patents 
since 2005. The UK also performed strongly in terms of 
knowledge exchange (F2), with an increase in the average 
number of wave energy project partners, as well as an 
increase in the number of projects with partners from both 
industry and science, and from outside the wave energy 
sector, evidencing cross-fertilisation. 
The UK also performed strongly in terms of resource 
mobilisation (F5), with funding in the second half of the 
period almost four times higher than the first in real terms. 
Furthermore, the UK Government’s budget for ocean 
energy RD&D as a share for all renewables also grew 
to 31% in 2014, up from a 19% average share during the 
period. Human resources also measured strongly, with a 
large number of higher education engineering degrees, 
although half of the companies engaged in publicly funded 
wave energy projects since 2000 had fewer than 50 
employees, suggesting a large number of small companies 
working in the sector with relatively few staff and 
resources.
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The UK performed poorly in terms of market formation 
(F6) with the number of wave energy developers steadily 
falling from 30 in 2011 to 24 in 2016, with 14 developers 
filing for administration during this time, including market 
leaders Pelamis and Aquamarine Power. The other 
indicator is cumulative installed capacity, which, despite 
growing from 0.5MW in 2008 to 3.5MW in 2012, dropped 
to 1.2MW in 2016. Both indicators suggest a shrinking 
market. 
The UK also performed poorly in terms of entrepreneurial 
experimentation (F3), with a clear divergence of technology 
design rather than a convergence identified through RD&D 
grants (Figure 1) and installed capacity. There was also little 
evidence of technology maturation with the average rated 
capacity of devices falling by 56% in the second half of the 
period versus the first and wave energy’s levelised cost of 
electricity (LCOE) growing from 2009 and remaining very 
high compared to other renewables.
Figure 1: Share of RD&D funding committed to different wave energy device designs 2000–2017 (source: author)
NOTE: Funding for 2017 only for grants up to 1st June 2017. Covers both experimental development and demonstration. 
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The research found a mixed performance in terms of the 
guidance of the search (F4). The analysis identified an 
increase in the number of foresight reports in recent years, 
albeit with a shift in focus from later stage demonstration 
and commercialisation to more fundamental 
experimentation. However, in parallel, explicit government 
targets for wave energy deployment have steadily reduced 
in ambition before being removed altogether by the UK 
Government. 
Legitimation (F7) of wave energy technology also 
exhibited a mixed performance. Whilst there was a large 
number of UK government publications (e.g. white papers, 
parliamentary reports) calling for the need to support wave 
energy, there was a clear change in direction from the early 
2010s, with a removal of formal wave energy deployment 
targets and a decline in vocal support from government 
ministers. This was at odds with the UK general public’s 
support for wave and tidal energy, which averaged 74% 
since 2012, greater than the figure for onshore wind (67%) 
and equal to that for offshore wind (74%).
 
Structural drivers of and barriers to wave 
energy innovation
The study considered the structural mechanisms that have 
served to block or induce wave energy innovation in the 
UK. We categorise these drivers and barriers according to 
four structural dimensions: actors, institutions, networks 
and technology/infrastructure.
Actors
Knowledge exchange (F2) was hindered by a lack of 
knowledge codification, meaning that knowledge generated 
from RD&D projects remained tacit and was limited to 
the experiences of their staff rather than the wider sector. 
However, investments in knowledge capture schemes and a 
requirement to licence intellectual property (IP), for example 
via Scotland’s WES, have helped to address this problem. 
These efforts to learn from past experience, coupled with 
a government capacity to translate learning into policy 
actions, have led to wide-ranging structural changes to 
the UK’s wave energy innovation system, albeit mostly 
constrained to efforts led by the Scottish Government. 
The limited breadth of technical and business expertise, 
linked to the very small size of UK wave energy developers, 
has negatively impacted on their capacity for knowledge 
development (F2) and entrepreneurial experimentation (F3). 
This was exacerbated by a culture of undertaking most 
activities in-house because of a desire to build up internal 
capabilities and the view that some highly specialised 
activities could be outsourced to the wider supply chain. 
Even so, the UK wave energy supply chain was overall 
considered to be strong, underpinned by a steady supply 
of skilled personnel and centred around the formation 
of niche markets (e.g. off-grid islands, aquaculture) and 
test facilities (e.g. the EMEC). Nonetheless, intermittent 
funding and the lack of a long-term strategy were 
considered to have led to a leakage of skilled personnel 
outside the sector. Human and financial resources were 
also dramatically improved and then subsequently 
reduced by the entry and exit of market incumbents (e.g. 
energy utilities, OEMs). They had been enticed in part 
by the introduction of market–pull mechanisms but lost 
confidence in wave energy following a lack of technological 
progress against initial expectations.
Institutions
A major institutional barrier was the overwhelming 
emphasis on full-scale device demonstration, with a 
view to ‘fast tracking’ progress to commercial array-scale 
projects before the underpinning early- to mid-stage 
R&D had been performed (Figure 2). Reasons for the UK 
going ‘too big, too soon’ included public and private sector 
funds being made available to progress the technology as 
quickly as possible following developers’ highly optimistic 
claims about the promise of wave energy. The outcome 
was that developers had over-promised  in order to 
receive funds but then subsequently under-delivered, in 
turn eroding investors’ confidence in wave energy and 
reducing their willingness to invest in the technology 
(resource mobilisation (F5)), triggering the collapse of leading 
firms (e.g. Pelamis) and further undermining the sector’s 
legitimacy (F7). Underpinning these developments was a 
poor understanding of the scale of the innovation challenge 
and the associated time and funds required to overcome it, 
as well as a lack of rigorous, objective procedures to review 
the credibility of funding proposals. 
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Figure 2: UK public RD&D funding for wave energy-related projects by innovation stage since 2000 (source: author)
NOTE: Includes RD&D activity explicitly related to wave energy or cross-cutting marine energy. 
Excludes test infrastructure. RD&D grants covered up to 1st June 2017.
Another issue was that a large proportion of the UK’s 
budget for wave energy RD&D went unspent because 
developers could not meet over-ambitious funding criteria 
and/or struggled after the financial crisis to secure the 
necessary private sector match funding required to access 
these public funds. Finally, financial resources (F5) were 
channelled away from wave and towards more mature 
technologies because of wave energy RD&D grant funding 
being bundled with tidal energy and long-term revenue 
payments with other renewables such as offshore wind 
for Contracts for Difference (CfDs). To address this, an 
explicitly wave energy-focused, 100% funded, earlier 
stage innovation programme called WES was established, 
with an objective and transparent stage-gated funding 
allocation procedure. Finally, the lack of a long-term 
strategy for wave energy innovation (guidance of the search 
(F4)) was blamed on a combination of short-term public 
spending review periods and a lack of political commitment 
to foresight reports (e.g. roadmaps), due to a lack of 
consensus building and detail relating to next steps. 
Networks
Actor knowledge exchange (F2) was considered to be 
constrained by a combination of: (1) a culture of developers 
operating secretively in order to protect IP; (2) the 
UK’s decentralised model of innovation that prioritises 
competition over collaboration; and (3) a strong focus 
on device-level innovation funding, which removed the 
incentive for actors to develop common solutions to shared 
problems. Again, steps were taken to address these issues 
– for example, WES imposed a requirement on awardees 
to licence their IP, share lessons and formulate consortia in 
order to be awarded funds.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Key findings
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT 
FOR UK WAVE ENERGY INNOVATION SINCE 2000XI
Industry–science collaboration was constrained by 
fundamental differences in the working cultures and 
timeframes adopted by the two communities, as well as a 
lack of joint industry–science funding that offered a jointly 
acceptable working arrangement. The introduction of 
funding for joint science projects (e.g. WES, Energy Catalyst 
(EC)) and the establishment of CDTs offering industrial 
placements to students have helped to address these 
issues. 
International collaboration was considered to be 
undermined by a belief that the UK could tackle the 
wave energy challenge alone as a leader of wave energy, 
as well as a perceived bias towards domestic wave 
technology. However, funding schemes either demanded 
or encouraged the formation of international consortia (e.g. 
EU Horizon2020) have helped to promote international 
collaboration.
Cross-government co-ordination was generally considered 
to be weak, resulting in a poorly co-ordinated policy 
landscape encouraging resource duplication and lack of 
a clear pathway to market. Instead, numerous different 
RD&D schemes were being delivered simultaneously 
by different funding agencies at three different levels of 
government (devolved administrations, UK and EU), often 
with overlapping remits. This was in part linked to the lack 
of an effective central cross-government body responsible 
for co-ordinating wave energy or energy innovation more 
broadly, although new bodies have since been formed to 
improve levels of co-ordination (e.g. the Energy Innovation 
Board (EIB)).
Technology and infrastructure
The unique characteristics of wave energy technology 
were considered to have slowed down its innovation 
journey, most notably developers’ conservative approach 
to testing in a very hostile ocean environment and a limited 
number of weather windows for testing. Furthermore, 
whilst levels of cross-fertilisation increased following a 
concerted effort to harness lessons from other sectors 
(e.g. automotive, materials science, commercial shipping 
and defence) via programmes such as WES, overall, wave 
energy was considered to represent a fundamentally new 
technological challenge that shared relatively few overlaps 
with established technologies.
Turning to infrastructure, the UK’s wave energy test facilities 
were considered to be the best in the world. However, 
concerns were raised about the cost of accessing these 
facilities and the in-built bias of some facilities towards 
particular device designs. The biggest barrier raised was the 
lack of test facilities filling the gap between testing of very 
small-scale and full-scale devices. However, the introduction 
of state-of-the-art new generation wave tanks (e.g. 
FloWaveTT) and open-ocean part-scale ‘nursery’ test sites 
(e.g. the EMEC’s Scapa Flow) were considered to have filled 
this gap, with UK facilities now offering excellent coverage 
across the entire innovation chain (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Evolution of land-based wave tanks and open-







NOTE: Selection of facilities is for illustrative purposes and does not 
include all test tanks constructed during this period.
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 The introduction of state-of-the-art wave  
 tanks (e.g. FloWaveTT) and open-ocean  
 part-scale nursery  test sites (e.g. EMEC’s 
 Scapa Flow) were considered to have  
 addressed the need for mid-TRL test  
 facilities, with these now offering  
 excellent coverage across the entire  
 innovation chain. 
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Policy recommendations
In light of the research’s key findings, we present ten policy recommendations to help improve the effectiveness of the 
UK’s future support for wave energy innovation and help accelerate the technology’s journey towards commercialisation.
4. Improve co-ordination of UK energy innovation 
policy landscape – There are still significant 
opportunities to improve the degree of co-ordination 
of wave energy RD&D support both within and across 
different levels of government. It remains to be seen 
how effective the UK’s newly formed EIB and UKRI 
will be in co-ordinating energy RD&D investment 
at UK level. It is recommended that, to ensure co-
ordination with bodies operating at different levels of 
government, these new networks engage closely with 
both the devolved administrations (e.g. the Scottish 
Government) and the EU. Furthermore, a top-down 
body responsible for wave energy at UK level, similar 
to Scotland’s WES model, could also improve co-
ordination of wave energy RD&D.
5. Share and synthesise lessons from past and present 
wave energy innovation programmes – Outputs 
from publicly funded later stage wave energy RD&D 
projects have not traditionally been made available 
for public consumption because of issues around 
IP protection and private sector match funding. In 
contrast, the Scottish Government’s WES programme 
and the EU’s FPs require awardees to share their key 
findings via project reports, enabling the wider sector 
to learn lessons from past projects and avoid making 
the same mistakes. It is critical that this approach is 
applied across all future publicly funded wave energy 
RD&D programmes in the UK and efforts should also 
be made to capture knowledge generated from past 
public RD&D projects, expanding upon WES’s current 
knowledge capture exercise. 
2 Through Mission Innovation, 22 countries and the EU are taking action to double their public clean energy R&D investment over five years. In 
 addition, Mission Innovation members encourage collaboration among partner countries, share information and co-ordinate with businesses 
 and investors.
1. Retain access to EU innovation funding post-Brexit 
– Brexit poses a major risk to EU wave energy funding, 
accounting for 27% (£53m) of all wave energy-related 
RD&D committed since 2000, and in 2016 EU funding 
(£6.3m) was greater than that from the UK Government 
(£6m). It is essential that the UK retains access to 
EU innovation funds following Brexit negotiations, 
especially EU Framework Programmes (FPs) (i.e. 
Horizon2020). Exiting from the EU will also remove 
the UK’s primary platform for international RD&D 
collaboration, making it necessary to identify alternative 
ways to collaborate internationally to achieve the 
critical mass of resources and expertise necessary 
to commercialise wave energy, possibly via new 
international platforms such as Mission Innovation.2
2. Allow time for new UK wave energy innovation 
policy landscape to take effect – The UK wave 
energy innovation system has undergone a major 
reconfiguration over the past few years and the 
effects of this have not yet been fully felt. This new 
configuration must be given time to take effect before 
its efficacy is critiqued and decisions made to engage in 
any additional wide-scale restructuring. 
3. Develop a long-term Scottish wave energy strategy 
in a new political order – With the UK Government 
significantly reducing its support for wave energy and 
the threat of EU funds being withdrawn after Brexit, 
the Scottish Government could find itself acting alone 
in developing wave energy technology. Consequently, 
a strategy must be put in place that presents a credible 
path towards delivering a commercial wave energy device 
in Scotland that is resilient to the potential withdrawal 
of UK Government and/or EU funds. This should situate 
the development of wave energy in the context of a 
wider portfolio of energy technologies that the Scottish 
Government has identified as playing a key role in the 
future as part of its recent energy strategy (Scottish 
Government 2017c) and outline the steps required to 
integrate the various sub-components developed by the 
WES programme into a single, commercial device. 
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6. Acknowledge that support for wave energy has 
been historically low and intermittent – Since 1974, 
ocean energy has been allocated approximately 
$1.8bn3 of IEA members’ public energy RD&D 
budget versus $25bn for solar PV and $7.5bn for 
wind energy. Furthermore, funding for wave energy 
has been much more intermittent than most other 
energy technologies, split across two phases during 
the 1970s and 1980s and the 2000s and 2010s, 
increasing the likelihood of significant knowledge 
depreciation between these periods of concentrated 
investment. In this context, key policy decisions should 
be made against the backdrop that wave energy has 
not enjoyed the same level or consistency of RD&D 
support in comparison to more mature renewables 
such as wind and solar energy.
7. Avoid competition for subsidies with established 
low-carbon energy technologies – Emerging 
technologies, such as wave energy, can be out-
competed for subsidies on a cost basis when in 
direct competition with significantly more mature 
technologies. Specific examples include separating 
wave energy from the same EMR CfD allocation as 
significantly cheaper technologies such as offshore 
wind energy and avoiding wave energy becoming 
bundled into wider marine energy RD&D programmes 
where it must compete with more mature 
technologies such as tidal range and tidal stream.
8. Avoid need for private sector match funding to 
support wave energy RD&D – The need to secure 
private sector investment to be awarded public 
grants has placed intense pressure on wave energy 
developers to ‘fast track’ their innovation timeline 
and avoid knowledge exchange in a bid to protect 
their IP. Furthermore, the financial crisis and wave 
energy’s slow progress saw private sector funds 
become more difficult to secure, in turn making 
access to public funds difficult. State aid compliant 
procurement frameworks such as WES can avoid the 
need for private sector match funding, offering a 100% 
intervention rate. Opportunities should be explored to 
apply this procurement model more widely, not just 
for wave but for other energy technologies.
9. Support wave energy niche market formation – A 
shift towards demonstrating wave energy devices 
in niche markets (e.g. off-grid islands, aquaculture) 
enables developers to learn valuable lessons through 
‘learning by doing’ in both real-world ocean and 
market environments, as well as providing both 
government and investors with greater confidence 
in the technology’s prospects. When wave energy is 
ready for full-scale demonstration, funds for wave 
energy RD&D should facilitate deployment in ‘real-
world’ niche markets. However, funds should be 
awarded to developers that present an evidence-
based roadmap that outlines how their technology 
can progress beyond small-scale niche application and 
towards wide-scale deployment.
10. Enable easy access to wave energy test facilities 
– Access to the UK’s world-class test facilities has 
required developers to secure public sector funds via 
open competitions, and the corresponding levels of 
private sector match funding. This process involves 
significant time and effort, channelling developers’ 
resources away from RD&D. To ensure developers 
can quickly and easily access these facilities, a state 
aid compliant UK-wide ‘innovation voucher’ scheme 
should be established to enable ‘free at the point 
of use’ access to those that have passed through 
preliminary stage-gated phases of development 
with independently verified positive results, building 
upon lessons learnt from the Europe-wide est 
infrastructure access schemes such as FORESEA and 
MARINET.
3 Includes all forms of ocean energy, not just wave energy.
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Wider lessons to support 
energy technology innovation
We draw a number of broader lessons from the case 
of UK wave energy innovation in order to improve our 
understanding of how energy technology innovation 
unfolds and how it can best be supported. This will help 
to inform both the design of energy innovation policy and 
development of innovation theory. 
1. Innovation systems can become destabilised and 
reconfigured – Traditionally, TIS evolution has been 
considered to follow a broadly linear and positive 
development trajectory, incorporating two main 
phases: formation and growth (Bergek, Jacobsson, et al. 
2008a). The case of wave energy highlights how a TIS 
may indeed follow a non-linear and more challenging 
development path involving distinct phases such 
as: (1) disintegration, in the face of destabilising 
forces such as the failure of market leaders and the 
withdrawal of government funds; (2) reconfiguration of 
structural elements potentially in a concerted effort to 
improve the efficacy of the TIS in reaction to system 
failures; and/or (3) stagnation, where a prolonged 
period of little investment results in low levels of 
activity, possibly inducing knowledge depreciation, 
but where investment is sufficiently high to preserve 
some key aspects of the TIS (e.g. research institutes, 
test facilities).
2. Test infrastructure innovation co-evolves with 
energy technology innovation – To date, the role of 
infrastructure in the technology innovation process 
has normally been characterised as one enabling 
technology deployment – for example, via integration 
with existing electricity networks (Gallagher et 
al. 2006). However, this research identifies the 
key role test facilities play in enabling technology 
innovation. Furthermore, the research finds that test 
infrastructure is subject to a process of innovation 
similar to that of the technologies of which it enables 
testing (e.g. wave energy). Crucially, test infrastructure 
also co-evolves with the technologies it is designed to 
test. Devices are designed with test facility capabilities 
in mind, whilst test facilities are designed around the 
key characteristics of emergent device designs.
3. Technology innovation relies on policy innovation – 
The research finds that government reflected upon 
and learned lessons from the successes and failures 
of past wave energy policy, using these to inform the 
design of its current policy framework. Paramount 
to successful energy innovation policy making is the 
iterative process of policy design, experimentation, 
‘learning by doing’ and subsequent refinement based 
on lessons learnt, which represents its own discrete 
form of innovation (Petmesidou & Gonz 2015; 
Mintrom 1997). This process of policy innovation 
is reliant upon the presence of personnel with the 
capacity and appetite to develop innovative policies 
(i.e. policy entrepreneurs) (Petmesidou & Gonz 2015), 
as well as intra- and inter-organisational networks 
that enable knowledge exchange and a culture that 
rewards policy innovation rather than discouraging it. 
4. Devolution creates a complex but diverse innovation 
system – Whilst research has considered how 
innovation policy unfolds in regions subject to 
multiple layers of governance (Sotarauta & Kautonen 
2007; Kuhlmann 2001) little work has examined 
how devolution impacts upon the evolution and 
performance of an energy innovation system. The 
case of wave energy is inextricably linked with 
devolution in the UK both upwards to the EU and 
downwards to devolved administrations such as the 
Scottish Government. On the one hand, devolution 
has led to a complex, multi-level energy innovation 
governance framework that has created difficulties 
in terms of co-ordination and policy landscape 
navigation. On the other, it has created diversity, 
meaning that the UK Government’s move away from 
wave energy has not entirely dictated the fortunes of 
wave energy, with support continuing to flow from the 
EU and Scottish Government. Furthermore, Scottish 
Government, the smallest and most agile of the three 
governments, demonstrated the strongest ability to 
learn from past policy performance and translate this 
into action.
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5. Innovation relies on the capture and codification 
of tacit knowledge – The case of wave energy 
identifies that, too often, tacit knowledge (i.e. ‘know-
how’) was lost when companies ceased trading, 
personnel moved on or knowledge was stockpiled 
due to confidentiality issues. Successful technology 
innovation relies on tacit knowledge being codified 
and, wherever possible, shared. However, it should 
be acknowledged that some tacit knowledge cannot 
easily be codified, making it difficult to transfer or 
‘sticky’ (Hippel 1994; Brodbeck & Polanyi 1960). 
Finally, codification can help protect against 
knowledge depreciation during periods of relatively 
low RD&D funding (Wilson & Grübler 2014), as was 
the case for UK wave energy during the 1980s and 
1990s.
6. Competition and collaboration must be balanced 
according to stage of innovation – The case of wave 
energy supports the need for a balance between 
competition and collaboration or closed and open 
innovation (Chesbrough 2003). It points to the need 
for a stronger emphasis on collaboration during 
the earlier TRLs to ensure technology developers 
do not operate in isolation but instead benefit from 
knowledge sharing and the pooling of human and 
financial resources. As the technology moves closer 
to market, the emphasis may gradually shift towards 
competition in a bid to encourage convergence 
around a single optimal device design. Even so, it 
is important that areas for collaboration are clearly 
demarcated and built on sectoral consensus, 
with suitable platforms put in place to facilitate 
collaboration (e.g. JIPs). 
7. Regional innovation clusters offer a locus for market 
formation – A growing body of literature points 
to the importance of ‘regional innovation clusters’, 
which constitute a geographical concentration of 
key structural elements underpinning innovation 
(e.g. actors, institutions, networks, infrastructure), 
facilitating key innovation functions such as 
knowledge exchange and market formation (Muro 
& Katz 2010). The wave energy case study supports 
this view in the examples of the EMEC and the 
University of Edinburgh, which have formed centres of 
excellence with their own entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Consideration must therefore be given to where 
and how regional energy innovation clusters will be 
established and opportunities to build these around 
test facilities, which already see a high concentration 
of actors, resources and infrastructure (e.g. grid 
connection).
8. Protected spaces help to shield emerging 
technologies from competition against mature 
technologies – To avoid emerging technologies 
becoming ‘crowded out’, it is essential that they are 
not in direct competition with more established 
technologies for the same RD&D funding. This finding 
supports the view outlined in the socio-technical 
transitions and strategic niche management literature 
that emerging technologies should be protected by 
the formation of ‘sheltered spaces’ such as niche 
markets (Schot & Geels 2008), enabling gradual 
technological maturation through ‘learning by 
doing’ and ‘learning by using’, as well as improving 
stakeholders’ confidence in the technology via 
successful real-world deployment.
9. Characteristics of technology influence its 
innovation journey – The case of wave energy 
points to the unique technical challenges it has 
faced, such as the need to test in a very hostile 
ocean environment and the lack of synergies 
with established technologies. It is critical that, 
when comparing the progress of different energy 
technologies, their respective characteristics are 
acknowledged because these will shape the pace and 
nature of their development trajectory. This echoes 
research by Nemet (2014) who identified how smaller, 
modular energy technologies (e.g. solar PV) tended 
to benefit from a faster rate of learning versus large, 
site-assembled technologies (e.g. nuclear) because 
they underwent a much larger number of iterations 
due to their lower costs and build times.
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Recommendations 
for future research
Looking forward and focusing specifically on research 
relating to strategies for wave and marine energy 
innovation, the report identifies the need for: 
1. a continued mixed-method assessment to monitor how 
structural changes are impacting upon the UK’s wave 
energy innovation performance over a long-term period;
2. firm-level case studies of wave energy developers’ 
experiences to offer a detailed understanding of their 
innovation journey and interaction with the wider 
innovation system; 
3. a similar study that focuses on tidal stream innovation 
to offer insights into the challenges facing a technology 
closer to commercialisation; and 
4. an international cross-country comparison of wave 
or marine energy innovation system performance, 
with follow-on case study research to examine the 
underlying factors responsible for some countries 
performing better or worse than others.
Turning to energy technology innovation studies more 
broadly, the report identifies the need for a systematic 
mixed-method comparison of different energy technology 
case studies across different countries to identify best-
practice innovation strategies. This assessment could 
include a cost–benefit analysis of innovation policy 
frameworks, comparing innovation inputs (e.g. RD&D 
investment) and outputs (e.g. levelised cost of electricity, 
unit cost and installed capacity) and/or outcomes (e.g. CO2 
emission reduction, job creation). This could help to identify 
the countries with best-practice innovation strategies and 
present a focus for more detailed case study research. Any 
such analysis should account for both public and private 
RD&D investment.
Pelamis machine installed at the Agucadoura Wave Park (Source: Wikipedia)
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Wave energy has long been identified as a potentially 
significant contributor to the UK’s electricity supply 
mix. It has been estimated that wave energy in UK 
waters could provide up to 70 TWh/annum of electricity 
generation4 (AMEC & Carbon Trust 2012), equivalent to 
approximately 21% of the UK’s electricity supply in 2015 
(BEIS 2016b). 
As a low-carbon energy source, wave energy has the 
potential to help the UK meet its 2050 target of reducing 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 80% against its 1990 
baseline. Furthermore, as a domestic natural resource, 
wave energy can help deliver on other government 
objectives such as improving energy security by replacing 
imported fossil fuels (e.g. gas, coal) and promoting 
economic growth through the birth of a new home-grown 
industry. 
To capture this prize, the UK has invested heavily in wave 
energy RD&D, but despite this significant investment, 
wave energy technology has yet to become commercially 
viable. Whilst this may in part be attributed to the 
scale of the associated engineering challenge and the 
viability of the technology, questions remain about 
whether this slow progress could also be attributed to 
government and industry’s strategy to accelerate wave 
energy technology innovation in the UK. This report 
therefore examines how well the UK has performed in 
accelerating wave energy technology since 2000 and 
the socio-technical factors responsible for supporting 
or undermining wave energy innovation, not least 
government policy. 
1.1 Rationale
The report’s findings are aimed primarily at government 
and industry in a bid to help improve the effectiveness of 
UK public wave energy innovation support and accelerate 
the technology’s journey towards commercialisation. 
Importantly, lessons are drawn from the case study to 
help inform the design and improve the efficacy of energy 
innovation policy more broadly. It is hoped these lessons 
will help shape the UK’s low-carbon energy innovation 
strategy and help it meet its Paris Agreement commitment 
to limit global temperature rise this century well below 2oC 
above pre-industrial levels.
The report also makes an important contribution to the 
extant literature on the structure, performance, drivers 
and barriers of wave energy innovation. Whilst a wealth of 
research has already examined the structure, performance, 
drivers and barriers of wave energy innovation, both in the 
UK (Winskel et al. 2006; Jeffrey et al. 2013; A. Vantoch-
Wood 2012) and other countries (Corsatea & Magagna 
2014; Magagna et al. 2016; Andersson et al. 2017), the 
extant research poses a number of limitations that this 
report seeks to address. 
First, only a handful of studies have employed a 
systematic analysis of wave energy technology innovation 
performance that considers a broad spectrum of causal 
factors and how these inter-relate (Corsatea & Magagna 
2014; A. Vantoch-Wood 2012; Andersson et al. 2017). 
Furthermore, very few of these systematic studies have 
focused specifically on the UK and those that have were 
conducted some years ago, thus failing to take into account 
the major changes the sector has recently undergone (see 
A. Vantoch-Wood 2012). 
Second, studies of wave energy technology innovation 
tend to be bundled together as part of a broader focus 
on marine energy innovation. However, wave energy 
presents a characteristically distinct technology when 
compared to other marine technologies (e.g. tidal stream, 
tidal range), most of which are also at very different stages 
of development (Mofor et al. 2014), thus demanding that 
research focuses exclusively on wave energy technology.
4 Takes into account practical constraints such as the: capability of existing wave energy technologies, needs of other sea users 
 (e.g. shipping, fishing) and need to mitigate environmental impact (AMEC & Carbon Trust 2012).
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Third, with the exception of Vantoch-Wood (2012) and 
Andersson et al. (2017), most marine energy innovation 
studies have employed either a predominantly qualitative 
or quantitative approach to analysis, rather than a mixed-
methods approach and the balanced assessment this 
provides.
Finally, whilst various excellent historical accounts of 
wave energy innovation exist (Ross 2002; Ross 1996; 
Wilson 2012), analyses of UK wave energy innovation 
performance and policy support tend to provide snapshots 
of particular moments in time rather than a longer term 
view of how innovation systems have evolved over 
time and how this evolution has shaped innovation 
performance. 
1.2 Research questions
In this context, this report provides an up-to-date 
systematic mixed-method analysis of how the UK wave 
energy innovation system’s structure and performance 
have evolved and the underlying factors responsible. This 
report examines the period since 2000 as this corresponds 
with a renaissance in UK support for wave energy 
technology innovation, following a cessation of intense 
government support dating back to the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. The study employs a Technology Innovation 
System (TIS) approach, analysing both qualitative and 
quantitative data to address the following questions:
1. How is the UK’s wave energy innovation system 
structured and how has it evolved?
2. How well has the UK’s wave energy innovation 
system performed and how has its performance 
changed over time?
3. Which factors have supported and undermined wave 
energy innovation in the UK?
4. What actions could be taken by the UK to accelerate 
wave energy innovation in the future?
5. What lessons can we learn from the case of UK wave 
energy innovation to help support innovation of other 
energy technologies? 
It is important to note that the research focuses explicitly 
on the effectiveness of the UK’s wave energy innovation 
strategy, examining in particular how government policy 
successes and failures have influenced wave energy’s path 
towards commercialisation. Consideration of the technical 
feasibility of wave energy technology and whether it 
should represent a priority for future innovation funding sit 
outside the remit of this report.
1.3 Structure of this report
This report is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a 
literature review of the fundamentals and drivers of wave 
energy technology innovation. Section 3 presents the 
research’s analytical framework and research strategy, 
introducing some core concepts of the TIS literature. 
Section 4 outlines the research’s data collection. Section 
5 maps the structure of the UK’s wave energy innovation 
system and how this has evolved since 2000. Section 
6 presents an analysis of the performance of the UK’s 
wave energy innovation system. Section 7 examines the 
factors responsible for supporting or undermining wave 
energy technology innovation in the UK. Finally, Section 
8 discusses the report’s key findings and identifies policy 
recommendations to accelerate wave energy innovation 
in the future, as well as lessons for supporting energy 
technology innovation more broadly.
SECTION 1 
Introduction
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT 




drivers of wave 
energy technology 
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2.1 Fundamentals of wave energy technology
Waves are generated when the wind blows over the ocean’s 
surface, itself a function of temperature and pressure 
differentials caused by the distribution of solar energy 
(Barstow et al. 2008). Wave energy carries both kinetic and 
gravitational potential energy, the level of which is a function 
of both the height and period of the wave (Barstow et al. 
2008). Importantly, sea waves offer the highest energy 
density of all renewable energy sources (Clément et al. 2002). 
For example, the intensity of solar energy intensity is typically 
between 0.1–0.3kW/m2  when incident on a horizontal 
surface. In comparison wave power offers an ‘average power 
flow intensity of 2–3kW/m2 of a vertical plane perpendicular 
to the direction of wave propagation just below the water 
surface (Falnes 2007)’ (Drew et al. 2009 p.887). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
estimates that the global theoretical wave energy potential 
is 32PWh per annum, roughly twice the global electricity 
supply of 2008 (17PWh per annum) (Lewis et al. 2011; 
Mørk et al. 2010). This estimate of total theoretical wave 
energy potential is, however, unconstrained by economic 
and geographical factors or the availability of wave energy 
technology. 
The UK’s mid-latitude location within the Atlantic Ocean 
means that the country is excellently placed to capture this 
resource, with a total theoretical wave energy potential of 230 
TWh per annum for electricity generation (AMEC & Carbon 
Trust 2012). However, when accounting for the capability 
of existing wave energy technologies, the needs of other 
sea users (e.g. shipping, fishing) and the need to mitigate 
environmental impact, this estimate falls to 70TWh per 
annum. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the UK’s wave 
energy resources, emphasising the high levels of wave energy 
incident on the North West coast of Scotland and to a lesser 
extent, the South West cost of England (Aquaret 2012).
Figure 1: Offshore and nearshore practical resource distribution (Source: www.aquaret.com)
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Harnessing the power of the waves requires the 
deployment of a wave energy convertor (WEC) capable 
of converting kinetic and gravitational potential energy 
into electricity. A host of challenges are associated with 
achieving this aim, as highlighted by Drew et al. (2009):
 n Conversion of a slow (∼0.1Hz), random and high-force 
oscillatory motion into a useful motion capable of 
driving a generator can be a problem. For example, 
heaving and nodding type devices are not directly 
compatible with conventional rotary electrical 
machines and so a transmission system is required. 
 n As waves vary in height and period, their respective 
power levels vary accordingly. This variable input must 
be converted into a smooth electrical output for grid-
connected power generation, meaning that an array 
of devices or some form of energy storage system are 
often necessary.
 n Ocean environments are characterised by multi-
directional waves, meaning that devices must be able 
to generate electricity from waves coming from a 
variety of directions.
 n Whilst power production generally takes place in 
relatively benign conditions, devices must be able to 
cope with rare but highly damaging waves generated 
during extreme ocean conditions, incurring additional 
costs in terms of engineering design and manufacture 
(Leijon et al. 2006).
 n Devices must be capable of withstanding a highly 
corrosive ocean environment which marine vessels 
and structures have to contend.
Wave energy convertors typically incorporate six sub-
components integrated within a single device to convert 
ocean waves into electricity. These sub-components are as 
follows (LCICG 2012):
n Power Take Off (PTO): Technology that converts 
kinetic energy into electricity. It can be converted 
directly to electricity via a rotary or linear electric 
generator or a hydraulic system.
n Structure and prime mover: The fluid mechanical 
process by which the device captures energy from the 
ocean, through oscillation or rotation.
n Control: Systems and software to safeguard the 
device and optimise its performance under a range of 
operating conditions. 
n Foundations and moorings: The manner in which 
the device is held in place, typically a moored, floating 
structure (moorings can be flexible or rigid) or a 
seabed structure (e.g. gravity-based or foundations).
n Installation: The process by which the device is 
installed, influenced by the device location and station 
keeping method.
n Connection: The method by which energy is 
transferred to shore. This can be an electrical 
connection – high voltage alternating or direct current 
– or, in some cases, a hydraulic connection.
Wave energy is available at varying ocean depths, meaning 
that WECs are deployed in three characteristically distinct 
ocean environments: onshore, nearshore and offshore. 
Onshore devices tend to be integrated into a natural rock 
face or man-made breakwater (SI Ocean 2012). These 
have the advantage of being close to the utility network 
and relatively easy to maintain. They are less likely to be 
damaged because wave energy is lost because of friction 
with the seabed, although this also reduces the potential 
resource for capture (SI Ocean 2012; Drew et al. 2009).
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Nearshore devices are located in water shallow enough to 
allow them to be fixed to the seabed either via pinned pile 
foundations or gravity mass (SI Ocean 2012) and typically 
where waves start breaking. This in turn provides ‘a 
suitable stationary base against which an oscillating body 
can work’ (Drew et al. 2009 p.888). Disadvantages of these 
devices are similar to those of shoreline devices.
Offshore devices are located in water tens of metres deep 
and tethered to the seabed using tight or slack moorings 
mass (Drew et al. 2009; SI Ocean 2012). They are a 
much greater potential energy resource than onshore 
or nearshore devices but are more difficult to construct, 
operate and maintain and must be designed to survive 
more extreme conditions (Drew et al. 2009). 
Figure 2 and Table 1 present the eight most common wave 
energy device designs and the ocean environments they 
are typically deployed in.
Figure 2: Schematic of typical wave energy devices (adapted from www.aquaret.com)
Note: A – Oscillating water column (OWC); B – Over-topping device or terminator WEC; 
C – Oscillating wave surge convertor; D – Point absorber; E – Submerged pressure differential device; 
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Table 1: Typical wave energy convertors (Magagna & Uihlein 2015; EMEC 2016f)




These use the oscillatory motion of a mass of water induced by a wave in a 
chamber to compress air to drive an air turbine. The water column acts as a piston 
on the air volume, pushing it through the turbine as the waves increase the water 
level in the chamber, drawing it as the water level decreases. OWCs are commonly 




Waves breaking on a ramp are collected in a reservoir above the free water surface. 
This then flows through a low-head hydraulic turbine. Commonly applied to 
onshore environments but also deployed offshore.
Nearshore Oscillating wave surge converters
These devices exploit the surging motion of nearshore waves to induce the 
oscillatory motion of a flap in a horizontal direction. They are often bottom-
mounted devices with floating devices also under development.
Offshore
Point absorber
Point absorbers are normally heaving/pitching devices that exploit the relative 
motion between an oscillating body and a fixed structure or component. They can 





These devices are fully submerged devices, exploiting the hydro-dynamic pressure 
induced by waves to force an upward motion of the device, which then returns to its 
starting position once the pressure differential is reduced.
Attenuator
These generate an oscillatory motion between adjacent structural components, 
which activates the PTO, either by pumping high-pressure fluids through a 
hydraulic motor or by operating a direct-drive generator. Attenuators are designed 
to operate offshore, and are commonly surface floating.
Bulge wave 
These use wave-induced pressure to generate a bulge wave within a flexible tube. 
As the bulge wave travels within the device it increases in size and speed. The 
kinetic energy of the bulge is used to drive a turbine at the end of the tube.
Rotating mass 
converters
These exploit the relative motion of waves to induce pitching and rolling in a 
floating body, thus forcing the rotation of an eccentric mass contained within the 
device. As the mass rotates it drives an electrical generator.
Other These include novel wave energy devices currently under development and not fitting any of the above categories.
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2.2 Drivers of wave energy technology 
innovation
With the basic principles of wave energy technology and 
some of the associated innovation challenges identified in 
Section 2.1, this sub-section explores some of the factors 
considered to be most critical to supporting successful 
innovation of wave energy technology. We outline these 
factors in relation to four categories that form the basis 
of this research’s TIS analytical framework (see Section 3): 
actors, institutions, networks and infrastructure/technology.
Actor-related factors include the importance of incumbent 
market actors positively engaging in the wave energy 
process, providing valuable knowledge, capabilities 
and financial resources to support wave energy RD&D 
(Andersson et al. 2017). Another issue is ensuring that 
small start-up companies, which typically drive the initial 
growth of nascent industries, possess the technical and 
managerial resources necessary to deliver successful 
large-scale and complex technology RD&D projects such 
as wave energy (RAB 2008).
Institutional factors typically focus around government 
policy. The first to be discussed is the importance of a 
long-term consistent funding regime that avoids ‘boom 
and bust’ cycles and can induce company failures during 
periods of limited funds but, during periods of abundant 
funding, can pressurise developers to spend funds 
quickly whilst still available (Vantoch-Wood 2012). Clear 
government visions, strategies or roadmaps for wave 
energy are considered critical to underpinning such 
long-term strategy (Andersson et al. 2017). Second is 
the importance of demand–pull mechanisms such as 
long-term subsidy revenue payments enticing actors to 
engage with wave energy technology demonstration and 
stimulated market formation (Corsatea 2014; Allan et al. 
2011; Jeffrey et al. 2014; Andersson et al. 2017). Third is 
the need to avoid the premature commitment of funds to 
later stage innovation, such as array-scale demonstration, 
before sufficient earlier stage investment has been 
made (RAB 2008; Jeffrey et al. 2014; Jeffrey et al. 2013; 
Mclachlan 2010; HoCECCC 2012). 
Finally, it is necessary to strike a balance between 
technology device design convergence and divergence. 
On the one hand this means avoiding narrowing down 
the number of device designs or ‘picking winners’ 
prematurely because this can ‘lock in’ sub-optimal designs 
before rival designs have been given the opportunity 
to demonstrate their potential (Vantoch-Wood 2012). 
On the other it involves ensuring that the number of 
funded device designs is steadily reduced to ensure that 
RD&D investment is not split across numerous designs 
indefinitely as this can dilute the impact of this RD&D 
funding and the pace with which the technology matures 
(RAB 2008; SI Ocean 2012; Magagna & Uihlein 2015).
Network-related factors include the importance of inter-
actor collaboration and knowledge exchange to share 
lessons learnt and best practice (Winskel 2007; LCICG 
2012; Foxon et al. 2005; Mclachlan 2010; Andersson et 
al. 2017; RAB 2008). Emphasis is placed on international 
(Corsatea 2014; Vantoch-Wood & Connor 2013) and 
industry–science collaboration (Winskel 2007). Another 
key factor is the importance of a well-co-ordinated 
policy framework that avoids numerous, over-lapping 
autonomous institutions simultaneously delivering similar 
funding programmes potentially inducing a duplication of 
effort (Jeffrey et al. 2014; HoCECCC 2012; Vantoch-Wood 
2012; Mclachlan 2010; Andersson et al. 2017). 
Infrastructure- and technology-related factors include the 
importance of world-class test infrastructure, enabling 
frequent experimentation and demonstration of marine 
energy technology in different environments (Jeffrey et al. 
2014; Mclachlan 2010; Corsatea 2014; Andersson et al. 
2017)
In the summary sections for each of the results chapters 
we compare and contrast this report’s findings with the 
extant literature to consider how they support or contradict 
previous research, and also highlighting the novelty of the 
research.
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Having reviewed the fundamentals and key drivers of 
wave energy technology, we now turn to the analytical 
framework of this report to assess the effectiveness of 
the UK’s wave energy innovation support strategy. 
This study mobilises Technology Innovation System (TIS) 
theory to map the evolution of the UK’s wave energy 
innovation system, measure its performance and identify 
the factors responsible for shaping its performance. A 
TIS can be defined as ‘a network or networks of agents 
interacting in a specific technology area under a particular 
institutional infrastructure to generate, diffuse, and utilise 
technology’ (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991 p.94). It is 
composed of a variety of core elements, namely actors, 
institutions, networks and technology/infrastructure, 
to perform a host of different functions such as the 
development of knowledge or the mobilisation of resources 
that help to support the development and deployment 
of new technology (Jacobsson & Bergek 2011; Bergek, 
Jacobsson, et al. 2008b; Jacobsson & Karltorp 2013; Hekkert 
et al. 2011; Wieczorek & Hekkert 2012; Suurs 2009). In line 
with previous TIS studies (Bergek, Jacobsson, et al. 2008b; 
Oltander, G., Perez Vico 2005; Wieczorek & Hekkert 2012; 
Hekkert et al. 2011), this study follows five sequential 
analytical steps (Figure 3), each corresponding to one of the 
five research questions outlined in Section 1.1. 
Figure 3: Analytical framework to assess effectiveness of UK’s wave energy innovation system (source: author)
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3.1 Step 1 – mapping the structure and 
evolution of the TIS
The first step involves mapping the structure of the UK’s 
wave energy innovation system to understand how it 
works and how its structure has evolved over time. To 
do this, we assess its structure according to the four 
key structural dimensions of a TIS system (i.e. actors, 
networks, institutions and technology/infrastructure), 
defined as follows:
 n Actors – the organisations responsible for developing, 
diffusing and implementing new technologies, most 
commonly knowledge and education institutes 
(e.g. universities), industry and market actors (e.g. 
technology developers, suppliers, customers), 
government and non-departmental public bodies5 
(NDPBs) (e.g. policy makers, funders) and supporting 
organisations (e.g. venture capitalists, trade 
associations).
 n Institutions – the ‘rules of the game’ that characterise 
actors’ behaviour, expectations and values (North 
1990). These include formal institutions (e.g. 
regulations, laws) and informal institutions (e.g. 
routines, expectations).
 n Networks – these connect actors and shape their 
activities through, for example, co-ordination and 
knowledge exchange. They typically centre upon 
scientific, industrial or governmental actors, or a 
combination of these.
 n Technology and infrastructure – the technological 
systems and infrastructural networks that facilitate 
technology innovation. These commonly include 
test facilities, complementary technologies and 
distribution/transmission networks.
In line with Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012), mapping the 
structure of the TIS helps to identify the presence and 
characteristics of key structural components before 
determining their capacity to stimulate innovation 
(see Step 3 in Section 3.3). This study grants particular 
attention to how the TIS structure has evolved over time, 
highlighting how important structural components have 
emerged or disappeared, as well as how their capacity to 
facilitate innovation has changed. To map the sector, data 
is drawn from expert interviews (Section 4.1.1) and a desk-
based survey, utilising publicly available documentation. 
3.2 Step 2 – measuring performance of 
TIS functions
This step measures how well the UK wave energy TIS is 
performing in terms of developing and deploying wave 
energy technology. Performance is compared against 
seven TIS functions over the period 2000 to 2017, with 
each TIS function defined as a specific interaction between 
the different structural components of the TIS system 
that, in turn, deliver outcomes with a positive bearing on 
the development, deployment and adoption of emerging 
technology (Edquist 2001; A. Johnson & Jacobsson 2000; 
Hekkert & Negro 2009). Assessment of TIS function 
performance therefore helps to identify weaknesses 
or ‘bottlenecks’ potentially undermining wave energy 
innovation (Smits & Kuhlmann 2004; Markard & Truffer 
2008). In essence, if a TIS’s functions are all performing 
strongly then, assuming basic viability of the technology, 
it should steadily progress towards commercialisation. 
However, should one or more functions perform poorly, 
the technology could fail to reach maturity (Edquist 2001; 
A. Johnson & Jacobsson 2000; Hekkert & Negro 2009). 
The seven TIS functions this study employs are outlined in 
Table 2.
5 A body with a role in the processes of national government, but not a government department or part of one, accordingly operating to a greater 
 or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers (UK Government 2016)
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Table 2: Description of TIS functions (source: see below)
TIS Function Description
F1 – Knowledge 
development
The creation of technological variety achieved by a broadening and deepening of a codified 
knowledge6 base via research and development (R&D).
F2 – Knowledge 
exchange Exchange of information between actors facilitated by inter-actor networks. 
F3 – Entrepreneurial 
experimentation
Entrepreneurs recognise the latent value proposition of emergent technologies and 
seek to realise this potential via commercial experiments. These experiments generate 
tacit knowledge that in turn helps to reduce the degree of uncertainty associated with a 
technology, either through success or failure.
F4 – Guidance of the 
search
Pressures that encourage actors to enter a technological field and subsequently guide 
the stage and focus of innovation activities they undertake, such as policy targets and 
technology roadmaps. 
F5 – Resource 
mobilisation
Mobilisation of financial, human and physical resources critical to the technology 
innovation process.
F6 – Market formation
Mechanisms that create niche markets or ‘protected spaces’ enabling technologies to 
compete against initially superior incumbent technologies in order to boost levels of 
adoption, such as favourable tax regimes or new industry standards.
F7 – Legitimation
The act of granting legitimacy to an emerging technology by strengthening its ‘fitness’ 
with the prevailing institutional regime. TIS actors seek to achieve this by shaping existing 
institutions to galvanise support for this new technology amongst actors, for example via 
political lobbying. 
Adapted from (Hekkert et al. 2007; Hekkert & Negro 2009; Bergek, Jacobsson, et al. 2008b; Suurs & Hekkert 2009; Kemp 
et al. 1998; Jacobsson & Bergek 2011; Jacobsson & Karltorp 2013; Bento & Wilson 2016)
To assess the performance of these functions, we examine 22 indicators, each of which are coupled with a specific TIS 
function (Table 3). The selection of indicators is informed by a literature review of TIS function indicator frameworks 
(Bento & Wilson 2016; Hillman et al. 2011; Hu et al. 2017), as well as the constraints imposed by the availability of data 
and the appropriateness of these measures for our case study of wave energy. All 22 indicators assess absolute changes 
in performance, i.e. the actual difference in the indicator over a period of time. However, where possible, the research also 
considers how the UK’s wave energy innovation performance has changed in relative terms. Consequently, measures of 
relative performance are taken for 11 indicators, typically as a share of overall output at national or international level, 
such as the UK’s share of global wave energy patents or scientific publications. Where such comparisons are not possible, 
wave energy is benchmarked against the progress of other renewable electricity generation technologies – for example, 
changes in the level of installed capacity versus tidal stream.
6 ‘Codified knowledge means reproducible, transparent, accessible knowledge documented or enshrined in blueprints, manuals, or sets of 
 instructions’ (Wilson & Grübler 2014 p.17)
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Table 3 outlines the selected indicators for this study, alongside the TIS functions they aim to measure, the time period 
covered and qualitative and/or quantitative sources of data, which are described in more detail in Section 4.
Table 3: Quantitative indicator framework for measuring wave energy innovation performance against TIS functions
TIS function Sub-theme Time period Absolute indicator Relative indicator Data source
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NOTE: Adapted from (Bento & Wilson 2016; Hillman et al. 2011; Hu et al. 2017). 1 Technology Readiness Level (TRL)
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3.3 Step 3 – structure–function analysis 
of innovation inducement and blocking 
mechanisms
Step 3 seeks to link the structure of the UK wave 
energy innovation system (Step 1 – Section 3.1) with its 
performance across different functions (Step 2 – Section 
3.2) to help us understand how the system’s structure has 
supported or undermined innovation performance. This 
follows the logic that unfulfilled system functions are a 
manifestation of structural problems within the TIS (Hekkert 
et al. 2011), associated with the presence and/or quality of 
structural elements (Wieczorek & Hekkert 2012) known as 
inducement or blocking mechanisms (Jacobsson & Karltorp 
2013; Bergek, Hekkert, et al. 2008; Patana et al. 2013). 
This report synthesises these approaches to employ a 
three-tiered approach to diagnose of the factors responsible 
for shaping the performance of the UK’s wave energy 
innovation system and the process is replicated for each 
of the four structural dimensions (actors, institutions, 
networks and technology). First, inducement and blocking 
mechanisms are identified that have served to support or 
undermine wave energy technology innovation. Second, 
these mechanisms are associated with a specific structural 
element identified through the data as having an important 
bearing on the innovation process. The traffic light colour 
coding indicates the overall impact of the structural element 
on the TIS functions. Third, these structural elements 
are linked to specific TIS functions that they have either 
supported or undermined, as indicated by arrows. 
A worked example is provided for the structural dimension 
of networks and is presented in Figure 4, which forms the 
basis of the summary diagrams presented in Section 7. 
Firstly, a requirement from government for all publicly 
funded RD&D projects to include multiple partners is 
identified as an inducement mechanism. Secondly, this 
mechanism helps to build networks, a key structural 
element necessary for inter-actor collaboration. Thirdly, this 
in turn facilitates knowledge exchange (F2) between actors, 
helping them to pool their human and financial resources (F5). 
In contrast, a related blocking mechanism might be the lack 
of a requirement for actors to share lessons generated from 
publicly funded RD&D projects, potentially undermining the 
degree of interaction and exchange between actors and, 
consequently, reducing the degree of knowledge exchange 
(F2) and failing to inform the guidance of the search (F4) for 
future projects . On balance, these two mechanisms result 
in inter-actor collaboration having a mixed impact on TIS 
functions, meaning that it is shaded yellow rather than 
green (positive) or red (negative).
Figure 4: Worked example of TIS structure–function analysis (source: author)
F1 – Knowledge development
F2 – Knowledge exchange 
F3 – Entrepreneurial 
experimentation
F4 – Guidance of the search
Lack of RD&D funding requirement for 
actors to share lessons generated via 
projects
RD&D funding only awarded to multi-
actor consortia
Inter-actor collaboration
F5 – Resource mobilisation
F6 - Market Formation
F7 – Legitimation
Blocking and inducement 
mechanisms
Structural element TIS Function
–
+
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3.4 Contribution to wider TIS literature
We briefly acknowledge some of the common criticisms 
levelled at the TIS functions approach as a tool for analysis 
of TIS performance and the ways in which this research 
aims to address these.
First, most TIS case studies tend to rely on ex-post 
qualitative analysis of innovation system performance, 
omitting the use of quantitative metrics to corroborate 
qualitative data (Gazis 2015; Jacobsson & Bergek 2011; 
Winskel et al. 2014; Grübler & Wilson 2014; Grübler et 
al. 2012). This research thus employs a mixed-methods 
approach, using a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative data to enable data triangulation and in turn 
more robust results (Section 3.4).
Second, TIS studies have been criticised for failing 
to fully capture the evolution of a TIS throughout its 
lifetime, instead providing a snapshot of its structure and 
performance for a given moment in time (Gazis 2015; 
Bergek, Jacobsson, et al. 2008b; Winskel et al. 2014). 
Consequently, a need for research that explores the 
temporal dimension and history of energy technology 
innovations (Wilson & Grübler 2014), especially the 
importance of the timing and sequence of events. Such 
analysis can offer a more comprehensive understanding 
of the evolution of TISs that goes beyond the commonly 
identified phases of formation, growth and stability 
(Gazis 2015; Bergek, Jacobsson, et al. 2008b; Winskel et 
al. 2014), exploring variations of this pattern that might 
involve alternative stages such as disruption, decline and 
reconfiguration. This study consequently grants particular 
attention to the chronology of events and how this has 
influenced changes to TIS structure and performance. 
Third, the TIS framework has been criticised for failing to 
acknowledge the influence of exogenous factors on the 
success or failure of a technological innovation (Smith & 
Raven 2012; Markard et al. 2015). As Bergek et al. (2015), 
explain, the ‘structures and processes inside a focal TIS 
are generally well conceptualized in the literature … [but] 
what happens outside and across the system boundary 
has been less systematically worked out’ (Bergek et al. 
2015 p.53). In response to this criticism, this study is 
sensitive to factors strictly outside the UK’s wave energy 
technology innovation system, such as the influence 
of other technologies (e.g. tidal stream, offshore wind) 
and high-level policy developments (e.g. climate change 
agreements).
Finally, TIS studies of energy technologies have been 
criticised for focusing predominantly on success stories 
rather than technology failures or those that have 
been slow to commercialise (Grübler & Wilson 2014). 
Consequently, our case study of wave energy, which has 
struggled to reach commercialisation, offers valuable 
insight into the types of barriers that could slow the 
progress of energy technology innovation.
In summary, this research makes an important contribution 
to state-of-the-art technology innovation studies, 
presenting an energy technology innovation case study 
that: 
1. utilises a mixed-methods approach; 
2. pays special attention to the sequence of historical 
developments over a long-term period; 
3. is sensitive to wider landscape developments; and 
4. examines a technology that has not yet reached 
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This section outlines the data collection methods that 
mobilise the analytical framework presented in Section 
3, split between both qualitative (Section 4.1) and 
quantitative (Section 4.2) methods.
4.1  Qualitative methods
4.1.1  Industry expert interviews
In total, 33 interviews were conducted between March 
and October 2015 with a wide range of experts across the 
UK wave energy sector, including technology developers, 
consultants, test facility directors, government policy 
makers, senior researchers and trade association 
representatives. A full list of the interviews and their 
dates is provided in Appendix A. The interviews took a 
semi-structured approach, covering the factors shaping 
the structure, performance and evolution of the UK wave 
energy innovation system. They were fully transcribed and 
thematically analysed using the software NVivo. 
4.1.2 Documentary analysis
Expert interviews and quantitative indicators were 
complemented with documentary evidence sourced 
via web searches such as official government policy, 
parliamentary committee reports, technology roadmaps 
and technology needs assessments. These are fully 
referenced wherever they are used as evidence.
4.2  Quantitative methods
4.2.1  UK marine energy RD&D public grant  
 database
To offer a comparison of RD&D funding for wave energy 
against tidal stream, a database of 444 marine energy 
RD&D public grants covering 327 organisations operating 
in the UK between 2000 and 2017 was constructed, 
with awarded grants covered up to 1st June 2017. Data 
was drawn primarily from a combination of existing 
databases including the RCUK Gateway to Research (RCUK 
& InnovateUK 2017), UKERC data centre (UKERC 2017a) 
and EPSRC Grants on the Web (EPSRC 2017). Additional 
UK grant data was sourced from funding agency websites, 
such as Wave Energy Scotland (WES 2017b), InnovateUK 
(InnovateUK 2017), Welsh European Structural Funds 
(Welsh European Funding Office 2017) and the European 
Commission’s Community Research and Development 
Information Service (CORDIS) database (European 
Commission 2017c).
The database covers only RD&D grants and not long-
term revenue payments or investments made by public 
investment banks (e.g. Scottish Investment Bank’s REIF, 
Green Investment Bank), aimed at supporting commercial 
deployment. Crucially, it covers awarded grants, not 
allocated budgets or actual grant expenditure from 
awardees. If we were to compare awarded funds against 
actual grant expenditure, we would likely find that some 
awarded grants may not have been paid to awardees in 
full or a portion of these grants going unspent, meaning 
that the total value for awarded grants will be higher than 
the actual public funds spent by awardees on wave energy 
RD&D. To help minimise this issue, any awarded grants 
known to have been rescinded because awardees failed to 
meet pre-defined criteria were omitted rom the analysis 
on the basis of information direct from government 
departments. 
Grant values are adjusted for inflation, providing values 
in UK sterling (£) for 2015 using GDP deflators at market 
prices, taking the mid-point of the project grant as the 
reference year. Grant expenditure is distributed across the 
period of the project rather than just the year awarded. 
SECTION 4 
Methodology
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT 
FOR UK WAVE ENERGY INNOVATION SINCE 200020
Where cross-cutting offshore energy projects are only 
partially related to marine energy the total grant value is 
adjusted to approximate the proportion of work focused 
on marine energy. These weightings are taken from the 
grant database held by the UKERC Energy Data Centre 
(UKERC 2017b), which includes subjective assessments of 
the balance of each grant’s technology focus using the IEA 
energy technology categorisation (IEA 2005). For grants 
not covered by the UKERC database, the authors made 
their own subjective judgement of the grant’s weighting 
towards marine energy, taking the same approach.
For grants with multiple partners, the funding is split 
equally unless a detailed breakdown is provided by the 
funder. The awardees are categorised in terms of size and 
sub-sector using a combination of Companies House and 
LinkedIn databases. Where awardees have undergone 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), the original company 
name is listed. Finally, the nationality of awardees is 
determined by where the head office is located.
The stage of innovation funding is categorised using a 
Technology Readiness Level7 (TRL) framework that builds 
upon the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Frascati Manual (OECD 2015), 
incorporating wave energy-specific activities relating to 
each TRL from Jeffrey et al. (2014). Six categories are 
applied: (1) basic or applied research; (2) experimental 
development; (3) demonstration; (4) test infrastructure; (5) 
knowledge exchange; and (6) training. The first three relate 
to RD&D activities at different stages along the innovation 
chain and the last three to non-RD&D activities that 
have an important bearing on the innovation process. For 
device level RD&D, the type of device is categorised using 
the European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) device and 
developer categorisation as a guide (EMEC 2017g; EMEC 
2017f). 
The source of innovation funding is split into four main 
categories: (1) EU; (2) UK Government; (3) Scottish 
Government; and (4) Other. The latter includes funding 
from the Welsh Government, regional development 
agencies, county councils and local authorities. European 
structural funds managed by devolved administrations (e.g. 
the Welsh European Funding Office (WEFO)) are classed as 
EU funding.
7 TRLs are a type of measurement system used to assess the maturity level of a particular technology, running from fundamental scientific 
 research to full commercial application. A breakdown of these levels and the innovation activities they represent are provided in Appendix A.
4.2.2  Scientific publications
International wave energy-related scientific publications 
were searched using the database Scopus. The search 
query outlined below was used, limiting the search 
to between 2000 and 2016 and covering only journal 
articles including the terms ‘wave energy’ or ‘wave power’ 
alongside ‘marine’ or ‘ocean’ in the title, abstract or key 
words. Citations of these publications were also analysed, 
excluding self-citations by authors. 
( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( “wave energy” ) OR TITLE-ABS-
KEY ( “wave power” ) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( marine 
OR ocean ) ) AND PUBYEAR > 1999 AND PUBYEAR < 
2017 AND ( LIMIT-TO ( SRCTYPE , “j” ) ) AND ( LIMIT-TO 
( DOCTYPE , “ar” ) ) 
4.2.3  Patents
Patent applications are taken from the 2017 spring edition 
of the European Patent Office (EPO) Worldwide Patent 
Statistical Database (PATSTAT) (EPO 2017). This study 
examines patents filed at the EPO between 1979 and 
2013, the earliest and latest years for which complete 
data was available via PATSTAT. PATSTAT includes 
the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) scheme, 
which allows for the identification of climate change 
mitigation technologies under the category Y02E. This 
study examines patents categorised using the following 
classifications for wave energy: OWC (Y02E 10/32) and 
wave energy or tidal swell (Y02E 10/38).
The data is for patent applications or filings, rather than 
granted patents, meaning that some applications could 
have been rejected after filing. The date of the invention 
is assumed to be the ‘priority date’, the filing date of the 
very first patent application for a specific invention. Patent 
nationality is determined as the inventor’s ‘country of 
residence’ and, where inventors from multiple countries 
are listed on the patent application, a fractional count 
method was used. Notably, patents are not the only proxy 
of technology ‘know-how’, such as trade secrets, and not 
all patents lead to operational technologies.
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4.2.4  Global marine energy installed capacity  
 database
The installed capacity data includes 220 projects of 
both pre-commercial demonstration and commercial 
installations (i.e. TRLs 5 to 9), covering the period from 
2007 to 2016. Project-specific data was sourced primarily 
from the IEA’s Ocean Energy Systems (OES) GIS database 
(OES 2017b) and the OES annual reports dating from 2007 
to 2016 (OES 2017a). By 2016, the OES programme had 
25 members, each reporting data to varying degrees to 
these two databases. 
This data was triangulated with data sourced from other 
online databases such as 4C Offshore (4COffshore 2017), 
Tethys (Tethys 2017) and the RenewableUK Marine Energy 
Database (RenewableUK 2017), as well as developer, test 
centre (e.g. EMEC), government and industry news (e.g. 
Tidal Energy Today) websites. 
The nationality of the installed capacity is determined by 
the country in which the technology has been installed 
rather than the origin of the developer, meaning that some 
installations might have emerged from RD&D investments 
from other countries. However, nationality by host country 
was preferred because overseas developers testing 
their devices in the UK are still being directly or indirectly 
supported by the UK’s wave energy innovation system. 
4.2.5  Test facilities
A survey of UK wave energy test facilities covered: (1) 
wave energy test tanks; (2) land-based sub-component 
test facilities; and (3) open-ocean wave energy test 
facilities. Three databases were surveyed: the Marine 
Research Infrastructure Database (EUROcean_RID 2017), 
the Scottish Energy Laboratory: Test and Demonstration 
Facilities Directory (SEL 2014) and the UK Renewable 
Energy Facilities Directory (OREC 2017a). This data was 
supplemented with information from market leaders in 
wave tank design Edinburgh Designs (Edinburgh Designs 
2017b) and test facility websites, as well as direct contact 
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This section describes the structure and evolution of 
the UK’s wave energy innovation system, focusing 
specifically on the actors, institutions, networks and 
technology/infrastructure that make up the system. 
Each sub-section begins with an overview of how each 
structural dimension has evolved since 2000, followed by 
a more detailed breakdown.
5.1  Actors
The evolution of the UK wave energy innovation actor 
landscape is summarised in Figure 5, highlighting the four 
different actor categories of knowledge and education, 
industry, government and public bodies and supporting 
organisations. For government, we cover the EU, UK and 
Scotland. 
A review of the actor landscape presents a broadly positive 
picture, with a wealth of knowledge and education institutes 
in the form of world-class universities, a burgeoning supply 
chain that has leveraged existing expertise from other 
offshore energy sectors and a wide range of government, 
NDPB and other supporting organisations (e.g. test facilities, 
trade associations) offering support across the entire 
innovation chain. 
Many important additions have been made to the actor 
landscape since 2000, with the introduction of two new 
funding bodies, InnovateUK and the Energy Technologies 
Institute (ETI)8, concentrating on mid-stage TRL 
support, previously missing at UK level. Other important 
introductions include EMEC in 2003 and the Offshore 
Renewable Energy Catapult (OREC) in 2013. The former’s 
role has grown beyond that of a test facility to incorporate 
other key activities, such as knowledge capture and the 
formation of industry standards, roles that were previously 
lacking in the sector. 
In contrast, we find that some important actors have 
withdrawn rom the sector. These include various failed 
wave energy developers and the withdrawal of incumbent 
multi-national firms (e.g. original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs), energy utilities and venture capitalists (VCs), 
who, at this stage do not consider wave energy as an 
investment priority. 
8 The ETI will be discontinued in 2019 and further details are provided in Section 4.1.3.2.
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Figure 5: UK wave energy innovation actor landscape (source: author)
NOTE: Lightly coloured actors indicate those that have been established or have fundamentally changed since 2000.
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5.1.1 Knowledge and education
The major knowledge institutes and educational 
organisations for wave energy in the UK are universities, 
with the universities of Edinburgh and Southampton 
producing the largest number of marine energy scientific 
publications globally in 2011, each delivering 10% of the 
global share (Corsatea & Magagna 2014). To determine the 
most active universities in this sector, an analysis of public 
funding for wave energy related RD&D9 between 2000 
and 2017 found that the University of Edinburgh received 
the most funding, at £16.3m, followed by the Universities 
of Exeter (£7.1m), Swansea (£7.1m), Bangor (£6.5m) and 
Strathclyde (£5.9m). Approximately £20m10 of university 
research funds were channeled through the UK’s marine 
energy Supergen consortium (Section 5.3.1.1), accounting 
for almost a quarter of all university marine energy funding 
(£87m).
UK universities are also leaders in wave energy-related 
training and knowledge exchange, receiving significant 
funds to support these activities. We expand upon the 
breadth and depth of training in Section 5.3.1.5 and identify 
the large number of wave energy test facilities managed 
by universities in Section 5.4.1, further underlining the 
important role universities play n supporting wave energy 
innovation. 
5.1.2 Industry actors
Drawing upon work undertaken by Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise (HIE) and Scottish Enterprise (2015), we 




3. Manufacturing, installation and construction
4. Operation and maintenance 
5.1.2.1  Technology development
5.1.2.1.1  Wave energy developers
Wave energy developers are the key actors in relation to 
wave energy technology development. Analysis of our 
public RD&D grants database and EMEC’s own market 
analysis (EMEC 2017g) reveals that 34 wave energy 
developers operated in the UK between 2000 and 2017, 
with 23 developers drawing on public RD&D funds in 
2017 (Section 6.6.1). Of these, Pelamis and Aquamarine 
Power were the most prominent, demonstrating WECs 
with the highest power rating (Section 6.3.2). Combined, 
they accounted for 49% (£24.4m) of the £49.2m awarded 
to wave energy developers for experimental development 
(TRL 5–6) or demonstration (TRL 7–8) of wave energy 
technology devices since 2000 (Figure 6).  
9   Includes wave energy RD&D at all stages, as well as funding for knowledge exchange and training. Excludes test infrastructure.
10   Deflated to 2015 value.
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Figure 6: Top 10 awardees of public mid- to late-stage 
wave energy RD&D funding (source: author)
 
 
NOTE: Covers only organisations with an explicit focus on developing a 
wave energy device in the UK.
Both Pelamis and Aquamarine Power ceased trading in 
the mid-2010s, with Pelamis going into administration 
in 2014 and Aquamarine Power in 2015. They were not, 
however, the only cases of company liquidation. Between 
2000 and 2017, 14 of the 34 wave energy developers 
operating in the UK ceased trading, including WavePower, 
WaveBob, Wavegen, C-Wave and Orecon. This represents 
a 41% failure rate, substantially lower than the 54% failure 
rate for all professional, scientific and technical start-ups 
established in 2010 ,in the five years since they began 
operating (ONS 2016). All these company failures came 
from 2011 onwards, shortly after the financial crisis, with 
four firms folding in both 2014 and 2017.
11  Data for company failures take from Companies House. Some data for 2017 failures taken from company and industry websites as status not 
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5.1.2.1.2 Original Equipment Manufacturers
OEMs are companies that play an active role in the 
conceptualisation, design and assembly of complex 
technology systems (Sturgeon 2001). They have played an 
important role in wave energy technology development, 
and are responsible for the design and manufacturing of 
WEC sub-components such as PTO and generator systems 
(e.g. Bosch Rexroth, Siemens); electrical and automation 
controls (e.g. ABB); bearings (e.g. Hutchinson, Schaeffler); 
coatings (e.g. Hempel); and hydraulic components (e.g. 
Hunger Hydraulics).
OEMs have also been active in terms of mergers with and 
acquisitions of smaller wave energy developers. Examples 
include Voith’s acquisition of Wavegen Ltd in 2005 (SDI 
2007), ABB Technology Ventures’ £8m investment in 
Aquamarine Power in 2010 (Aquamarine 2016) and 
Alstom’s acquisition of a 40% stake in AWS Ocean Energy12  
in 2011 (Alstom 2011). Another approach used more 
recently to harness expertise from large multi-nationals 
is to engage them as project partners, as evidenced by 
Scottish Government’s WES that has funded projects with 
energy utility (e.g. Iberdrola, GDF Suez), OEM (e.g. Siemens, 
Doosan Babcock, DuPont) and technical consultancy (e.g., 
Arup, Black and Veatch) partners.
Interest in the wave energy sector from large corporations 
has significantly declined in recent years, with a lack of 
recent investment and retrenchment from those who had 
already invested, such as Voith, who closed Wavegen in 
2013. The UK tidal stream sector has witnessed a similar 
‘entry and withdrawal’ pattern. However, large OEMs 
remain active in the sector unlike the wave sector. For 
example, Rolls Royce acquired Tidal Generation Ltd (TGL) in 
2009. However, they subsequently withdrew, selling TGL to 
Alstom in 2012. Since 2016, this has been part of General 
Electric Power (PEI 2012), who have now discontinued 
their tidal stream activities. Similarly, Marine Current 
Turbines was acquired by Siemens in 2012, before Siemens 
withdrew and sold the company on to Atlantis Resources, 
another device developer (Atlantis Resources 2015). 
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5.1.2.1.3 Energy utilities
UK energy utilities have also been active in supporting 
wave energy technology development, attracted by the 
vast global wave energy resource, which is compatible with 
their vision of a low-carbon centralised electricity system. 
For example, the UK saw both E.On and Scottish Power 
purchase devices from Pelamis, which they subsequently 
tested at EMEC in 2010 and 2012 respectively, off the 
Orkney Isles (EMEC 2016b; EMEC 2016e). The utilities 
operated the devices in partnership with developers to 
provide feedback from the perspective of the developers’ 
target customer. However, like the OEMs, the utilities 
have retreated in recent years. E.On withdrew in 2013 and 
Scottish Power sold its device to EMEC shortly afterwards 
(BBC 2013; EMEC 2017c)
5.1.2.2   Project development
The project development phase is concerned with project 
planning, surveying, consenting and preparation. These 
include geotechnical surveys for construction purposes 
that require divers, remote operated vehicles (ROVs) and 
specialist vessels (e.g. James Fisher Subsea), as well as 
resource surveys to measure wave energy potential (e.g. 
Partrac) and environmental surveys to assess the potential 
impact of wave energy device installation (e.g. Aquatera). 
Planning and consenting support is also important in 
acquiring rights to generate electricity offshore (e.g. SAMS 
Research Services Ltd), as well as project design to ensure 
optimal device layout and to maximise yield (e.g. The 
Northern Energy Initiative (TNEI)). Finally, independent 
comprehensive evaluation, verification and certification 
of wave energy devices and their sub-components is 
also important (e.g. DNV GL), playing an important role 
in giving potential investors and customers confidence 
that the technology in question will provide safe and 
reliable electricity generation. Much of this expertise 
can be usefully drawn from existing sectors such as the 
shipping, offshore wind and oil and gas sectors, given the 
overlapping offshore application.
5.1.2.3 Manufacturing, installation and 
construction
The manufacturing and construction phase includes 
the development and manufacturing of key supporting 
technologies such as foundations and moorings (e.g. 
Fugro Seacore, Mallaig Marine, Leask Marine), as well 
as electrical systems design and development (e.g. 
MacArtney, Ramboll, Atkins). It also includes the companies 
responsible for co-ordinating the installation of these 
supporting systems alongside the wave energy devices 
(e.g. Orcades Marine), as well as the fabrication of devices 
(e.g. Zeus Engineering Purepipe, Burntisland Fabrications, 
A&P Falmouth, BiFab) (Magagna & Uihlein 2015; HIE & 
Scottish Enterprise 2015).
5.1.2.4 Operation and maintenance
The third and final phase covers operation and maintenance 
and is concerned with ongoing generation during a project’s 
anticipated lifespan, including activities such as dockside 
operations, performance monitoring and device inspection, 
as well as site decommissioning (e.g. Leask Marine).
5.1.3 Government and non-departmental public 
bodies 
This sub-section explores the government bodies, NDPBs 
and royal chartered bodies responsible for supporting wave 
energy innovation at three levels of government: the EU, 
UK and Scotland. 
12  AWS Ocean Energy also saw investment from the Shell Technology Ventures Fund in 2010, an affiliate of Royal Dutch Shell 
  (Scottish Enterprise 2010a).
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5.1.3.1 EU
Since the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, energy and innovation 
policy have both been areas of ‘shared competence’, 
between the EU and its member state governments (Gubb 
& Maclean 2015; Tosun et al. 2015). Consequently, the 
EC, the politically independent executive arm of the EU, 
has a shared mandate with member states to support 
energy technology innovation. The day-to-day running 
of EC business is managed by departments known as 
directorates general (DGs), such as the DG for Research 
and Innovation (R&I). These DGs are responsible for 
managing the framework programmes for research and 
technological development that represent a major source 
of energy technology innovation funding (Section 5.2.1.2). 
5.1.3.2 UK
Prior to 2007, the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) was largely responsible for energy technology 
innovation (Pearson & Watson 2012), followed by the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (BERR) (2007–2009). However, from 2008/2009, 
the UK Government wave energy technology innovation 
policy was shared between the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC) (2008–2016) and the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (2009–
2016). DECC had direct control over pre-commercial 
demonstration and commercial deployment policies, 
whilst agenda setting and budgeting for earlier stage 
science and innovation funding was the responsibility of 
the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills. Since 
2016, the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy has consolidated control over both energy and 
technology innovation policy making.
Beneath government sits a tier of arm’s-length 
government-affiliated organisations with executive 
powers for further agenda setting and allocation of funds 
to support energy innovation. Funding for earliest stage 
research is allocated via the UK research councils, Royal 
Charter bodies that receive money direct from government, 
with most funds for wave energy managed through the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC), given its engineering focus. With a growing 
appetite for inter-disciplinary research, the research 
councils established the cross-council funded RCUK energy 
programme in 2002 with the aim of strategically planning 
and coordinating the councils’ delivery of energy research, 
training and knowledge exchange in order to maximise its 
impact (RCUK 2017). Mid-stage wave energy innovation 
has been funded by InnovateUK13, the UK’s technology 
innovation delivery body, established in 2004, whose 
primary goal is to foster innovation to boost economic 
growth and employment. 
A similar stage of innovation was supported by the ETI, 
a public–private partnership established in 2007 under 
the Limited Liability Partnership Act. This is due to close 
in 2019 and is currently delivering the remainder of its 
projects, with some functions due to be absorbed into 
the UK Catapult centres. It acts as a conduit between 
academia, industry and the government to accelerate the 
development of low-carbon technologies and is funded 
equally by the UK Government and industry, with industry 
funders (including BP, Caterpillar, EDF, Rolls Royce and 
Shell). Each private sector partner contributes the same 
funding of up to £5m per year14, which is match funded 
by the UK Government (ETI 2016). The ownership and 
exploitation of IP arising from ETI-funded RD&D projects 
is negotiated specifically for each project, with bespoke 
agreements around how this is apportioned between 
project funding awardees and the ETI with appropriate 
licensing to its members (public and private). Alongside 
funding wave energy demonstration and the development 
of cross-cutting marine energy solutions (e.g. tools to 
predict marine energy array yields), the ETI has also 
produced marine energy roadmaps in conjunction with the 
UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) (ETI & UKERC 2010; 
ETI & UKERC 2014).
13    Formerly the Technology Strategy Board and rebranded in 2014.
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The Carbon Trust, founded in 2001 as a private company 
limited by guarantee to help it foster closer business 
relationships (NAO 2008) was originally funded by DECC to 
accelerate a low-carbon transition and was responsible for 
supporting various wave energy demonstration projects. 
In 2012, its core funding was cut by the UK Government 
and it now operates as a not-for-dividend company. 
It continues to play an active role in the wave energy 
sector; for example leading the work on the Low Carbon 
Innovation and Coordination Group’s (LCICG)15 technology 
innovation needs assessments (LCICG 2012) and advising 
on the management and design of government-funded 
marine energy programmes (Carbon Trust 2017).
5.1.3.3 Scotland
Since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 
1999, an increasing degree of political power has been 
devolved from the UK Government to the Scottish 
Government through landmark legislation such as the 
Scotland Acts of 2012 and 2016. Whilst some areas 
of policy have remained explicitly ‘reserved’ for the 
UK Government and others ‘devolved’ to the Scottish 
Government, little clarity exists around which government 
is directly responsible for energy technology innovation 
policy, with energy policy and ‘trade and industry’ UK 
Government responsibilities but policies to promote 
renewable energy generation and economic development 
under Scottish Government control (Devolution Further 
Powers Committee 2016). Nonetheless, the Scottish 
Government has played an increasingly important role in 
supporting wave energy innovation, primarily through its 
two economic development arms, Scottish Enterprise and 
Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE).
5.1.4 Supporting organisations 
Test centres such as EMEC play a very important 
supporting role. Whilst their test infrastructure capabilities 
are covered in Section 7.4.2, the centres also fulfil 
other roles. For example, EMEC provides assistance 
with grid connection, power purchase agreements, 
renewable obligations certificates (ROCs) accreditation 
and compliance with regulation, as well as real-time 
technology, resource and environmental monitoring 
(EMEC 2016d). EMEC is also recognised by the United 
Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) as an accredited 
test laboratory for full-scale wave and tidal test facilities 
(ISO 17025) and environmental technology verification 
(ISO 17020), allowing it to provide independent, 
internationally recognised verification of the performance 
and environmental benefits of the devices they test 
(EMEC 2016a). EMEC has also helped to develop 12 
different industry guides to ensure consistent and accurate 
comparison of performance between different WECs 
(EMEC 2017a). Finally, EMEC purchased a P2 wave energy 
device from Pelamis after it went into administration in 
2014 to capture knowledge from the device following 
further examination, with WES performing a similar activity 
having purchased the other P2 device from Pelamis (EMEC 
2016c).
In 2012, InnovateUK established the OREC (OREC 2017c), 
one of ten new UK Catapult centres that constitute 
‘physical centre[s] where the very best of the UK’s 
businesses, scientists and engineers work side by side 
on late-stage research and development’ (TSB 2014a). 
The centres rely on a ‘thirds’ funding model whereby 
competitively won private (1/3) and public (1/3) sector 
funds are complemented by core funding issued by 
InnovateUK (1/3) to tackle sectoral innovation challenges 
(TSB, 2013b). The OREC has managed joint-industry-
enabling research projects, focusing on issues such 
as biofouling, component reliability and energy yield 
assessments (OREC 2017b). It is also responsible for 
managing marine energy test facilities (formerly NAREC) 
and the UK wave and tidal knowledge transfer network, as 
well as publishing reports on solutions to common industry 
issues such as financing solutions for marine energy (OREC 
2014).
14    E.On was originally a member but subsequently exited the ETI. 
15    See Section 4.3.3.2 for a description of its role.
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The Crown Estate is also an important actor, granting 
leases for offshore renewable energy developments and, 
more recently, funding marine energy RD&D projects 
through its Enabling Actions Fund. It manages the 
commercial interests of the sovereign’s public estate and is 
independent of government, although any surplus revenue 
from the estate is paid to the UK Treasury each year (Crown 
Estate 2017). Following the Scotland Act 2016, the Crown 
Estate’s activities were devolved in Scotland, resulting in 
the formation of Crown Estate Scotland, with profits now 
going to Scottish Ministers rather than the UK Government 
(Crown Estate Scotland 2017).
Finally, other important actors include investors, notably 
VCs, who have been instrumental in providing match 
funding for public grant schemes for mid- to late-stage 
TRL activities. Wave energy supporting trade associations 
also play a key role but are classified as networks for the 
purposes of this study and covered in Section 5.3.2.
5.2 Institutions
The evolution of UK wave energy innovation policy 
between 2000 and 2017 is presented in Figure 7. First, 
this reveals the complexity of the funding landscape, 
with technology developers facing a plethora of 
schemes simultaneously offering support from different 
departments or agencies operating at different levels of 
governance (i.e. EU, UK, Scotland). Second, it illustrates 
how fast the policy landscape has evolved, with a 
succession of new schemes emerging, each with their 
own submission application guidelines and objectives. 
Finally, it demonstrates the shift from commercially 
focused RD&D programmes in the mid-2000s and early 
2010s (e.g. Scotland’s WATES and MRCF and the UK’s 
MRDF and MEAD), some of which had an explicit focus 
on arrays (e.g. MRCF, MEAD), to innovation programmes 
that supported much earlier stage development through 
to commercialisation (e.g. Scotland’s WES and the UK’s 
Energy Catalyst).
It is also important to note how these sector-specific 
policy developments have corresponded with higher level 
energy and climate change policy developments. Figure 
7 illustrates two points in this regard. First, landmark 
energy and climate change legislation has been enacted 
at all three levels of government, especially during the late 
2000s and early 2010s, followed by ambitious emissions 
reduction and renewable energy generation targets. 
Second, these high-level policy developments typically 
preceded a proliferation of new programmes to support 
wave energy innovation, suggesting that they laid the 
foundations for a renewed commitment to wave energy 
RD&D.
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Figure 7: Overview of wave energy innovation support policies 1999–2017 (source: author)
NOTE: Dates refer to period of project funding. For revenue payment schemes (e.g. RO), dates relate to when funds were available. Some RD&D 
schemes that committed small sums when funding wave energy are omitted. Test facility access programmes (e.g. MARINET) are classified as 
networks and included in Section 5.3. * - MESAT partly funded by Scottish Government; ^ - Capital expenditure covered but also longer term 
offered revenue support payments.
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5.2.1  EU
5.2.1.1  Over-arching energy policy landscape
Following the 2007 EU Lisbon Treaty, the EU member 
states adopted a set of EU-level 2020 policy targets, set 
in 2007 and enacted into EU legislation in 2009. The 2020 
targets are a 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions (from 
1990 levels), 20% of the EU’s total energy consumption to 
be met from renewables and a 20% improvement in energy 
efficiency. Linked to this, EU member states (including the 
UK) adopted binding national targets to raise the share 
of renewables in their energy consumption by 2020 under 
the Renewable Energy Directive (European Commission 
2017a). 
In 2014, the EU adopted a new policy framework setting 
an overall target of renewables accounting for a 27% share 
of energy consumption by 2030 to help deliver a 40% cut 
in greenhouse gas emissions on 1990 levels for the same 
year (European Commission 2017b). Importantly, this is 
an EU level target and there are no binding targets for 
individual member states.
In the context of these ambitious high-level energy and 
climate change targets and the EC’s new energy and 
technology innovation policy making powers, the EC 
formulated its Strategic Energy Technologies plan (SET 
plan) in 2007, which is ‘the principal decision-making 
support tool for European energy policy’ (European 
Commission 2017f). The plan identifies priority actions for 
research and innovation to co-ordinate action across EU 
member states and other participating countries (Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland and Turkey). Marine energy was 
incorporated into the SET plan in 2013. 
5.2.1.2  Wave energy innovation support  
 policies
5.2.1.2.1 Supply–push mechanisms
The EU has offered substantial support for technology 
innovation throughout the period examined in this study. 
Since 1984, the EU’s framework programmes (FPs) for 
research and technological development have provided 
RD&D grants. The FPs aim to strengthen the scientific and 
technological base of European industry and to encourage 
its international competitiveness, whilst promoting research 
that supports EU policies (European Commission 2016). 
The FPs are the primary mechanism by which the EC 
supports technology RD&D with the current programme, 
Horizon2020, accounting for almost two thirds of EU R&D 
funding for the period 2014–2020 (Royal Society 2015). 
The funds are open not just to universities and research 
organisations but also to businesses and charities from 
qualifying European countries, covering both early and later 
stage innovation, such as technology demonstration.
Alongside the FPs, the EU also supports wave energy 
innovation via its structural and investment funds, through 
sub-schemes such as the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF). These represent ‘funds targeted especially 
(though not exclusively) at building capacity in the least 
economically developed regions of the EU’ (Royal Society 
2015 p.8), with a specific focus on supporting technology 
innovation, small- to medium-sized enterprise (SME) 
competitiveness and the transition to a low-carbon 
economy (Reillon 2015). Whilst the structural funds 
typically support infrastructural investments, for the period 
2014–2020, these structural funds will account for roughly 
one third of EC R&D investment (Royal Society 2015). The 
implementation of these structural funds is managed at 
regional/national level on behalf of the EC (e.g. WEFO).
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In 2012, the EC introduced a new scheme to support 
demonstration of innovative low-carbon energy 
demonstration projects called the New Entrants Reserve 
300 (NER300). Funded by the sale of 300 million emission 
allowances from the NER (set up for the third phase of 
the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS)) (European 
Commission 2017e), the scheme awarded over €2.1bn to 
38 renewable energy projects between 2012 and 2014 
(European Commission 2017e). Whilst no UK wave energy 
projects were funded in the first two funding rounds, the 
scheme awarded Ireland’s WestWave project with €19.8m 
(European Commission 2014; European Commission 2012). 
5.2.1.2.2  Demand–pull mechanisms
In 2014, the EC, in conjunction with the European 
Investment Bank, established Innofin EIB. This initiative 
has made €24bn of financing available until 2020 for 
investments in research and innovation to help ‘address 
the issue that the EU lags behind its global competitors 
in terms of both private and public investment in 
research and innovation’ (Innovfin EIB 2017). Whilst no 
UK wave energy developers have been supported so far, 
Finnish company AW Energy received €10m in 2016 to 
demonstrate its 350kW WaveRoller in Portugal (Innovfin 
EIB 2016).
5.2.2  UK
5.2.2.1  Overarching energy policy landscape
Over the past 20 years, the UK energy policy landscape 
has been strongly influenced by the need to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions whilst improving energy 
security and affordability. Following the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, the UK committed to reduce its emissions to 
12.5% below 1990 levels over the period 2008–2012. 
This pledge was strengthened as part of its 2000 climate 
change programme, when it increased its non-binding 
commitment to reducing CO2 emissions to 20% below 1990 
levels by 2010 and 60% by 2050 (DETR 2000). 
This ambition was formalised as part of the 2008 UK 
Climate Change Act, which committed the UK to reducing 
emissions by at least 80% in 2050 from 1990 levels (CCC 
2016). The UK Government is required under the act to set 
legally binding ‘carbon budgets’, each relating to a limit on 
the amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted in 
the UK over a five-year period (CCC 2016) (Table 4). In order 
to meet these carbon reduction targets and to comply with 
EU legislation, the UK set itself a legally binding target in 
2009 that 15% of energy consumed in the UK should come 
from renewables by 2020, equating to approximately 30% 
of electricity demand (DECC 2009).
Table 4: UK carbon budgets and targets (Source: CCC 2017)
Budget Carbon budget level
% reduction on 
1990 carbon 
emissions
1st carbon budget 





3rd carbon budget 
(2018–2022) 2,544 MtCO2e 37% by 2020
4th carbon budget 
(2023–2027) 1,950 MtCO2e 51% by 2025
5th carbon budget 
(2028–2032) 1,725 MtCO2e 57% by 2030
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5.2.2.2 Wave energy innovation support  
 policies
5.2.2.2.1 A renaissance in wave energy   
 support (1999–2006)
Supply–push mechanisms
In this context of a need to deliver a low-carbon 
transition, the UK once again began to invest in wave 
energy technology RD&D via its new and renewable 
energy programme. Launched in 1999 by the DTI (DTI 
2002), it funded demonstration projects for both Pelamis 
and Wavegen devices. Mid-stage RD&D was also 
supported a few years later by the Carbon Trust’s applied 
research programme (2003–2008), funding 17 projects 
with a strong focus on wave energy device prototype 
development, including projects by Pelamis, Aquamarine 
and AWS Ocean Energy. In parallel, the Carbon Trust 
ran its Marine Energy Challenge (2003), which offered a 
platform where developers could collaborate with offshore 
engineering and power generation consultants to help 
build their capacity, independently validate their device’s 
performance and drive down costs (Carbon Trust 2006). 
Much early-stage scientific research was supported by the 
research councils established by Marine Energy Supergen 
in 2003 (Section 5.3.1.1).
Demand–pull mechanisms
Turning to the other end of the innovation chain, the 
market–pull subsidy scheme entitled the Non-Fossil 
Fuel Obligation (NFFO) was replaced by the Renewables 
Obligation (RO) in 2002, requiring electricity suppliers 
to source a portion of their electricity from low-carbon 
sources. Renewable electricity generators were awarded 
one ROC per MWh of electricity generated from eligible 
technologies, including wave. ROCs could be sold to 
suppliers to help them meet their obligations and suppliers 
failing to meet their obligations had to pay the buyout 
price for every MWh they supplied without the necessary 
certification, with these funds distributed to the energy 
suppliers who submitted ROCs via 20-year-long revenue 
payments (Ofgem 2016; BERR 2009).
5.2.2.2.2 Strong push towards full-scale   
 commercialisation (2007–2013)
Supply–push mechanisms
The period between 2007 and 2013 is characterised 
by a UK Government drive towards full-scale and even 
array-scale demonstration of wave energy devices. This is 
encapsulated by the DTI’s Marine Renewable Deployment 
Fund (MRDF), launched in 2007, an ambitious £42m 
demonstration scheme16. It offered a combination of 
capital grant and revenue payment support, the latter a 
£100/MWh payment for a maximum of seven years, with 
support capped at £9m or 25% of total ‘eligible costs’17 per 
project. Unfortunately, developers struggled to meet the 
highly ambitious eligibility criteria, including three months 
full-scale device sea trial data, meaning no awards were 
made (HoCECCC 2012; DTI 2005). 
With the acknowledgement that wave energy technology 
was not as advanced as first thought, a new £22.5m 
scheme was launched in 2009 called the Marine 
Renewables Proving Fund (MRPF), which shifted the 
focus back to short-term single device pre-commercial 
demonstration. The MRPF made two wave energy awards 
to Pelamis (£4.9m) and Aquamarine Power (£4.7m). 
In the same year the newly formed ETI (see Section 
5.1.3.2) commenced its marine energy programme which, 
alongside cross-cutting challenges, also funded full-scale 
demonstration, again awarding funds to Pelamis (ETI 
2017). 
The UK Government once again re-focused its efforts 
on array-scale demonstration schemes in 2012 with 
its £20m Marine Energy Array Demonstrator (MEAD), 
to fund projects incorporating at least three generating 
devices with a combined capacity of no less than 3MW 
and generating at least 7GWh per annum (UK Government 
2015b). No wave projects received funding, with funding 
instead going to two tidal stream projects (MeyGen and 
Skerries18) (DECC 2016b). 
16 Another £8m was made available for infrastructure, environmental research and the development of protocols for developers to report their 
 performance more accurately.
17 ‘Costs associated with the construction of the project over and above the cost of constructing a combined cycle gas turbine with the same 
 average annual power’ (DTI 2005 p.13).
18 Marine Current Turbines subsequently had their award withdrawn as they could not meet the generation deadline, with funding only drawn 
 down by Atlantis for MeyGen.
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Other array-focused schemes during the period included 
InnovateUK’s £10.5m Marine Energy – Supporting Array 
Technologies (MESAT)19  scheme (2012) to support the 
development of supporting array technologies such as 
sub-sea electrical connections, moorings, installation 
and maintenance vessels. Finally, funded through the 
OREC but managed by the Carbon Trust, the Marine Farm 
Accelerator (MFA)20 was established in 2013, focused on 
tackling six common challenges associated with marine 
arrays: electrical systems, yield optimisation, installation 
methods, insurance, operations and maintenance and site 
characterisation (Carbon Trust 2016). It employed the same 
joint industry programme (JIP) model as the Offshore Wind 
Accelerator (OWA), bringing together 14 wave and tidal 
device developers, with two thirds funded through industry 
and one third from government (OES 2014; Carbon Trust 
2016; Robertson 2014). 
Whilst the period between 2007 and 2013 mostly saw 
later stage innovation investments, some earlier stage 
funding was still forthcoming. For example, the DTI 
established its £3.5m Marine Energy Accelerator (MEA) 
in 2007, which supported a comprehensive review of 
new device concepts and their potential to significantly 
lower marine energy costs (Carbon Trust 2011). Other 
important investments included NERC and Department 
for Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs’ (DEFRA) 
joint £2.4m Marine Renewable Energy Programme 
(2010–2013) to examine the environmental benefits and 
risks of up-scaling marine energy schemes (NERC 2010). 
InnovateUK also launched its Wave and Tidal Stream 
Energy Technologies (WTSET) programme in 2010 to 
support the verification of device performance, improve 
device reliability and cost-effectiveness, and develop more 
robust installation and O&M methodologies (Technology 
Strategy Board 2010). 
Demand–pull mechanisms
Further underpinning the UK’s push towards 
commercialisation was the banding of its RO by 
technologies in 2009, designed to offer preferential 
revenue payments to less mature renewable energy 
technologies such as wave energy. Consequently, marine 
energy, along with some other less mature renewable 
technologies (e.g. geothermal, solar PV), was awarded 
two ROCs per MWh. This was increased to five21 from 
2013 (DECC 2013a), mirroring Scotland’s support for wave 
energy since 2007 through its marine supply obligation 
(Section 5.2.3). Despite this increase, only three wave 
power stations have ever received ROCs, the first being the 
Claddach farm (2006) led by Wavegen using the Limpet 
device22, and the others utilising Pelamis devices, namely 
E.On’s Vagr Atferth project (2011) and Scottish Power 
Renewables’ Orcadian wave project (2012) (Ofgem 2017).
5.2.2.2.3 UK Government steps back from   
 marine energy (2014–present)
Supply–push mechanisms
From 2014, the UK Government slowly stepped down its 
support for wave energy, leading to an absence of any 
UK Government schemes explicitly designed to support 
wave energy innovation. Non-marine energy innovation 
schemes, however, committed support to wave energy, 
such as the Energy Catalyst in 2015. In a departure from 
most previous UK energy technology RD&D schemes, 
this is jointly funded by InnovateUK, EPSRC and DECC, 
and supports technologies from the early concept 
stage through to pre-commercial technology validation 
(InnovateUK 2014). It has funded three wave projects, 
together worth only £0.3m in funding, versus £2.3m for 
seven tidal projects.
19 Co-funded by Scottish Enterprise and Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).
20 The MFA was subsumed into the ocean energy strand of the Offshore Renewables Joint Industry Programme (ORJIP), which functions much 
 more like a network than a funding programme (Section 4.3.2).
21 Five ROCs subject to 30 MW cap at each generating station. Two ROCs for any additional capacity added above 30 MW cap (DECC 2013a).
22 LIMPET stands for Land Installed Marine Power Energy Transmitter.
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Demand–pull mechanisms
The UK’s move away from wave energy is also evident in its 
demand–pull mechanisms, most notably via its Electricity 
Market Reform (EMR) Contracts for Difference (CfD), introduced 
in 2014 to replace the RO (Ofgem 2015). Under the CfD, both 
wave and tidal stream were in an allocation pot of £290m 
per annum (2021/2022 and 2022/2023) with other ‘less 
established technologies’, including offshore wind, advanced 
conversion technologies, anaerobic digestion, dedicated 
biomass with combined heat and power (CHP) and geothermal. 
Eligible wave energy projects were to be awarded a ‘strike 
price’ of £305 per MWh (DECC 2013c), which was guaranteed 
regardless of fluctuations in the market price for electricity 
(EnergyUK 2016). However, should the cost of eligible projects 
exceed the total funding available for the ‘less established 
technologies’ pot, all CfDs for that pot are allocated via a cost 
competitive auction24 (Clifford Chance 2015), where bids are 
‘accepted sequentially, from lowest to highest cost, up to the 
budget limit’ (McNaught 2017). 
To encourage marine energy, the UK Government legislated 
that the first 100MW of marine schemes would be guaranteed 
access25 to CfDs until the end of the first delivery plan period in 
2019 but that any capacity above this would have to compete 
against other technologies (HM Government 2015). However, 
this funding allocation minimum was removed for marine 
energy during the second CfD allocation round (post-2019), 
in turn removing the guarantee that up to 100MW of eligible 
marine energy projects would receive long-term revenue 
payments (BEIS 2016a).
5.2.3  Scotland
5.2.3.1 Overarching energy policy landscape
Following the UK’s Climate Change Act 2008, Scotland passed 
equivalent legislation in 2009, committing itself to a 42% 
reduction in emissions by 2020 and an 80% reduction by 2050 
on 1990 levels (CCC 2016). In 2011 this commitment was 
translated into a host of relevant energy targets including 
sourcing 100% electricity demand equivalent from renewables 
by 2020, with an interim target of 31% by 2011, which it 
achieved (Scottish Government 2012; Scottish Government 
2011). The Scottish Government has recently published a 
provisional target that 50% of energy consumption is met by 
renewable energy by 2030 (Scottish Government 2017c). 
5.2.3.2  Wave energy innovation support  
 policies
5.2.3.2.1  Commencement of an ambitious   
 marine energy strategy (2000–2013)
Supply–push mechanisms
The Scottish Government initiated their highly ambitious 
marine energy innovation programme in 2006, launching 
its £13m Wave and Tidal Energy Scheme (WATES). This 
was designed to support full-scale demonstration of 
marine energy devices and supporting technologies (e.g. 
foundations, moorings). Like the UK’s MRDF scheme 
(Section 5.2.2.2.1), it had a strong commercial focus, offering 
a combination of grant funding and revenue payments, set 
as £100/MWh up to a maximum of five years from project 
commissioning (Scottish Government 2009b). Continuing 
this support for full-scale demonstration, Scotland 
introduced its £12m Wave and Tidal Energy: RD&D Support 
(WATERS) programme in 2010, running through three 
rounds to 2015. However, unlike its predecessor WATES, 
it did not include revenue payments, placing less pressure 
on long-term commercial deployment (Scottish Enterprise 
2010b; Scottish Enterprise 2012). 
Once again, the Scottish Government reignited its support 
for commercial marine energy deployment, launching the 
£18m Marine Renewables Commercialisation Fund (MRCF) 
in 2012. This aimed to deliver 3–10MW arrays of at least 
three devices already demonstrated at full scale (Blair 
2013; Scottish Government 2014). Alex Salmond, then 
First Minister of Scotland, explained that the scheme was 
aimed at:
‘those companies now at the verge of commercial 
deployment, to develop their prototype devices and forge 
ahead with the development of commercially viable 
arrays’ (Scottish Enterprise 2012). 
23 Another £8m was made available for infrastructure, environmental research and the development of protocols for developers to report their 
 performance more accurately
24 When the auction is closed, all projects within that delivery year are awarded a final clearing price equal to the strike price of the last approved 
 project … [which] is capped at the relevant Administrative Strike Price set for each technology’ (McNaught 2017).
25 Wave and tidal technologies would receive ‘first access to the less established technologies pot, without competition from other technologies’ 
 (Weightman 2014) but restricted to projects less than 30MW (RegenSW 2016). 
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Demand–pull mechanisms
Market–pull mechanism support for wave energy can be 
traced back to the third round of the Scottish Renewables 
Obligation (SRO) in 1999, which awarded contracts to 
three projects: Wavegen’s LIMPET, Pelamis’s P1 and Sea 
Power International’s floating wave power vessel (House 
of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2001). 
However, despite the importance of this commitment from 
government, only LIMPET was commissioned in 2000, off 
the Isle of Islay in Scotland (DTI & DETR 2000). 
In 2007, Scotland significantly increased its support 
for wave energy via its marine supply obligation (MSO), 
supplementing its Renewable Obligation Scotland (ROS), the 
Scottish version of the UK RO introduced in 2002 (Section 
5.2.2.2). The MSO required electricity suppliers obligated 
under the RO to meet a proportion of that obligation with 
ROCs awarded for marine energy generation in Scottish 
waters or by paying a higher buyout price, initially set at 
£175/MWh for wave devices and £105/MWh for tidal 
devices, much higher than the standard RO buyout price of 
£35.76/MWh in 2008/2009 (Scottish Government 2017a). 
However, because of a lack of eligible capacity that suppliers 
could draw on to meet the obligation, the MSO was set at 
zero and discontinued in 2009 when the ROS offered five 
ROCs per MWh for wave energy (RenewableUK 2010; The 
Scottish Government 2008).
In 2008, Scotland launched another demand–pull policy, 
in the form of its £10m Saltire Prize. The prize was open 
internationally and was to be awarded to the developer 
generating the greatest volume of electricity from the ocean 
by June 2017, over a threshold of 100GWh and a continuous 
two-year period (Scottish Government 2009a). No party was 
successful in meeting the criteria and the prize money went 
unspent. 
Finally, in 2012, Scotland launched its £103m Renewable 
Energy Investment Fund (REIF). Backed by the Scottish 
Investment Bank (Scottish Enterprise 2014), this offered 
low-cost loan and equity finance for renewable energy 
projects deemed too risky by institutional investors. By 
2016, it had financed three wave projects, with Aquamarine 
and Pelamis together receiving £12m in investment, whilst 
Albatern received investment to harness wave energy for 
use in aquaculture (Ekosgen 2016).
5.2.3.2.2  Targeted support for wave energy  
 innovation (2014–present)
Supply–push mechanisms
In 2013, there was an acknowledgement that ‘wave array 
projects are not realistically able to be delivered within the 
MRCF time [2017] and spending constraints’ (Blair 2013), 
whilst tidal stream had already received significant funding 
via other projects such as the EU’s NER300 and the UK’s 
MEAD. Consequently, the Scottish Government decided to 
recalibrate its support for marine energy, the first move being 
to compartmentalise RD&D funding for wave energy, splitting 
it from marine energy more broadly. For example, in 2014, it 
reconfigured its £18m MRCF programme, creating a stand-
alone funding stream for wave, namely the £13m Wave 
First Array Support Programme. Two awards were made to 
Pelamis and Aquamarine but neither project reached fruition 
as both companies entered administration (The Carbon 
Trust 2014). The remaining £5m was committed to enabling 
technologies (e.g. moorings) and services (e.g. installation) to 
support deployments of marine energy arrays (i.e. the Array 
Technology Innovation Programme).
This trend towards offering discrete support for wave energy 
is, however, best encapsulated by its establishment of Wave 
Energy Scotland (WES) in 2014. The scheme’s focus is to 
‘support wave energy technology development until the 
technical and commercial risks are low enough for private 
investment to re-enter the sector’ (WES 2016 p.2). As of 
summer 2017, WES has awarded £24.6m across 56 projects 
and 150 organisations (Hurst 2017). 
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WES differs from most of its predecessors in a number of 
important ways. These include: 
 n Supporting activity across the innovation chain, from the 
concept characterisation and refinement stage (TRLs 
1–3) through to small prototype development (TRLs 
5–6).
 n Employing a rigorous stage-gating model where 
developers must meet stringent criteria to progress to 
unlock funding at a higher TRL. 
 n Adopting a bottom-up approach, focusing on optimising 
sub-components (e.g. PTOs, controls, structural 
materials) and different device designs rather than 
optimising a single device design, although it still retains 
a focus on device design via its novel wave energy 
converter call. 
 n Encouraging the formation of consortia and has opened 
up funding to international developers as long as RD&D is 
conducted in Scotland. 
 n Offering 100% funding via a state aid compliant 
procurement model, meaning no match funding from the 
private sector is required.
 n Imposing a requirement on developers to licence their 
intellectual property (IP) and, if they do not do this after a 
pre-determined period of time, WES has the right to do 
so on their behalf (WES 2016). 
 n Supporting lesson sharing through publication of open-
access reports on project results. This is supplemented by 
a series of reports outlining lessons learnt over the past 
decade by the sector on key issues such as supply chain 
development, installation and O&M (WES 2017d), as well 
as knowledge generated by former leading developers such 
as Pelamis and Aquamarine Power (WES 2015) (Figure 8). 
Figure 8: WES’s knowledge capture portal (source: WES)
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5.3 Networks
The evolution of the UK’s wave energy related scientific, industry and government networks is presented in Figure 9 and 
Table 5. First, we find that key scientific and industry networks have been present in one form or another since the early 
2000s. However, networks co-ordinating test facility, training and government activities were much slower to form, 
mostly emerging after 2010. Since 2015, we can identify excellent connectivity across the UK wave energy innovation 
system, as evidenced by strong coverage of networks across the five domains of science, test facility, training, industry 
and government, with a good spread across regional, national and international levels. 
Table 5 also indicates a good coverage not only exists across these five network domains but also across the six key 
intermediary/network functions, ranging from relationship building to policy advocacy26. Again, this coverage of network 
functions has significantly improved as the number and diversity of networks has increased. However, there is some 
evidence of overlapping networks, such as multiple trade associations and marine energy centres for doctoral training 
(CDTs). This could result in a duplication of efforts and dilute the overall impact of networks versus a single consolidated 
network for each of these discrete activities.
Figure 9: Timeline of wave energy innovation networks 2000–2017 (source: author)
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26 These categories are adapted from a framework synthesised by Kilelu et al. (2011) on the functions of intermediary organisations, identifying 
 six common functions they perform: 1) Relationship building – actor match-making and facilitation of long-term relationships; 2) Capacity 
 building – improving actors’ innovation capabilities via training and experience sharing; 3) Knowledge transfer – strategic dissemination 
 of knowledge between knowledge generators and users; 4) Technology foresighting – identification of priority RD&D areas and strategies to 
 deliver these; 5) RD&D coordination – coordination of innovation activities across sectors; 6) Policy advocacy – promoting changes in 
 institutional frameworks to support technology innovation.
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Table 5: Summary of wave energy innovation networks and the activities they perform (source: author) 




















Regional PRIMaRE 2013 7 (1) X X X X
UK SuperGen 2003 15 (1) X X X X X
European
WaveNet 2000–2003 14 (9) X X X
EERA Ocean 2011 9 (9) X X X X X
Global
OES 2001 25 (25) X X X X
INORE 2006 N/A (76) X X X




MARINET2 2011–2015 39 (12) X X X
MARINET2 2017–2021 57 (13) X X




IDCORE 2011 5 (1) X X X
REMS 2014 2 (1) X X X
CDT WMES 2014 2 (1) X X X
European
WaveTrain 1 2004–2008 11 (6) X X X
WaveTrain 2 2008–2012 13 (8) X X X




Renewables 1996 53  (N/A) X X
WES library 2017 N/A X X
UK
REA 2001 44 (N/A) X X
RenewableUK 2004 N/A X X X
WT KTN 2013 N/A X
ORJIP OE3 2014 87 (N/A) X X X X
EU OEE 2006 115 (N/A) X X X
Government
Scotland
FREDS3 2003–2009 N/A X X X
WIPB4 2014 N/A X X X X
UK
LCICG/EIB 2008 8 (1) X X X X X
MEPB3 2013–2015 N/A X X X X X
European OCEANERA-NET 2013 16 (8) X X
 
NOTE: 1 An 18-month project; 2 1 non-EU partner; 3 A combination of industry, government and third sector membership; 4 Disbanded in 2014
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5.3.1 Scientific and educational networks
Knowledge and educational actors within the UK wave 
energy system are very well connected through a large 
number of extensive scientific networks, operating at global, 
European, UK and regional levels, performing a range of 
activities. We briefly review the development and content 
of these, categorising them by research, test facility and 
educational networks.
5.3.1.1 Research
The wave energy sector has a long tradition of international 
scientific research networks. The most significant is the 
IEA’s Technology Collaboration Programme (TCP)27 on 
ocean energy systems (OES) (OES 2016). From an initial 
three members in 2001 (the UK, Denmark and Portugal), 
its membership had grown to 25 by the end of 2016. Its 
over-arching aim is to drive marine energy innovation via 
international collaboration and it achieves this aim by co-
ordinating different work R&D packages on issues such 
as testing protocols, grid integration and environmental 
impacts/monitoring, as well as reviewing the existing 
evidence base and disseminating this knowledge (OES 2015). 
The OES also produces a detailed review of global ocean 
energy sector developments and foresight reports offering a 
vision of a future ocean energy sector and co-ordinates the 
bi-annual International Conference on Ocean Energy (ICOE).
Another major international network was established in 
2011, this time at European level, called the European Energy 
Research Alliance (EERA). Its aim is to accelerate new energy 
technology development through co-operation, bringing 
together more than 175 research organisations from 27 
European countries, involved in 17 joint programmes. EERA 
is the public research pillar of the EU’s SET plan. One of 
EERA’s joint programmes is for ocean energy (EERA Ocean), 
involving nine organisations from nine countries. Its primary 
aim is to ‘underpin the coordination of the emerging ocean 
energy sector in an effort to promote the incorporation of 
ocean energy into the SET plan’ (Ocean Energy EERA 2015 
p.5), which was achieved in 2013. Its primary role is to offer 
strategic leadership of ocean energy research, providing 
a ‘co-ordinated voice towards the European Commission 
and the member states on medium- to long-term research 
priorities’ (Ocean Energy EERA 2015 p.5).
A host of other international networks are outlined in Table 
5, including: WaveNET (est. 2000), International Network 
on Offshore Renewable Energy (INORE) (est. 2006) and 
Offshore Renewable Energy Conversion platforms – 
Coordination Action (ORECCA) (est. 2013). The INORE 
exists specifically to support early-stage researchers of 
offshore renewable energy, bringing together over 1,400 
individual members from over 76 countries via symposia 
and workshops (INORE 2017). 
At the UK level, the most notable network is UK’s Centre 
for Marine Energy Research (UKCMER), established 
in 2003 as part of the RCUK Supergen programme. 
Established primarily as a centre of research excellence to 
quantify the risk and return associated with marine energy 
and reduce uncertainty around the technology (UKERC 
2007) it also performs important networking functions. 
For example it brings together a consortium of 15 UK 
universities, manages international and industry networks, 
as well as running residential training schools (Supergen 
UKCMER 2017). It is likely that the fourth phase of the UK 
Supergen programme will see marine energy merge with 
offshore wind as part of an offshore renewable energy 
hub following a recent review of the Supergen programme 
(RCUK 2016).
The other major network is the Partnership for Research in 
Marine Renewable Energy (PRIMARE) (est. 2009), bringing 
together seven world-class marine energy institutes in 
the south west of the UK. The network hosts an annual 
research conference, identifies priority research topics via 
workshops and maintains a directory of associated experts 
and projects to facilitate networks (PRIMARE 2017).
27 The IEA runs 38 TCPs, which represent ‘independent, international groups of experts that enable governments and industries from around the 
 world to lead programmes and projects on a wide range of energy technologies and related issues’ (IEA 2016 p.1).
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5.3.1.4 Test facilities
In addition to these inter-organisational RD&D networks, 
there are two major infrastructure testing networks: the 
Marine Renewables Infrastructure Network (MARINET) 
and Funding Ocean Renewable Energy through Strategic 
European Action (FORESEA). The primary aim of these 
schemes is to award periods of free access to allow 
developers to make use of a world-leading network of test 
centres across Europe that stretch from early- to late-
stage TRLs, thus circumventing the very high costs these 
developers face in accessing facilities. 
The first phase of EU-FP7-funded MARINET began in 
2011 and has offered over 700 weeks of access to 39 
test facilities across 12 countries for approximately 300 
projects and 800 external users (Ocean Energy Europe 
2017). Furthermore, MARINET has committed significant 
funding to other activities such as networking and training 
in the form of staff exchanges and training courses (e.g. 
numerical, experimental), as well as efforts to standardise 
test protocols and improve testing capabilities (MARINET 
2015). A second phase of the scheme (MARINET2) 
commenced in 2017 under Horizon 2020, broadening the 
number of facilities to 57 test facilities across 13 countries, 
with no explicit focus on capacity building and networking. 
It should be noted that MARINET only funded researchers 
or developers to utilise test facilities outside their countries 
of residence.
In 2016, FORESEA, a similar initiative, was established 
under the EU-funded Interreg North-West Europe28. It 
brings together four test facilities across four countries, 
covering up to 100% of the costs of testing at these, 
including EMEC in the UK. Crucially, unlike MARINET, UK 
developers can apply for these funds to test free-of-charge 
in the UK and it funds the use of real-sea test facilities 
rather than onshore test facilities (e.g. wave tanks). 
5.3.1.5 Training
The UK is also home to a host of important multi-university 
training networks for wave energy RD&D with three CDTs: 
 n Industrial Doctorate Centre in Offshore Renewable 
Energy (IDCORE) – established in 2011 between the 
Universities of Edinburgh, Strathclyde and Exeter, 
the Scottish Association for Marine Science and HR 
Wallingford. It is co-funded by the ETI and the EPSRC 
RCUK Energy programme.
 n Centre for Doctoral Training in Wind & Marine Energy 
Systems (WMES) – established in 2014 between the 
Universities of Oxford and Cranfield and funded by 
EPSRC.
 n Centre for Doctoral Training in Renewable Energy 
Marine Structures (REMS) – established in 2014 
between the Universities of Edinburgh and Strathclyde 
and funded by EPSRC.
Both IDCORE and REMS offer engineering doctorates 
(EngDs), whilst WMES offers a PhD programme. The 
key difference between an EngD programme and a PhD 
programme is that the former offers a direct link with 
industry, with ‘students spending 75% of their time working 
in their companies but will attend intensive training periods 
at the universities for taught modules, group project 
working and other activities’ (REMS 2017). In addition to 
industrial placements and supervision, these programmes 
host regular events to support research dissemination, 
training and networking. It should also be noted that all 
three centres are funded by EPSRC but IDCORE has been 
co-funded by ETI, providing a very strong industrial focus.
European training networks have also been established, 
notably the two phases of WaveTrain, which ran from 2004 
to 2012, bringing together a combination of universities 
and wave energy developers from eight countries, focused 
explicitly on creating a pool of specialised wave energy 
research professionals to support the emerging industry. 
OCEANET was established in 2013, bringing together 13 
students across ten universities from eight countries, to 
develop the skills required for the design, implementation 
and operation of arrays, as well as develop supporting 
technologies (e.g. connectors, monitoring, O&M) (OCEANET 
2017). As outlined in Section 5.3.1.4, test facility networks 
such as MARINET also offer training. 
28 A European Territorial Co-operation Programme funded by the EC.
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5.3.2  Industry networks
At the European level, the Ocean Energy Europe (OEE) 
association was established in 2006,29 with 115 members 
across Europe. In addition to hosting networking activities, 
OEE plays a special role in defining research and innovation 
priorities for the ocean energy sector through its hosting 
of the European technology and innovation platform for 
ocean energy (TP Ocean), established in 2014 (ETIP Ocean 
2017). Consequently, OEE is recognised by the EC as an 
advisory body to inform the design of the SET plan (TP 
Ocean 2016). It also hosts the annual Ocean Energy Europe 
Conference and Exhibition and produces periodic reports 
such as its Strategic Initiative for Ocean Energy (SI Ocean) 
series, which highlighted key priorities for technology 
development and a roadmap for commercial deployment.
5.3.2.2 UK
There are a few major trade associations at UK level, 
the oldest being Scottish Renewables (est. 1996), as 
well as the Renewable Energy Association (REA) (est. 
2001) and RenewableUK (which included marine energy 
in its remit in 2004). Alongside the typical functions 
of lobbying government to develop favourable energy 
policy, these associations also host networking events 
(e.g. conferences), publish periodic foresight reports and 
invite members to shape the associations’ response to 
government (e.g. policy consultations). 
Several networks focus exclusively on knowledge 
exchange. The Wave & Tidal Knowledge Network (W&T 
KTN), originally established by the Crown Estate and 
DECC in 2013, is now managed by the ORE Catapult (ORE 
Catapult 2014). It provides an online repository of datasets 
and reports across the marine energy industry, as well 
as curating a newsfeed about sectoral developments 
(W&T KTN 2017). A similar function was established by 
WES in 2017 as part of their online library, presenting 
outputs from the projects and showcasing what IP has 
been generated, in a bid to foster collaboration and lesson 
sharing (WES 2017c). This is complemented by WES’s 
knowledge-capturing initiatives (Section 5.2.3.2.2).
Finally, in 2014, toe Offshore Renewables Joint Industry 
Programme (ORJIP) was established, the aim of which is 
to reduce consenting risks for offshore energy projects. 
It does this by strategically coordinating RD&D funding 
and activity to address cross-industry challenge, bringing 
together industry, funders and researchers (ORJIP 2015). 
5.3.3 Government networks
Various cross-government networks have also existed 
to improve the degree of policy co-ordination and 
effectiveness at different levels of government.
5.3.3.1 Europe
At the European level, OCEANERA-NET was formed 
in late 2013 to link 16 national and regional funding 
agencies from across the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, 
Netherlands, France, Spain and Portugal. The aim is to 
coordinate activity between European countries and 
regions to better support research and innovation in the 
ocean energy sector (OCEAN ERA-NET 2017). As part of 
its co-ordination activities, OCEANERA-NET has run joint 
funding calls, informed by member state representatives, 
as well as the European Energy Research Alliance Ocean 
Energy Joint Programme, Ocean Energy Forum and 
Technology Platform to develop a shared vision and co-
ordinated action plan.
5.3.3.2 UK
At the UK level, the Marine Energy Programme Board 
(MEPB) was established in 2013 to bring together key 
stakeholders (60-plus members) from companies and 
trade associations from the marine energy sector to 
advise UK Government ministers about how best to meet 
the needs of the UK marine energy sector (UK Gov 2017). 
Special taskforces were established to tackle particular 
sectoral barriers and propose an evidence-based way 
forward (MEPB 2014). According to the UK Government’s 
website it met twice, once in 2013 and 2014, with the 
Programme Management Board meeting another six 
times between 2013 and 2015 to ensure that the MEPB 
workgroups had met their objectives (UK Gov 2017). 
29 Formerly the European Ocean Energy Association and rebranded in 2013.
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In a bid to improve innovation policy co-ordination the 
UK Government recently announced the formation of UK 
Research and Innovation (UKRI) due for 2018, primarily 
to improve co-ordination between the research councils 
and InnovateUK. This followed the recommendations of 
the Nurse Review to ‘support the Research Councils to 
collectively make up more than the sum of their parts’ and 
develop a ‘smoother pathway to more applied research’ 
(UKRI 2017).
Efforts have also been made to improve co-ordination 
specifically of energy innovation across the UK and 
devolved administration governments. The Low Carbon 
Innovation Group (LCIG) was formed in 2008, later 
becoming the LCICG. Its core membership included the 
UK Government’s DECC, BIS, the Carbon Trust, the ETI, 
EPSRC and TSB (now InnovateUK), as well as the Scottish 
Government and Scottish Enterprise. In addition to better 
aligning the activities of UK energy innovation funders by 
providing a forum for regular communication and co-
ordination, the LCICG also published a series of foresighting 
exercises known as Technology Innovation Needs 
Assessments (TINAs) for different energy technology 
areas, including marine energy (published in 2012). These 
identified key innovation needs for low-carbon energy 
technologies and their associated benefits to help the UK 
plan its innovation support, compiled with significant input 
from industry and academia (LCICG 2014a). 
The LCICG was discontinued in 2016 and replaced by the 
Energy Innovation Board (EIB), which provides strategic 
oversight of UK public programmes on energy innovation 
(EIB 2017). Unlike the LCICG, the EIB is made up of senior-
level civil servants and chaired by the Chief Executive 
Designate of UKRI, Sir Mark Walport. Today, it has eight 
members (BEIS, InnovateUK, research councils, DCLG, 
DEFRA, DfID, DfT and Ofgem), one observer (HM Treasury) 
and the devolved administrations are invited to attend 
board meetings (EIB 2017). 
5.3.3.3 Scotland
The Forum for Renewable Energy Development in Scotland 
(FREDS) was established in 2003, an advisory board made 
up of a mixture of industry, academia and government 
experts to help Scotland meet its 2020 targets under the 
Renewables Action Plan, containing a sub-group for marine 
energy (Scottish Government 2015; Scottish Government 
2010). From 2009, this was subsumed into the Scottish 
Energy Advisory Board (SEAB), with no specific marine 
energy group but a Renewables Industry Leadership Group 
(Scottish Government 2017b).
Arguably, the most important development came in 
2014, following the Wave Energy Summit organised by 
the Scottish Government’s First Minister Alex Salmond 
in January 2014 in reaction to the withdrawal of private 
sector investment and the faltering of market leaders 
Pelamis and Aquamarine in the mid-2010s. As explained 
by one senior civil servant, the summit:
‘brought utilities and other investors together in January 
2014, and said to them, “What do you need the public 
sector to do, to keep you at the table?” and they said, “We 
want to see the technology working, so the public sector 
needs to focus on supporting technology development, 
rather than project development”’ (I18)
A key outcome of the summit was an acknowledgement 
that efforts should focus on developing the technology 
first, and supporting technologies and processes second 
(e.g. grid connection, consenting), as well as the critical 
need for collaboration, a more stringent critique of device 
designs and a clear technology roadmap (Bannon 2017). 
The summit ultimately led to the establishment of the 
informal Wave Industry Programme Board in 2014 (see 
Section 7.3.4), which brought together multiple bodies 
to ‘sit down and work out how we could produce a 
programme that would get over the previous problems 
of funding programmes that we’d had’ (I17 – Senior 
public servant). Its membership included the Scottish 
Government, Scottish Enterprise, HIE, the Offshore 
Renewable Energy Catapult, the Carbon Trust, InnovateUK 
and DECC (now BEIS). It was from this that WES emerged 
(Section 5.2.3.2.2).
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5.4 Technology and infrastructure
This section examines synergies with complementary 
technologies from other sectors and the presence and 
evolution of test infrastructure established to support 
wave energy RD&D. 
With regards to technology, the review finds synergies 
across a number of already mature energy technologies, 
notably offshore wind and oil/gas sectors, as well as 
non-energy sectors such as aviation, defence, offshore 
construction, sub-sea mining and shipping.
A review of the UK’s wave energy test facilities identifies 
a very clear progression across both land-based and 
open-ocean test facility capabilities, culminating today 
in a world-class suite of test facilities for wave energy 
developers and researchers stretching across the TRLs 
(Figure 10). With regards to test tanks, clear improvement 
has taken place in capabilities over the past 40 years 
(comprehensive list in Annex D). They have evolved from 
wave flumes offering small-scale testing of devices in 
mono-directional waves to highly complex facilities able 
to replicate real ocean environments and enable testing 
of devices up to 1:10 scale, thus enabling developers to 
test part-scale devices in a much less hostile and easier to 
manage environment than the open ocean. 
In parallel, the UK has also grown its suite of open-ocean 
test facilities, beginning with full-scale grid-connected 
facilities and later expanding to earlier stage part-
scale (1:4) nursery sites (e.g. Scapa Flow at EMEC) and 
multi-device array sites (e.g. WaveHub). Add to this the 
introduction of new sub-component test facilities, we find 
that the UK now offers a comprehensive suite of wave 
energy test facilities stretching across the innovation chain. 
Figure 10: Evolution of land-based wave tanks and open-ocean test facilities since 2000 (source: author)
NOTE: Selection of facilities is for illustrative purposes and does not include all test tanks constructed during this period, which are included in Appendix D. 
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5.4.1 Complementary technologies
Wave energy represents a distinct class of technology but still shares a number of potential synergies with other technology 
sectors, which could offer valuable lessons to support wave energy innovation via cross-fertilisation. Drawing upon work 
conducted by the SI Ocean (2012) project, we find that wave energy could draw upon valuable technological and operational 
‘know-how’ not just from energy sub-sectors, notably offshore wind and oil/gas, but a host of non-energy sub-sectors 
such as aviation, defence, offshore construction, sub-sea mining and shipping. Table 6 outlines the different sectors that 
could offer valuable lessons to inform the development of wave energy sub-components (e.g. PTO, structure/prime mover), 
supporting technologies (e.g. moorings, electrical connections) and processes (e.g. installation, O&M).
Table 6: Potential cross-fertilisation benefits for wave energy from other technology sectors (Source: SI Ocean 2012)
Sector Examples of potential cross-fertilisation
Aviation and defence  n Composites manufacture and automation of manufacturing processes 
Offshore construction and 
sub-sea mining
 n Installation methods (e.g. seabed preparation, vessel usage)
 n Hydrodynamic loading and degradation of structural materials
Offshore wind  n Offshore installation and recovery techniques in tight weather windows
 n Resource assessment and array layout optimisation
 n PTO and sub-sea connection technology
Oil and gas  n Offshore connections (e.g. wet mate connectors)
Shipping  n Survivability of devices and components within the marine environment
 n Mooring and foundations with both permanent and dynamic loading requirements
5.4.2  Wave energy test infrastructure
5.4.2.1 Wave tanks
Central to wave energy technology development has 
been the ability to test device prototypes in facilities that 
replicate ocean environments. At present, there are at least 
30 wave energy generating test facilities or ‘wave tanks’ in 
the UK, the majority of which are operated by universities 
(e.g. Imperial College London, Plymouth, Edinburgh), 
with some others managed by former public sector R&D 
agencies (e.g. Qinetiq, HR Wallingford) (EUROcean_RID 
2017; OREC 2017a; SEL 2014; Edinburgh Designs 2017b). 
These wave tanks use either a bottom-hinged paddle or 
horizontal motion piston-type wave generator across 
a contained body of water (Edinburgh Designs 2017d). 
Whilst wave energy devices are one of the most common 
uses of these facilities, they are also used for a variety of 
other research purposes such as exploring the effects on 
coastal and offshore structures and the transportation 
of sediment. Importantly, test tank technology has 
progressed in parallel with wave energy technology 
innovation, with each new generation of facility offering an 
even greater spectrum of conditions in which to test device 
prototypes.
The first generation of wave tanks took the form of narrow 
flumes such as Edinburgh’s Narrow Tank (Figure 11), 
commissioned in 1974. It was 9m long, 0.3m wide and 
0.6m deep, capable of generating waves up to 0.2m and 
frequencies of up to 2Hz. It represented: ‘a 2D slice, with 
the model fully blocking the width of the tank … [with] 
waves and flow act in a plane’ (Edinburgh Designs 2017c). 
If offered benefits such as excellent visibility and easy 
access but these facilities tended to be limited to very early 
stage experimentation. 
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Figure 11: Stephen Salter (right) testing the Salter 
Duck in an early wave flume (source: Edinburgh Wave 
Power Group)
The next generation of tanks were wider rectangular 
tanks that included numerous flap- or piston-style wave 
makers with multi-directional capabilities to provide a 
wider spectrum of more complex and realistic sea states, 
demanding computer software control of individual paddles 
(Edinburgh Designs 2017b). Their larger size also meant 
that they could generate larger waves and thus test larger 
scale devices. For example, Edinburgh’s Wide Tank (Figure 
12), commissioned in 1977, was 11m long, 28m wide and 
1.2m deep and capable of testing devices up to 100th scale. 
It included 89 absorbing wave makers30 along one of the 
tank’s sides, capable of producing waves up to 0.3m high 
and a rich variety of different sea states that differed in 
terms of ‘amplitude, frequency, starting phase and angle 
relative to the line of wave makers’ (Taylor et al. 2003). 
Figure 12: University of Edinburgh researchers working 
with the Wide Tank (source: Edinburgh Wave Power Group)
The intervening years saw mostly narrow flumes 
commissioned. However, by the 1990s, a number of similar 
tanks were constructed, utilising a similar rectangular 
design. Examples include a 24-paddle tank at Heriot Watt 
University, Edinburgh, in 1996 (12m x 13m x 5m) and 
Imperial College London’s 56-paddle tank (20m x 15m x 
1.5m) in 2003. In general, these larger tanks could replicate 
larger waves and had sufficient space to test small-scale 
arrays.
The third generation of wave tanks offered the simulation 
of even more realistic sea states, this time by developing 
curved rather than rectangular tanks. Edinburgh was once 
again at the forefront, commissioning their curved tank in 
2003 (Figure 13), with a depth of 1.2m and radius of 9m, 
sub-tending an angle of 96o and incorporating 48 wave 
makers (Gyongy et al. 2014). Key advantages included 
removing parallel tank walls that could generate ‘hard-to-
damp’ standing waves and that the curvature allows for 
greater multi-directional wave spread (up to 90o), offering 
a greater workable area in the tank and extra power to be 
generated through focused waves (Edinburgh Wave Power 
Group 2009a). Together with ‘a driven carriage or arm to 
give users easy access to the test area [and] to deploy 
wave measuring gauges’ (Taylor et al. 2003), the curved 
tank could test devices up to 1:70 scale (University of 
Edinburgh 2016). 
Figure 13: University of Edinburgh Curved Wave Tank 
(source: Edinburgh Wave Power Group)
30 Absorbing wave makers enable energy to be quickly absorbed to calm the water ready for a further testing (Edinburgh Wave Power 
 Group 2009b).
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Another important development was the construction of 
tanks enabling researchers to test the combined effects of 
waves, currents and wind. One of the first tanks to achieve 
this was Newcastle University’s Wind Wave Current Tank in 
2004, offering small-scale prototype testing in waves up to 
0.12m high, as well as currents up to 1m/s and wind speeds 
up to 20m/s (Newcastle University 2014).
The latest generation of wave tanks appeared during the 
2010s, including the University of Plymouth’s 24-paddle 
COAST Ocean Wave Basin (35m x 15m x 3m), QinetiQ’s 
122-paddle Ocean Basin and Rotating Arm (122m x 
61m x 4.4m) and HR Wallingford’s 10-paddle Fast Flow 
Facility (F³) (75m x 4m x 3m). However, the best example 
is the FloWaveTT (Figure 14) facility located in Edinburgh, 
constructed in 2014. This constitutes the first 360o tank 
in the UK, 25m in diameter, 2m deep and containing 168 
wave paddles. Importantly, ‘the circular design allows omni-
directional wave and current generation’, meaning that it is 
‘able to simulate any sea conditions around the British Isles’ 
to part scale (Edinburgh Designs 2017a). It also incorporates 
28 tidal current generators capable of generating currents 
up to 1.6m/s, a hydraulic floor to change water depth and 
a crane capable of lifting five tonnes. In culmination, the 
facility can test devices up to 1:10 scale and is large enough 
to test small arrays of devices (FloWaveTT 2016). 
This evolution of test facilities over the past 40 years is 
illustrated by the case of the University of Edinburgh in 
Table 7.
Figure 14: University of Edinburgh FloWaveTT wave tank 
(Source: Dave Morris)
Table 7: Evolution of wave energy test tanks at the University of Edinburgh (source: see below)
Narrow Tank Wide Tank Curved Tank FloWaveTT
Date constructed 1974 1977 2003 2014
Geometry Rectangular Rectangular Curved Circular
Dimensions L 9m x W 0.3m x 
D 0.6m
L 11m x W 28m x D 
1.2m
Radius 9m x D 
1.2m
Diameter 25m x D 2m
Actuator 1 absorbing, uni-
directional, flap-










168 multi-directional wave makers 
360o arc
Max. wave height 0.2m 0.3m 0.22m (at 1Hz) 0.7m
Frequency range 0.5–2Hz 0.5–2Hz 0.5–1.6Hz 0.3–1Hz
Max. current 
speed
- - - 1.6m/s
Scale of model 
testing
1:150–1:100 1:150–1:100 1:100–1:70 1:40–1:10






waves (up to 
90o)
• Omni-directional waves (360o)
• 28 flow-drive submerged units 
simulate current
• Overhead 5t crane for device 
transport
• Rising tank floor to manipulate 
depth
NOTE: Table data taken from numerous sources (Taylor et al. 2003; EWPG 2009; University of Edinburgh 2016; Gyongy et al. 2014; Edinburgh Designs 
2017a; FloWaveTT 2016) and peer reviewed by former University of Edinburgh researcher
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In addition to these wave tank facilities, a wide range of 
other test facilities to support wave energy technology 
R&D also exist, focused primarily on sub-component 
RD&D. Examples include facilities to test the power output 
of PTOs (e.g. EMEC facility established in 2016), as well as 
the strength and durability of moorings (e.g. south west 
mooring test facility at the University of Exeter, established 
in 2009) and WEC components (e.g. dynamic marine 
component test facility at Exeter and Energy Technology 
Centre in East Kilbride) (University of Exeter 2017; Marine 
Energy Systems 2009; MARINET2 2017).
5.4.2.2 Open-sea facilities
To help support device demonstration, the UK has invested 
heavily in full-scale ‘open-sea’ test facilities, including 
EMEC in Scotland (test facility opened in 2004) and 
WaveHub (est. 2010) in England. Importantly, these sites 
offer rich wave energy resources, dock facilities to aid 
installation and maintenance, and a fully permitted space 
for the generation of wave power, avoiding the time and 
costs associated with securing permits. These facilities 
also offer electricity grid connection, meaning that any 
electricity generated can be sold to the grid and monitoring 
facilities installed, such as EMEC’s integrated monitoring 
pod, which transmits real-time data from the seabed to 
provide improved characterisation of the high-energy 
marine environment, to ‘assist in device design, enable 
more accurate assessment of device performance, and 
support operations and maintenance planning’ (EMEC 
2015). 
These facilities do, however, differ in two key ways. 
First, unlike WaveHub, EMEC offers both full-scale test 
sites (e.g. EMEC’s Billia Croo site) and nursery sites (e.g. 
EMEC’s Scapa Flow) for testing of earlier stage, part-scale 
prototypes in less hostile conditions (MARINET2 2017). 
The nursery facility was opened in 2011, a few years 
after the full-scale Billia Croo test site (2004), to ‘provide 
a more flexible sea space helping close the gap from tank 
testing, and acting as a stepping stone towards larger scale 
projects’ (EMEC 2017d; EMEC 2017b). In reaction to this 
need, WaveHub partnered with FabTest, a nursery test site 
situated near Falmouth. 
Second, whilst EMEC was established to offer single 
device testing via its five 2.2MW berths, the latter was 
established to enable deployment of offshore wave energy 
arrays via a 48MW sub-sea hub situated 16km offshore 
(WaveHub 2017) (Figure 15). 
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This section presents an assessment of UK wave 
energy innovation performance since 2000. It examines 
22 predominantly quantitative indicators, each 
corresponding to one of seven different functions of TISs 
(Section 3.2). An overview of the results is presented 
below and in Table 8, with a detailed breakdown offered 
in the following sub-sections.
Since 2000, the UK’s wave energy innovation system has 
exhibited a mixed performance. If we examine the long-
term trends in performance by comparing the second half 
of the period against the first, we find that 14 of the 16 
absolute quantitative indicators exhibit an improvement in 
performance, whilst nine of the 11 normalised quantitative 
indicators show improved relative performance. 
Turning our attention to short-term trends by comparing 
the performance of the last year against the average for 
the whole period excluding the final year we find a slightly 
poorer performance versus the longer term trend, with 
13 of the 18 indicators showing an absolute increase in 
performance and six of the 11 relative indicators showing 
an improvement in relative performance. This suggests 
that wave energy innovation performance has generally 
been much stronger in the second half of the period since 
2000 than before but that performance has started to 
decline recently across some indicators, such as number of 
patents and level of installed capacity. 
Over the period, performance was weakest against 
entrepreneurial experimentation (F3) and market formation 
(F6) and strongest against knowledge development (F1), 
knowledge exchange (F2) and resource mobilisation (F5). 
Overall, this indicates a weaker performance at the later 
stages of the innovation chain, which cannot be wholly 
attributed to a lack of scientific knowledge generation 
or public investment in innovation. We summarise the 
performance against each of the seven TIS functions.
Knowledge development (F1) – The UK’s level of scientific 
publications and associated citations has improved over 
the period both in absolute and relative terms, the latter 
versus its international peers. However, the same cannot 
be said of patents, with a clear downturn in absolute 
terms since 2010 and as a share of global wave energy 
patents since 2005, suggesting that the UK is becoming 
less inventive and/or facing stiffer competition from other 
countries. 
Knowledge exchange (F2) – We note an increasing 
trend in the number of project partners, an important 
proxy of collaboration. We also find that in both absolute 
and relative terms, a major increase in the number of 
projects, including partners from non-energy sectors and 
a combination of industry and science organisations, has 
taken place, evidencing both cross-fertilisation and cross-
innovation collaboration. However, there is less evidence 
to support the notion that international collaboration has 
increased across scientific publications, patents or project 
partnership. 
Entrepreneurial experimentation (F3) – Performance 
is very weak against all three indicators. Analysis of 
wave energy RD&D funding and installed capacity 
uncovers a divergence of technology design rather than 
a convergence. There is also little evidence of wave 
energy technology maturation given that the average 
rated capacity of devices fell by 56% in the second half 
of the period versus the first and the levelised cost of 
electricity (LCOE) of wave energy has increased since 2009 
and remained very high compared to other renewable 
electricity technologies.
Guidance of the search (F4) – A review of wave energy-
related foresight reports found a very strong guidance of 
the search and an increase has taken place in the number 
of these reports in recent years, albeit with a shift in focus 
from later stage demonstration and commercialisation 
to more fundamental experimentation. In parallel, explicit 
government targets for wave energy have steadily reduced 
in ambition, before they were removed altogether by the 
UK Government.
31 With the exception of a significant decline in patenting between 2010 and 2013.
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Resource mobilisation (F5) – The UK wave energy sector 
has seen an increase in funding since 2000, with funding in 
the second half of the period 264% higher than the first half 
in real terms. The government budget for ocean energy 
RD&D as a share of that for all renewables has also grown 
during the period, up from 10% in the first half (2000-2007) 
to 15% in the second half (2007-2014). Human resources, 
measured as the number of higher education engineering 
degrees, remained steady, whilst the share of companies 
with over 50 employees involved in wave energy RD&D 
projects was 55% in 2016, slightly lower than the average 
for the period (64%).
Market formation (F6) – This category saw an initial 
improvement and then decline in performance across 
two indicators. The first was the number of wave energy 
developers, which steadily increased from seven in 2000 to 
30 in 2011, before a steady decline to 24 in 2016, with 14 
developers filing for administration since 2011, including 
market leaders Pelamis and Aquamarine Power. The 
other indicator was cumulative installed capacity, which 
grew from 0.5MW in 2008 to 3.5MW in 2012. However, 
between 2013 and 2016, this fell by two thirds, from 
3.5MW to 1.2MW
Legitimation (F7) – Wave energy’s legitimacy from the 
perspective of government grew in the first half of the 
period, with a host of white papers and parliamentary 
reports calling for increased support for wave energy 
RD&D. However, from the early 2010s, there was a clear 
change in direction, with a removal of formal wave energy 
deployment targets and an absence of official statements 
of support from government ministers. This downturn in 
perceived legitimacy was not however reflected by the 
general public, who have remained strong supporters 
of wave energy, averaging 74% since 2012, greater than 
support for onshore wind (67%) and biomass (62%), and on 
a par with offshore wind (74%). (Source: Dave Morris)
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Table 8: Summary of UK wave energy innovation performance since 2000










































































11% ↗↘ -8% -7%





















2016 18 ↗ +303% +134%














2013 0 ↗↘ +1,500% N/A
















































2016 5 ↗ +386% +229%






































2017 498.5 ↗→ +13% +8%
SECTION 6 
Assessing wave energy 
innovation system performance
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT 
FOR UK WAVE ENERGY INNOVATION SINCE 200054


































F4 – Guidance 
























2016 19.4 ↗ +264% +123%
Share of UK 
renewables  
budget5


















2016 51 ↗ +271% +178%
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2016 1.2 ↗↘ +107% -41%
Share of UK  
marine 
industry6
9% ↗↘ -6% -25%
















2017 79% ↗ +2% +5%
NOTE: Where latest year values are provided as % shares, normally for relative indicators, then changes over period are given as changes in overall share not 
as % change on total 
1. If period is an odd number of years then the two periods will overlap by a year to provide two periods of an equal number of years.
2. Mean excludes last year.
3. Average of past three years (2015–2017) taken against long-run averages to avoid bias towards devices only demonstrated in final year. 2017 includes 
two planned deployments at EMEC.
4. Change on base year for data drawn from RD&D funding database takes 2016 rather than 2017, as grants only taken up to 1/6/2017. 
5. IEA data inclusive of all forms of ocean energy and data for 2008 is missing.
6. Data inclusive of tidal stream.
7. Covers both wave and tidal.
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 The study finds that UK wave energy  
 innovation performance was measurably  
 stronger against most indicators in the  
 second half of the period since 2000  
 (c. 2008–2016) than the first (c. 2000–2007)  
 both in absolute and relative terms but that  
 performance has started to decline in recent  
 years across some of these indicators. 
(Source: Jan Oelker)
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6.1  Knowledge development 
6.1.1 Number of scientific publications
An important proxy of knowledge development at the 
earlier TRLs is the number of scientific publications. 
Analysis of the period 2000–2016 finds that the UK has 
steadily increased its number of wave energy publications, 
publishing 21 times as many publications in 2016 versus 
2000. In relative terms, the UK was second only to the 
US, with 287 scientific journal publications in wave energy 
(Figure 16). The UK also accounted for an average of 15% 
of global publications, with its share steadily increasing 
from 12% between 2000 and 2008 to 16% between 2008 
and 2016. The analysis therefore indicates that the UK’s 
level of knowledge generation at early TRLs has gradually 
increased over the past 15 years in both absolute and 
relative terms.
Figure 16: Top five countries for scientific journal 
publications in wave energy 2000–2016 (source: Scopus)
6.1.2  Number of scientific publication  
citations
Scientific publication citations are another useful indicator, 
acting as a proxy of publication quality. As Figure 17 
illustrates, the UK has seen a strong year-on-year increase 
in citations of wave energy publications, growing from just 
two in 2000 to 720 in 2016. Its share of citations for the 
period was on average 14%, second only to the US, and 
the UK’s share steadily increased from an average of 11% 
between 2000 and 2008 to 14% between 2008 and 2016. 
Whilst this increase in citations can largely be accounted 
for by the increase in publications, we also see a major 
increase in the number of citations per publication, rising 
from four in the first half of the period to 13 in the latter. 
However, with an international trend towards more 
citations per publication, this could be a function of a 
growing propensity to cite other literature in journal papers 
rather than an increase in the quality of the knowledge 
being generated. Furthermore, with an average of 11 
citations per publication, the UK is mid-ranking, behind 
some of its international peers such as the US (17) and 
Australia (22). 
Figure 17: Top five countries for citations of scientific 
publications in wave energy 2000–2016 (source: Scopus)
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6.1.3 Patents
We take patents as another proxy of knowledge 
development, albeit at a later stage along the innovation 
chain than scientific publications. This is because patents 
are typically applied for at the applied research (TRL 3–4) 
and experimental development (5–6) stages of innovation, 
rather than earlier (i.e. fundamental research (TRL 1–2)) 
and later stages (i.e. technology demonstration (TRL 7–8)) 
(Abercrombie & Loebl 2014).
Between 2000 and 2013, the UK filed 152 wave energy 
patents. This followed an increasing trend, with the annual 
number of patents growing from three in 2000 to 20 in 
2008. However, the number of UK wave energy patent 
filings has dropped significantly after 2010, with less than 
half the number of patents filed in 2013 (eight patents) 
than 2010 (20 patents). In terms of its global performance, 
the UK accounted for 18% of global wave energy patents 
during the period, more than any other country including 
the US (Figure 18). However, we find a declining trend in 
the UK’s global share of wave energy patents, which fell 
from an average of 23% between 2000 and 2006 to 16% 
between 2007 and 2013. 
Figure 18: Top five countries for wave energy patents 
2000–2013 (source: EPO)
NOTE: Covers patent classifications: OWC (Y02E 10/32) and/or (Y02E 
10/38) wave energy or tidal swell.
Considering the steady increase in early- to mid-stage 
wave energy R&D during the 2000s (Section 6.5.1), and 
the typical lag of three years between RD&D expenditure 
and patenting (Kondo 1995; Margolis 1999), an increase in 
patent applications would be expected during this period 
rather than the observed decline. This could be the result 
of numerous factors. First, a fall in patenting could indicate 
that wave energy technology has moved beyond the 
early- to mid-TRL stages to later stage demonstration and 
commercialisation, which is not normally associated with 
patenting (Abercrombie & Loebl 2014). However, this is not 
supported by analysis of the other indicators, especially 
those indicating a lack of convergence around an optimal 
device design for wave energy (Section 6.3.1). Second, it 
could be a function of a wider global downward trend in 
wave energy patenting and/or low-carbon technology 
patents since 2000. This is supported by Figure 19, which 
identifies a global downturn in wave energy patenting 
since 2008 and low-carbon technology patents since 2010, 
in contrast to no relative change in the number of patents 
across all technologies since 2000. However, whilst this 
downturn in patenting could more widely account for the 
drop in the total number of wave energy patents, it does 
not account for the UK’s fall in its share of global wave 
energy patents, which suggests that the UK has become 
less inventive in this area.
Figure 19: Wave energy, low-carbon and all patents 
indexed to 2000 (source: EPO)
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6.2  Knowledge exchange
6.2.1  Inter-organisational connectivity
6.2.1.1  Average number of project partners
Knowledge exchange is a difficult phenomenon to measure 
but the degree of connectivity between actors is a good 
indicator that knowledge is being exchanged. Analysis 
of the UK marine energy RD&D grants database reveals 
a trend towards a larger number of partners per project, 
increasing from three in the early 2000s to five during the 
late 2010s (Figure 20). This could be attributed to various 
factors such as a bottom-up move from researchers and 
developers to collaborate more with one another or a top-
down requirement from funders for these actors to form 
larger consortia in order to be eligible for grant funding – 
the latter is discussed in detail in Section 7.3.1.4.
Figure 20: Average number of partners working UK on 
wave energy-related RD&D projects (source: author) 
 
Note: Year of project represents project start date. Only RD&D project 
represented, not training, testing or knowledge exchange. Only projects 
included with a majority focus on ocean energy technology innovation.
6.2.2  International collaboration
The number and breadth of international networks has 
increased dramatically since 2000 (Section 5.3). To assess 
the impact of these growing cross-country networks, we 
measure the degree of international collaboration across: 
1) scientific publications; 2) patents; and 3) grants.
6.2.2.1  International co-authors of scientific  
 publications
International collaboration between UK and non-UK 
authors of scientific articles on wave energy has been 
strong across the period, with 49% of all articles co-
authored with international partners since 2000 (Figure 
21). Whilst the total number of internationally co-authored 
publications has increased significantly in line with the 
overall increase in publications (Section 6.1.1), the share 
of publications authored with international partners has 
remained steady, with 45% of publications between 2000 
and 2008 and 50% between 2008 and 2016. However, 
the low number of publications in the 2000s means that 
we cannot conclusively say that levels of international 
collaboration were already strong at the beginning of the 
period.
Figure 21: Number and share of UK wave energy scientific 
publications co-authored with non-UK partners 
(source: Scopus)
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6.2.2.2 International co-authors of patents
Focusing further up the innovation chain, we examine the 
number and share of patents filed by both UK- and non-
UK-based inventors (Figure 22). The total share of patents 
with non-UK partners steadily increased from zero in 
the early 2000s to a high of 33% in 2011, but dropped to 
zero by 2013, corresponding with an overall fall in wave 
energy patenting internationally. The average share of 
patents applied for with international partners was 12% 
for the period 2000 to 2013 and this share increased in 
the second versus the first half, growing from 4% between 
2000 and 2006 to 16% between 2007 and 2013. The 
statistical significance of this analysis is low given the 
small numbers of wave energy patents filed with overseas 
partners.
Figure 22: Number and share of UK wave energy patents 
filed with non-UK partners 2000–2013 (Source: EPO)
6.2.2.3 International project partners
International collaboration is also measured by analysing 
the number of publicly funded UK wave energy RD&D 
projects conducted with international partners. This 
takes account of UK and devolved administration grants, 
including international partners, but the majority of 
international projects stem from EU FP funds that demand 
partners from at least three different countries. 
Overall, a significant increase has taken place in the 
number of non-UK partners, increasing from just one 
to 36 in 2016 (Figure 23), although this coincided with 
an overall increase in number of projects. However, the 
share of wave energy projects with a non-UK partner has 
gradually risen during the period from 22% during the first 
half (2000 to 2008) to 26% during the second half (2008 to 
2016), suggesting a growing trend towards international 
collaboration. This latter trend corresponds with an overall 
reduction in the share of UK funding and an increase in EU 
and Scottish Government funding (Section 6.5.1), with the 
EU mandating international collaboration via its framework 
programme (e.g. H2020) and the Scottish Government 
encouraging such collaboration via its WES programme.
Figure 23: Number and share of non-UK partners in UK-
based wave energy RD&D projects (source: author)
NOTE: Excludes test infrastructure grants
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6.2.3  Cross-sectoral fertilisation
6.2.3.1  Project partners from outside energy  
 sector
Another important form of knowledge exchange is the 
transfer of knowledge between actors from different 
sectors, often known as ‘cross-sector fertilisation’. In the 
case of wave energy, a host of other technology sectors 
can offer useful insights to help commercialise wave 
power technology (Section 5.4.1). Figure 24 examines 
the number and proportion of companies involved in 
publicly funded UK wave energy projects operating 
primarily in other sectors. Between 2000 and 2005, 
projects involved firms exclusively focused on energy 
technology engineering. However, from 2006, the sector 
saw an influx of companies operating in different sectors. 
Initially, the move came from the maritime and electronic 
manufacturing sectors but, by the 2010s, the defence, 
aviation, plastics, nanotechnology and shipbuilding 
sectors had entered the industry. The level of cross-sector 
fertilisation was between 3% and 5% of project partners 
since the mid-2000s but in 2017 this roughly doubled to 
almost 10%. This trend corresponds with WES’s funding 
of sub-components (e.g. PTO, structural materials and 
manufacturing processes) and novel device designs, with 
an emphasis on drafting ideas from outside the sector. 
Figure 24: Number of organisations engaged in wave 
energy projects from other technology sectors 2000–2017 
(source: author)
NOTE: Share of projects calculated as share of total wave energy-related 
projects, excluding universities, research institutes and non-technology 
development-related service providers (e.g. accountancy, computer 
software). Excludes knowledge exchange, training and test facility grants.
6.2.4  University–industry connectivity
This section considers both the number of publicly funded 
joint university and industry projects relating to wave 
energy (Section 6.2.4.1) and the number of university-
affiliated start-up wave energy-related companies that 
have been established (Section 6.2.4.2).
6.2.4.1 Publicly funded joint university–  
industry projects
Since 2000, the number of new projects including both 
industry and university partners increased during the 
period, from just one or two in the early 2000s to between 
five and 10 in the mid-2010s. The share of joint projects 
also increased, doubling from 9% in the first half of the 
period (2000–2008) to 17% in the second half (2008–
2016), with 35% of projects in 2017 involving actors 
from both science and industry (Figure 25). The picture 
is therefore one of an overall increase in the degree of 
collaboration between industry and science in the wave 
energy sector. 
Figure 25: Number and share of joint industry–university 
wave energy related projects (source: author)
NOTE: Excludes test infrastructure grants. Third sector not-for-profit 
organisations not accounted for.
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6.2.4.2  University-affiliated wave energy  
 companies
Another important proxy for the degree of knowledge 
exchange across different stages of the innovation 
chain is the number of start-up firms emerged from 
universities. Four different wave energy device 
developers can be directly linked to the UK: Pelamis Wave 
Power, Aquamarine Power Ltd, The Bobber Company and 
Aqua Power Technologies, with the first two formerly 
industry leaders. In addition, four other wave energy-
affiliated companies undertake component or test facility 
innovation, including Edinburgh Designs and Artemis 
Intelligent Power (Table 9).
The University of Edinburgh’s wave power group has 
been at the epicentre of much of this spinout activity. 
The team, led by Prof. Stephen Salter, which created 
Salter’s ‘duck’ to generate electricity from the waves in 
the 1970s, generated a wealth of knowledge relating 
to WEC design, high efficiency hydraulic transmission 
and the development of wave test tanks (University of 
Edinburgh 2017). Richard Yemm, a former PhD student of 
Prof. Salter, went on to found Ocean Power Delivery (later 
known as Pelamis Wave Power) in 1998 (The Engineer 
2007). 
Artemis Intelligent Power Ltd also emerged from 
Edinburgh, and was set up by Prof. Win Rampen and Prof. 
Salter in 1994. Its origins are in research relating to the 
design of the gyro Salter duck, which formed the basis 
for Artemis’s digital displacement technology, which 
allowed for high-efficiency control and transmission of 
fluid power able to be applied to wave power (University 
of Edinburgh 2017; Taylor 2008). Another notable wave 
power spin-off company from Edinburgh is Edinburgh 
Designs, a world-leading wave tank developer with its 
roots in the work undertaken in Edinburgh in specifying 
and constructing wave tanks (Section 5.4.2.1). Finally, 
NGenTec is another Edinburgh spin-off, developing direct 
drive generators and the C-GEN Direct Drive PTO, which 
seeks higher levels of efficiency and reliability versus 
hydraulic systems (WES 2017a; SET Ventures 2017).
Beyond Edinburgh, the most high-profile company is 
Aquamarine Power, formed in 2005 by Allan Thomson 
to further develop the Oyster device, an oscillating wave 
surge convertor design first developed by a team at 
Queen’s University Belfast32, led by Prof. Trevor Whittaker 
(Queen’s University Belfast 2012). Other wave energy-
related spinouts include the University of Manchester’s 
The Bobber Company (est. 2006), Brunel University’s 
Aqua Power Technologies (est. 2014) and the University 
of Strathclyde’s Synaptec (est. 2014).
Table 9: Number of wave energy-related companies that emerged from universities 
(source: adapted from New Company Finance)
Name Established Status Universities Area RD&D focus
Artemis Intelligent Power 1977 Trading University of Edinburgh Sub-component PTO (hydraulic)
Edinburgh Designs 1988 Trading University of Edinburgh Test infrastructure Wave tanks
Pelamis Wave Power 1998 Ceased 
trading
University of Edinburgh Device Attenuator




Device Oscillating wave surge 
converter





NGenTec 2009 Trading University of Edinburgh Sub-component PTO (direct drive)
Synaptec 2014 Trading University of 
Strathclyde
Sub-component Connections
Aqua Power Technologies 2014 Trading Brunel University Device Attenuator (multi-axis)
32 Queen’s University Belfast also initially devised the LIMPET device, which was developed further by Wavegen, commissioning a 75kW device 
 in 1991 (QUB 2002).
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6.3 Entrepreneurial experimentation 
Entrepreneurial experimentation involves the 
reduction of risk associated with a technology 
through market-oriented experiments. One way 
of measuring this is through the extent to which 
technological convergence has taken place, 
evidencing a shift towards a common ‘optimal’ 
design proven to work. We measure this by 
examining trends in the concentration of funding 
(Section 6.3.1) and deployment (Section 6.3.2) 
of different device designs. We also examine the 
maturity of wave energy technology by examining 
the extent to which the device rated power 
capacity of wave energy devices has increased 
(Section 6.3.2) and its LCOE (Section 6.3.3). We 
compare wave energy’s performance against tidal 
stream to help benchmark wave energy’s progress.
6.3.1 Convergence around a single 
device design
Figure 26 and 27 highlight very clearly how 
funding has been distributed across a wide range 
of wave energy designs with a distinct lack of 
convergence (see Section 2.1 for an overview of 
designs). In the early 2000s, funding was largely 
split between attenuators (e.g. Pelamis’s P1 and 
P2) and OWCs (e.g. Wavegen’s LIMPET). Whilst 
attenuators continued to receive the most funding 
of any design, OWCs saw funding reduced with 
an influx of funds for overtopping/terminator (e.g. 
Wavedragon), submerged pressure differential (e.g. 
Checkmate’s Anaconda) and oscillating wave surge 
convertor (e.g. Aquamarine Power’s Oyster) devices 
amongst others. Post-2014 funding shifted again 
with a major fall in funds for traditional devices 
in favour of rotating mass devices (e.g. WelloOy’s 
Penguin) and entirely novel device designs (see 
Other), the latter in part a function of WES’s novel 
wave energy convertor funding call. 
This lack of convergence can be illustrated by the 
fact that during the first half of the period (2000–
2008) the most well-funded device design received 
a 47% share of of RD&D funding, compared to only 
35% in the second half (2009–2017), suggesting a 
weakening convergence of support around a single 
dominant design.
Figure 26: Share of RD&D funding committed to different wave 
energy device designs 2000–2017 (source: author)
NOTE: Covers both experimental development (TRL 5–6) and demonstration (TRL 
7–8), and grants up to 1st June 2017.
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 Whilst tidal stream has witnessed a  
 convergence around a single device design,  
 namely horizontal axis turbines, wave  
 energy has exhibited the opposite. 
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If we compare the technological convergence 
for wave against tidal stream (Figure 28 and 29) 
we find that during early 2000s saw funding for 
tidal devices split almost exclusively between 
horizontal axis turbines (e.g. Andritz Hydro 
Hammerfest, Atlantis) and oscillating hydrofoil 
devices (e.g. Pulse Tidal), with some funding 
committed to the enclosed tips (venturi) (e.g. 
DCNS Open Hydro) turbines by the mid-2000s. 
However, if we compare the first half of the 
period (2000 to 2008) versus the second half 
(2009 to 2017) we find that the share of funding 
awarded to horizontal axis turbines grew from 
60% to 81%, demonstrating a strong degree 
of convergence around a single device design. 
Whilst we acknowledge that the heterogeneous 
nature of the ocean wave regime and he need for 
different device designs to best take advantage of 
the characteristically distinct onshore, nearshore 
and offshore environments (see Figure 2), the 
contrast in the degree of convergence between 
wave and tidal stream is stark.
Figure 28: Share of RD&D funding committed to different tidal 
stream device designs 2000–2017 (source: author)
NOTE: Covers both experimental development (TRL 5–6) and demonstration (TRL 
7–8), and grants up to 1st June 2017.
Figure 29: Share of tidal stream energy RD&D funding by device 
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6.3.2 Rated power capacity
One indicator of energy technology maturity is the rate at which the rated capacity33 of each device has increased over 
time. As Figure 30 illustrates, the rated capacity of new iterations of wave energy devices developed by UK developers 
or tested in UK waters has witnessed a decline over the past 15 years, with the average rated capacity of wave energy 
devices over the past 3 years (2015-2017) was 70% lower than the remainder of the period between 2000 and 2014. 
The period up to the early 2010s saw demonstration of devices pushing 1MW, with Pelamis’ 750kW P2, Aquamarine 
Power’s 800kW Oyster and WelloOy’s 500kW Penguin device. However, from the early 2010s onwards, when Pelamis 
and Aquamarine ceased trading, the average power rating of devices demonstrated fell dramatically, with the largest 
being CorPower’s 250kW point absorber, due for deployment at EMEC in 2017. Figure 30 also illustrates the relative lack 
of convergence around a single device design, supporting the findings in Section 6.3.1. 
Figure 30: Evolution of wave energy device capacity rating by developer and device type (source: author)
NOTE: * - Non-UK companies testing devices in the UK; ^ - Planned deployments at EMEC for 2017. Ignores redeployment of the same devices, instead 
listing new iterations of devices.
33 This relates to the rated capacity of the device, i.e. the maximum rather than the average power output.
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 The average rated capacity of wave   
 energy devices over the past three years   
 (2015-2017) was 70% lower than the  
 remainder of the period between 2000 and  
 2014. In contrast tidal stream saw a 124%  
 increase in the average rated capacity  
 during the same period. 
(Source: Shutterstock)
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In contrast to wave energy, the tidal stream sector has witnessed a gradual convergence around the horizontal axis 
turbine design, representing 77% of demonstration projects between 2003 and 2017 tested by UK developers or in 
UK waters (Figure 31). Furthermore, during this period, the sector saw an increase in the rated capacity of tidal stream 
devices, growing from the 300kW Seaflow device to three devices being tested at over 1.5MW, namely the Hammerfest 
Strom’s HS1500 (1.5MW), Atlantis’ AR1500 (1.5MW)34 and Scottish Renewables’ SR2000 M1 (2MW)35, suggesting that 
tidal stream technology is maturing at a much faster rate than wave technology. In contrast to wave energy tidal stream 
saw a 124% increase in the average rate capacity during the past three year (2015-2017) versus the remainder of the 
period (2000-2014).
Figure 31: Evolution of tidal stream device capacity rating by developer and device type (source: author)
 
NOTE: * - Non-UK companies testing devices in the UK
A different proxy of maturity that can be taken between wave and tidal stream energy is the total number of unit 
deployments of a technology (MacGillivray et al. 2015). Here, the UK has hosted 26 new iterations of tidal stream devices 
versus 16 for wave energy despite a greater degree of design convergence, suggesting a greater level of knowledge 
development and maturity overall. However, both marine technologies are some distance away from the hundreds or 
thousands of unit deployments observed for mature technologies such as steam, gas and wind turbines (MacGillivray et 
al. 2015).
34 Atlantis’ AR 1500 co-developed with the US’s Lockheed Martin.
35 ScotRenewables SR2000 M1 is two 1MW turbines on one floating structure.
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6.3.3 Levelised cost of electricity
Finally, an important metric of entrepreneurial 
experimentation is a reduction in the cost of the 
technology developed, in this case electricity generated. 
As outlined in Figure 32, unlike solar PV (crystalline 
silicon) and to a lesser extent offshore wind, the LCOE36 
for wave energy has risen rather than fallen, from $380/
MWh in 2009 to $500/MWh by 2012. Tidal stream energy 
has demonstrated a similar trend but sits at the lower 
cost of $442/MWh. In contrast, other renewable energy 
technologies’ LCOE has fallen dramatically, for example, 
solar PV has seen a fall of two thirds.
Figure 32: Levelised cost of electricity generated by wave 
energy 2009–2017 (source: Bloomberg)
6.4.1 Wave energy technology foresight reports
Between 1999 and 2017, our research identified 
45 ‘foresight’ reports explicitly dealing with wave or 
marine energy, with 27 delivered by UK organisations, 
ten by European organisations and seven by Scottish 
organisations (Figure 33). Most of these were delivered 
by governments (19), with a large number of non-
governmental (e.g. trade associations, research centres) 
organisations (14) and government-affiliated (e.g. NDPBs, 
advisory groups) (12) reports. This indicates a relatively 
even split between the guidance of the search across 
different sectors and levels of governance (i.e. Scotland, 
the UK and the EU). 
In addition, during the early 2010s, the frequency of reports 
increased over time and a gradual downgrading took place 
in the innovation stage targeted by these reports, with many 
influential reports suggesting that wave energy was only ten 
to 15 years away from large-scale commercial deployment 
during the mid-2000s before a gradual refocusing on earlier 
stage R&D (Figure 33).
Figure 33: Overview of wave energy-related technology 
foresight reports between 1999 and 2017 (source: author) 
 
 
NOTE: Reports identified following rigorous literature review. However, 
there is potential for some reports to be missing if not identified by 
desk-based survey and expert elicitation. Excludes roadmaps with a 
global focus (e.g. OES). TRL focus relates to the report’s primary focus for 
innovation over the forthcoming 20-year period.
6.4 Guidance of the search 
The ‘guidance of the search’ relates to the pressures that 
influence whether organisations commit resources to 
wave energy innovation and the focus of their efforts. To 
gauge the strength and direction of the ‘guidance of the 
search’ for wave energy, we examine the number and 
focus of foresight reports (e.g. policy strategies, roadmaps, 
technology innovation needs assessments) examining the 
potential role of wave energy in a future energy system 
and the steps that need to be taken to help it play this 
role. We also consider the ambition of targets for future 
deployment of wave energy.
36 LCOE data is taken from Bloomberg, the methodology for which is outlined by Salvatore (2013): ‘The calculation of LCOEs in this preliminary 
 report is based on empirical data wherever possible. The data includes capital costs, operating costs, the cost of finance and load factors – either 
 experienced or projected, and they are from actual projects that have been or are currently being built. Where actual project cost data is 
 incomplete the analysis uses Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s trend analysis on technology and financing costs’ (p. 39).
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This transition from encouraging demonstration and 
deployment to earlier stage experimentation is also 
supported by our analysis of the UK’s 2020 visions and 
scenarios for marine energy deployment. From as early as 
the mid-2000s, reports from the DTI, British Wind Energy 
Association (BWEA) and Carbon Trust outlined lofty targets 
for the marine energy sector, with the DTI, for example, 
envisaging between 1.4 and 4.5GW of deployment by 2020 
(DTI 2004) (Figure 34). This pressure to scale up continued 
during the late 2000s, evidenced by a series of reports 
with a very strong focus on later stage pre-commercial 
demonstration and commercial deployment, most notably 
the DECC’s marine energy action plan (DECC 2010), which 
targeted approximately 1 to 2GW of marine energy by 
2020, albeit with the target including tidal range. 
This focus on relatively short-term commercial deployment 
began to dissipate with a recognition that wave energy 
was not advancing as quickly as first hoped, evident 
in a steady reduction in deployment targets for 2020 
(Figure 34) and the increasing number of reports focusing 
on earlier stage innovation (Figure 33). This shift in 
expectation is best illustrated by the UK Government’s 
target of between 1 and 2GW of deployment by 2020 
(DECC 2010), falling to between 200 and 300MW in its 
2011 UK renewable energy roadmap the following year 
(DECC 2011). Furthermore, the subsequent two updates of 
the roadmap (DECC 2012; DECC 2013d) did not specify a 
marine energy deployment target. 
This downgrading of 2020 visions for deployment 
suggests that wave energy was making slower progress 
than expected. In this context, we would expect targets to 
drop as we advanced closer to 2020. However, importantly, 
these were not normally refreshed, with similarly 
ambitious targets for 2050 not put in place.
Figure 34: Wave and tidal stream 2020 deployment scenarios across Scotland, the UK and Europe (source: author)
 
NOTE: For consistency, the scenarios include deployment of just wave and tidal stream. 
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6.5 Resource mobilisation
This sub-section considers two forms of resource 
mobilisation, namely financial (Section 6.5.1) and human 
(Section 6.5.2), which both represent critical inputs into the 
wave energy innovation process.
6.5.1 Financial resources 
Between 2000 and 2017, £545m of public grants were 
awarded to marine energy. Of the amount awarded to 
RD&D activities, tidal stream received 47% (£178m), 
followed by wave at 27% (£102m) and cross-cutting 
marine RD&D at 26% (£96m). If we take wave and cross-
cutting marine energy RD&D together, £198m has been 
spent on wave energy-related projects (Table 10), with a 
further £170m awarded to the installation, operation and 
maintenance of marine test infrastructure. 
Table 10: Summary of public funds awarded for wave and 
tidal stream energy RD&D 2000–2017 (source: author)









If we consider this split in funding over time (Figure 35), we 
find that in 2016 funding for wave energy-related RD&D 
(including cross-cutting but excluding tidal stream and test 
infrastructure) was running at more than double the long-
run average between 2000 and 2015, representing a 123% 
increase. Taking a longer term view we find that funding 
for RD&D activity taking place during the second half of the 
period (2008 to 2016) stood at £130m, more than three 
times that of the first period (2000 to 2008), which was 
£36m.
From the mid-2000s, tidal stream energy also consistently 
received more RD&D funding than wave energy, although 
the share of funding for wave energy versus tidal has 
increased significantly in recent years following the 
formation of WES. Finally, a significant increase has also 
taken place in cross-cutting funding during the early 
2010s, typically supporting either earlier stage research 
or later stage development of technologies (e.g. moorings, 
connections) and services (e.g. O&M, installation) relevant 
to both wave and tidal stream energy.
Figure 35: UK public RD&D funding for marine energy 
projects by research area 2000–2017 (source: author)
 
 
NOTE: Excludes test infrastructure. Funding for 2017 
only for grants up to 1st June 2017.
It is also important to consider whether this increase 
in resources was indicative of a targeted bid from 
government to support wave energy innovation or a 
broader increase in renewable energy support. Analysis 
of the IEA data reveals that, between 2000 and 2014, the 
UK’s ocean energy budget stood at £127.6m37, accounting 
for 14% of the UK’s total renewable energy RD&D budget 
and 4% of its RD&D budget for all forms of energy.
Ocean energy’s share of the UK’s renewable energy RD&D 
budget also increased during this period, accounting for 
£26m (10%) between 2000 and 2007, versus £107m 
(15%) between 2007 and 2014.38 By 2014, ocean energy 
accounted for 31% of the UK’s renewable energy RD&D 
budget and 6% of its total energy RD&D budget, illustrating 
that an increase in the funding allocation for wave energy 
in both absolute and relative terms.
37 The total budget for ocean energy (£130m) is significantly lower than the actual awarded funds for wave and tidal stream energy (£552m). Both 
 cover capital and current costs for basic research, applied R&D, experimental development and demonstration (IEA 2011). Reasons for the 
 IEA value being significantly lower could include the IEA data not covering funding for 2015 to 2017 and some pre-commercial demonstration 
 programmes (e.g. MRDF, MEAD) with a strong emphasis on array deployment being excluded because they were classified as deployment. The 
 IEA value is surprisingly low considering that budgets for marine energy specific programmes total almost £200m (see Annex C), excluding EU 
 funds and non-marine energy-specific programmes.
38 IEA data for 2008 UK ocean energy RD&D budget is missing.
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It is also important to consider the level of RD&D 
funding committed to wave energy at a global level, 
considering that technology innovation represents a 
global phenomenon and developments outside the UK will 
dictate the pace at which wave energy progresses towards 
commercialisation. 
Compared to other renewable and supporting technologies, 
ocean energy received a very small share of public support 
amongst the 29 countries (includes EC) (Figure 36). Overall, 
since 2000, $0.9bn has been committed by IEA countries to 
ocean energy,39 accounting for 2% of the global renewables 
RD&D budget. Interestingly, its share remained very low 
during the early 2000s, sitting at between 0.5% and 1%, 
although this steadily increased from the mid-2000s, rising 
to almost 3.5% by 2014. However, the cumulative budget 
for ocean energy is dwarfed in comparison to the funding 
now committed to much more mature renewable electricity 
generation technologies such as solar PV $11bn (31%) 
and, to a lesser extent, wind, which received $4bn (11%). A 
similar dynamic exists if we go back to the early 1970s, with 
ocean energy receiving only $1.8bn (3%) versus $25bn (40%) 
for solar and $7.5bn (12%) for wind, suggesting that wave 
energy’s failure to reach commercialisation could be linked 
to its level of funding. 
Figure 36: Ocean energy’s share of global public renewable 
energy RD&D budget 2000–2014 (source: IEA)
 
NOTE: IEA data excludes private sector investment and is for government 
budgets rather than actual spend.
6.5.1.1 Funding by stage of innovation
If we examine public funding of wave energy by innovation 
stage we find a clear shift away from an initial emphasis 
on demonstration, towards earlier stage innovation 
activities during the period. The first half of the period 
(2000 to 2008) saw 40% of public wave energy-related 
RD&D reserved for basic or applied research, 14% for 
experimental development and 43% for demonstration, 
with the remainder committed to training (2%) and 
knowledge transfer and exchange (1%) (Figure 37 and 
Table 11). If we compare this split against the second 
period (2008 to 2016) we find that the share committed 
to demonstration fell to 31%, whilst the combined share 
of funding awarded to basic research, applied R&D and 
experimental development rose from 54% to 65%, with the 
remainder given over to training and knowledge exchange. 
This gradual decline in later stage innovation in favour of 
earlier stage R&D is contrary to what we might normally 
expect for technology innovation, where greater sums of 
demonstration funding are awarded as the technology 
matures and moves closer to market.
Figure 37: UK public RD&D funding for wave energy-
related projects by innovation stage 2000–2017 
(source: author)
 
NOTE: Includes RD&D activity explicitly related to wave energy or cross-
cutting marine energy. Excludes test infrastructure.
39 This includes all forms of ocean energy, such as tidal stream, tidal range, ocean thermal energy conversion and salinity gradient.
SECTION 6 
Assessing wave energy 
innovation system performance
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT 
FOR UK WAVE ENERGY INNOVATION SINCE 200072
Table 11: Wave energy and cross-cutting marine energy innovation funding in the UK by innovation stage for projects taking 
place between 2000 and 2022 (source: author) 








Basic or applied 
research 14.4 40% 63.9 49% 86.9 44%
Experimental 
development 4.9 14% 20.2 16% 29.3 15%
Demonstration 15.5 43% 39.8 31% 69.2 35%
Training 0.6 2% 4.2 3% 8.6 4%
Knowledge transfer 
and networking 0.3 1% 1.8 1% 3.9 2%
Total (exc. test 
facilities) 35.7 130 197.9
6.5.1.2    Funding by government funder
Table 12 and Figure 38 present the total funding awarded 
between 2000 and 2017 to wave energy related RD&D 
by government funder, covering projects running to 2022. 
Overall, the UK Government was the largest funder, 
awarding £93m (47%), followed by the EU with £53m 
(27%), the Scottish Government with £49m (25%) and other 
devolved administrations with £2.9m (1%). 
This funding mix has changed significantly over time, 
with the UK Government playing a significantly less 
important role in recent years, whilst the EU has played a 
significantly more important role. For example, the split 
of RD&D funding was 69% UK Government, 23% Scottish 
Government, 7% EU and 1% other devolved administrations 
in the period between 2000 and 2008. However, for 
projects between 2008 and 2016, the funding mix changed 
dramatically, with the UK Government accounting for 49% 
of awarded funding, the EU 26%, the Scottish Government 
23% and other administrations 2%. Interestingly, a 
snapshot of funded projects in 2016 reveals that the UK 
government accounted for only 31% of awarded funds, 
whilst the EU stood at 33% and the Scottish Government 
36%, further highlighting the UK’s steady withdrawal 
compared to the EU and Scottish Government’s growing 
commitment.
Figure 38: UK public RD&D funding for wave energy-related 
projects by funder 2000–2017 (source: author)
NOTE: Includes RD&D activity explicitly related to wave energy or cross-
cutting marine energy. Excludes test infrastructure. Funding for 2017 only 
for grants up to 1st June 2017.
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Table 12: Wave energy and cross-cutting marine energy innovation funding in the UK by government funder for projects 









UK Government 24.5 69% 63.6 49% 93.2 47%
European 
Commission
2.4 7% 34.1 26% 52.7 27%
Scottish 
Government




0.1 0% 1.9 1% 1.9 1%
Welsh 
Government
0.4 1% 0.8 1% 1.0 0%
Total (exc. test 
facilities)
35.7 130 197.9
NOTE: Excludes test infrastructure. Funds from EC’s structural funds (e.g. ERDF) classified under EC funds rather than devolved 
administrations (e.g. Welsh Government). 
6.5.2 Human resources
We examine two proxies of human resources, the number 
of wave energy-related graduates (Section 6.5.2.1) and 
the number of employees working for companies involved 
in UK Government-funded wave energy projects (Section 
6.5.2.2).
6.5.2.1 Number of higher education graduates
This report draws upon data from the HESA for higher 
education degrees obtained with relevance to wave energy 
technology. We take two subject categories – maritime 
technology, the closest to wave energy available, and 
engineering, which covers the various engineering subjects 
most relevant to wave energy (e.g. naval architecture, 
electronic and electrical engineering, mechanical 
engineering) – covering both doctorates and ‘other higher 
degrees’40 (Figure 39 and 40). We acknowledge that not all 
of these graduates will necessarily work in the wave energy 
sector. However, they are a proxy of the supply of relevant 
skilled individuals who could potentially work in the sector 
and therefore the level of appropriate human resource.
In 2016, the UK trained 20 maritime engineering 
doctorates and 185 students taking other higher degrees. 
The number of maritime doctorates remained steady 
during the period 2010 to 2016 apart from a spike in 2013, 
with the number of other higher degrees increasing by 
over 50%. Examining engineering more broadly in 2016, the 
UK trained 3,170 doctorates and 14,380 students taking 
other higher degrees. Together, the number of advanced 
engineering degrees has increased by 18% over the period. 
In summary, there appears to be a supply of highly trained 
individuals with the broad skills necessary to conduct wave 
energy RD&D and the number of engineers has climbed 
steadily over the past few years.
40 Higher degrees primarily relate to those after postgraduate studies (e.g. MSc), including doctorates (incorporating new route PhDs) and Master’s 
 degrees studied primarily through research (e.g. MRes).
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Figure 39: Number of doctorates obtained in wave energy-
related studies 2010–2016 (source: HESA)
Figure 40: Number of higher degrees other than doctorates 
obtained in wave energy-related studies 2010–2016 
(source: HESA)
6.5.2.2 Project partners’ employee numbers
Another important proxy for human and also financial 
resources is the relative size of companies involved in 
UK wave energy projects. Figure 41 illustrates the mix of 
different sized companies, specifically the proportion of 
these made up of medium-sized companies or larger – i.e. 
more than 51 employees. Ignoring the very early years 
due to small number of projects, the proportion of these 
companies remained relatively high at between 50% and 
65% in the mid-2000s, growing to between 70% and 80% in 
the late 2000s and early 2010s, before falling after 2013 to 
around 50%. Interestingly, despite the high-profile failures 
of leading wave energy developers in the mid-2010s, large 
corporations have remained active in the sector41. However, 
this masks the fact that 96% of wave energy developers 
funded since 2000 were micro, small or medium sized 
enterprises, with no more than 200 employees.42
Figure 41: Size of UK wave energy project partners by 
numbers of employees (source: author)
 
 
NOTE: Size of companies taken as of 2017 so does not account for growth 
or contraction during period.
41 The data is likely to be biased against the number of large corporations because these corporations may not target government funds as they 
 are able to fund projects internally or via institutional investors.
42 This only takes into account developers for which we have employment data. The figure is likely to be much higher than 96% in reality as 
 employee data was missing for some companies of very small sizes.
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6.6 Market formation
We take two important proxies of market formation for the 
UK wave energy sector. These include the number of wave 
energy developers (Section 6.6.1) and the level of installed 
capacity (Section 6.6.2).
6.6.1 Number of wave energy developers
Figure 42 presents the number of wave energy developers 
active for any given year since 2000. Between 2000 and 
2011, the number of developers more than quadrupled 
from seven to 30. However, since 2011, there has been a 
steady decline, with the number of operational developers 
dropping to 24 in 2016. In total, between 2011 and 2017, 
14 developers filed for administration, including market 
leaders Pelamis and Aquamarine Power.  
Figure 42: Number and device focus of wave energy 
developers operating in the UK 2000–2017 (source: author)
NOTE: Developers considered active or inactive primarily according 
to Companies House register. Developers identified via a combination of 
RD&D funding database, sectoral reports and expert interviews. 
Data correct up to 1st August 2017.
6.6.2 Installed capacity
Installed capacity is used as a proxy of the scale of market 
formation. Figure 43 illustrates the level of installed 
capacity between 2007 and 2016, taking nationality as the 
country hosting the installed capacity. The UK performed 
strongest during the period compared to other countries, 
with a major growth from 0.5MW in 2008 to 3.5MW in 
2012. However, between 2013 and 2016, the capacity of 
operational devices dropped by two thirds, from 3.5MW to 
1.2MW.43 Notably, whilst UK capacity fell, other countries 
such as Sweden, China and Belgium also saw an increase 
in installed capacity. 
Figure 43: Top ten countries for installed capacity of wave 




Wave energy’s decline in market size since 2013 is in 
contrast to tidal stream energy, which has witnessed a 
major increase since 2015, doubling from 6MW to 12MW 
(Figure 44). This was exclusively due to the commissioning 
of the four device Meygen array in the north of Scotland, 
with a combined capacity of 6MW. There is another 6MW 
of additional capacity approved for 2019.
43 The installed capacity data does not include installations by UK-based companies in other countries, such as Pelamis’ three-device (2.25MW) 
 wave farm in Aguçadoura, Portugal, in 2008 or 40SouthEnergy’s two installations off the coast of Italy between 2013 and 2015. Importantly, the 
 Pelamis array generated very little electricity before equipment failure and subsequent decommissioning.
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Figure 44: Comparison of UK-installed capacity for wave 
and tidal stream energy 2007–2016 
(source: adapted from OES)
6.7 Legitimation
Legitimation is the process of making something 
acceptable to a particular audience. The process of 
creating legitimacy for an energy technology is difficult to 
measure, however the degree of legitimacy attached to a 
technology is easier to gauge. Whilst the level of funding 
(Section 6.5.1) and the size of government deployment 
targets (Section 6.4.1) are important proxies of this, we 
focus on two different measures to illustrate the extent of 
wave energy’s perceived legitimacy: the degree of political 
(Section 6.7.1) and public support (Section 6.7.2) for wave 
energy.
6.7.1 Government support for marine energy
A review of UK Government official reports uncovered 
six government white and green papers44 and four UK 
parliamentary select committee reports with direct 
relevance to wave energy. Figure 45 demonstrates how 
both the UK Government and parliament were very much 
in support of developing wave energy during the 2000s 
and the early part of the 2010s. We summarise these 
developments below.
Following a number of influential reports highlighting 
the potential of wave energy and calling for additional 
support for wave energy innovation from the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
(1999), the Office of Science and Technology Foresight 
Report on marine energy was produced (Office of Science 
and Technology 1999) and the Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution (Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution 2000) and the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee conducted a special 
enquiry into wave and tidal energy in the UK. This 
concluded that there was a need for a reinstatement of 
wave energy innovation funding: 
‘It is extremely regrettable and surprising that the 
development of wave and tidal energy technologies has 
received so little support from the Government … We 
welcome the growing recognition by Government of the 
energy potential of a range of offshore technologies. We 
hope it will lead to a coherent strategy for technology 
development and long-term investment’ (House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee 2001)
This recognition of wave energy’s potential was 
underpinned by an update of the Government’s own 
Energy Technology Support Unit’s (ETSU)45 report of the 
potential of wave energy: an independent review of the 
conflicting evidence and further evaluation of offshore 
wave power following the discontinuation of funding in the 
1970s and 1980s. It concluded that:
‘DTI’s earlier review of wave energy found that the 
optimistic expectations for the original wave energy 
devices were unfounded. Nevertheless, the same review 
methodology now indicates that wave energy could 
become a useful source of energy’ (Thorpe 1999 p.iii).
44 White papers are government policy initiatives and proposals for legislation, whilst green papers are government consultation documents (UK 
 Parliament 2017).
45 Later known as AEA Technology. 
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Successive government white papers and parliamentary 
committee reports subsequently identified wave energy as 
a technology that could play an important role in the UK’s 
low-carbon transition and as a priority for government 
support. One of the best examples is the House of 
Commons Committee on Energy and Climate Change’s 
2012 report on the future of marine renewables, which 
made the following recommendation:
‘While we recognise that funding is limited in the 
current economic climate, we nevertheless feel that the 
Government’s funding for marine renewables represents 
a modest investment for what is a world-leading 
industry with the potential to bring significant benefits to 
the UK’ (HoCECCC 2012 p.13)
This commitment seemingly shifted in 2013. Greg Barker, 
then Minister of State for Climate Change, offered clear 
support during a speech in February 2013, emphasising 
that:
‘This government supports wave and tidal 110% ... Now 
is the time for bold next steps – moving from individual 
projects to large-scale arrays’ (DECC 2013b). 
However, by the time the DECC published its renewable 
energy roadmap in November 2013, its confidence in wave 
energy had clearly diminished: 
‘In the 2011 roadmap we set out a profile of potential 
deployment by 2020 for wave and tidal stream energy. 
This suggests a range of between 200 and 300MW of 
deployed capacity. However, the delays in progressing 
to pre-commercial array demonstration and a better 
understanding of the challenges for both the wave and 
tidal stream sectors suggests that the actual levels of 
deployment may be lower than predicted’ (DECC 2013d)
Evidence indicates that this crisis of confidence was 
closely aligned to market leaders such as Pelamis going 
into administration, as noted by then Minister of State for 
Climate Change Ed Davey in a speech in November 2014: 
‘Despite Government support … it remains difficult 
to attract risk-averse funders. We have seen planned 
array projects which have been shelved or pushed to 
the right. And last week’s sad news about Pelamis 
Wave Power filing for administration shows that risk 
aversion has real, and potentially devastating, effects on 
companies, their employees and families. This is always 
hugely disappointing for all concerned … such recent 
developments are … stark reminders of how fragile and 
young the industry is’ (DECC 2014)
A clear change in government policy subsequently 
became clear with the formation of a new Conservative 
government in 2015, reflected in a speech by Amber Rudd 
int he same year, then Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change. It focused on emphasising the importance 
of ‘picking winners’ and focusing on those technologies 
demonstrating the greatest potential or a low-carbon 
transition.
‘Energy research and development has been neglected 
in recent years in favour of the mass deployment of all 
renewable technologies. We do not think this is right. We 
cannot support every technology. Our intervention has 
to be limited to where we can really make a difference 
– where the technology has the potential to scale up 
and to compete in a global market without subsidy’ (UK 
Government 2015a)
No reference was made to either wave or marine energy, 
instead supporting other technologies such as energy 
storage, low-carbon transport fuels and energy-efficient 
lighting. This lack of support for wave energy was echoed 
in the Government’s latest green paper outlining its 
industrial strategy (BEIS 2017a) and received only a 
passing mention in BEIS’s recent Clean Growth Strategy, 
outlining that:
‘More nascent technologies such as wave, tidal stream 
and tidal range, could also have a role in the long-
term decarbonisation of the UK, but they will need to 
demonstrate how they can compete with other forms of 
generation’ (BEIS 2017b p.99).
This shift in UK Government support is corroborated by 
analysis of UK Government policies (Figure 7) and funding 
(Figure 35) to support wave energy, as well as government 
targets for deployment (Figure 34). 
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Figure 45: UK government and parliamentary reports and statements on wave energy 1999–2017 (source: author)
6.7.2 Public support for wave energy
Another measure of a technology’s legitimacy is the degree 
of public support it attracts. Drawing upon official UK 
Government data, during the period 2012 to 2017, support 
for wave and tidal energy among the public has remained 
very high, tracking between 71% and 79%. On average, 
wave and tidal energy received 74% support, greater than 
onshore wind (67%) and biomass (62%), putting it on a 
par with offshore wind (74%), behind only solar PV (82%). 
Furthermore, support has grown slightly over the past 
two years, despite the challenges the sector has faced, 
although this is in line with a general increase in public 
support for renewables (Figure 46).
Figure 46: Public perception of wave and tidal energy in the 
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‘Wave and tidal energy technologies have proven themselves as dependable 
and are becoming significant means of generation’ (p.24)
‘Wave and tidal stream energy sources [have] the potential to
make a significant contribution to our longer-term (2020-2050) energy and 
climate change goals by providing up to 20% of our electricity needs’ (p.141)
‘Potential to make a significant contribution towards our energy and climate 
change objectives … Even so, progress towards full commercialisation … has 
been slower than expected.’ (p.226)
‘Wave and tidal technologies are rather further from commercialisation, with 
a number of competing designs … Determined that wave and tidal 
technologies should be given the opportunity to play the fullest part they can 
in the expansion of generation from renewables’  (p.57)
‘The technology will not be able to make a substantial contribution to 
renewable energy supplies in the short and medium-term’
‘Extremely regrettable and surprising that the development of wave and tidal 
energy technologies has received so little support from the Government’
‘Recommend that there should be a co-ordinated programme of capital 
grants to encourage the establishment of pre-commercial wave and 
tidal power demonstration projects.’ (p.11)
‘Government’s funding for marine renewables represents a modest 
investment for what is a world leading industry with the potential to bring 
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‘This government supports wave and tidal 110% ... Now is the time for bold 
next steps - moving from individual projects to large-scale arrays’
DECC – Greg Barker’s opening speech RUK Wave and Tidal conference (2013)
‘More nascent technologies such as wave … could also have a role in the 
long-term decarbonisation of the UK, but they will need to demonstrate how 
they can compete with other forms of generation’
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This section considers the factors responsible for 
supporting or undermining wave energy technology 
innovation in the UK, categorising these according to 
the four structural dimensions of the UK wave energy 
innovation systems: actors, institutions, networks and 
technology/infrastructure. The findings are primarily 
drawn from 33 interviews conducted with UK wave 
energy industry experts.
7.1 Actors
This sub-section examines the actor-related factors 
responsible for supporting or undermining TIS functions 
and the underlying factors responsible for these. It 
considers the presence and capabilities of both private 
actors, namely technology developers (Section 7.1.1), the 
wider supply chain (Section 7.1.2) and market incumbents 
(Section 7.1.3), as well as public sector actors (Section 
7.1.4), summarised in Figure 47. 
The research finds that the majority of UK wave energy 
developers were very small organisations lacking the 
full breadth of technical and business expertise (resource 
mobilisation (F5)) needed to successfully commercialise 
wave energy via knowledge development (F2) and 
entrepreneurial experimentation (F3), supporting previous 
research from the Renewables Advisory Board (RAB 
2008). This was exacerbated by developers preferring 
to undertake most activities in-house because of a 
combination of a perceived culture that developers 
preferred to operate independently to avoid high 
consultancy costs and build up internal capabilities via 
‘learning-by-doing’ and a belief that the wider supply 
chain could not satisfy all the developers’ needs, especially 
for highly niche wave energy-related activities. Finally, 
knowledge exchange (F2) was hindered by a lack of actor-led 
codification of knowledge generated by RD&D projects, 
meaning knowledge remained tacit and was limited 
to the experiences of their staff rather than the wider 
sector. Investments in knowledge capture schemes and a 
requirement to licence IP, such as via Scotland’s WES, have 
helped to address this problem.
Overall, the UK wave energy supply chain was considered 
strong, offering good support to developers. An excellent 
supply of skills from CDTs and higher education energy 
engineering was considered critical to supply chain 
development, as was the formation of niche markets, 
centred around off-grid market opportunities (e.g. islands, 
aquaculture) and the clustering afforded by UK test 
facilities such as EMEC. Concerns were, however, raised 
that intermittent funding and lack of a long-term strategy 
for wave energy has created a threat of skilled personnel 
moving outside the sector (resource mobilisation (F5)), 
echoing research from Vantoch-Wood (2012).
To further embellish the financial and human resources 
(F5) of the UK wave energy supply chain, a strong focus 
was placed on the need to attract market incumbents 
such as OEMs and energy utilities. Attractive market–pull 
mechanisms such as multiple ROCs were considered to 
have enticed these incumbents to enter the wave energy 
sector from the mid-2000s onwards, supporting previous 
research (Corsatea 2014; Allan et al. 2011; Jeffrey et al. 
2014; Andersson et al. 2017). So too was wave energy’s 
promise of grid-scale low-carbon electricity, which was 
compatible with these large companies centralised 
electricity generation business model. However, they 
began to exit during the early 2010s following a lack of 
technological progress against initial expectations and 
a focus on consolidating rather than diversifying their 
activities following the financial crisis. Their presence was 
considered very important in offering a combination of 
technical and financial resource mobilisation (F5), legitimacy 
(F7) and market information (F6), as previously identified by 
Andersson et al. (2017).
Finally, with respect to government, whilst it established 
a host of schemes that prematurely focused on full-
scale demonstration, it in fact exhibited the capacity to 
learn from these mistakes resulting from a combination 
of in-house review mechanisms and cross-government 
networks. Importantly, however, this was mostly 
constrained to Scottish Government, encapsulated by 
its formation of WES; a programme designed around the 
lessons learnt from the successes and failures of its policy 
making over the previous 15 years.
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Figure 47: Overview of inducement and blocking mechanisms related to actors (source: author)
NOTE: Blocking and inducement mechanisms in italics are those which emerged in the period since 2000.
F1 – Knowledge 
development
F2 – Knowledge 
exchange 
F3 – Entrepreneurial 
experimentation
F4 – Guidance of the 
search
• Developer culture of performing activities 
in-house to build knowledge base and avoid 
consultant costs (n=6)
• Developers lacking key technical and business 
skills due to small size (n=5)
• Most knowledge tacit, not codified, making 
learning lessons difficult (n=3)
• Supply chain unable to satisfy all needs (n=3)
• Skills leakage to other sectors (n=2)
• Failure to implement lessons when industry 
buoyant (n=1)
• Lack of confidence in technology following slow 
progress against expectations (n=2)
• Utilities’ retrenchment to core activities (n=2)
• Government funded knowledge capture (n=9) 
• Government funded business/technical 
support (n=5)
• Cross-government networks and in-house 
learning processes (n=2)
• Niche market formation seeded by test facilities 
and off-grid applications (n=6)
• Strong supply of skills from CDTs and higher-
education engineering courses (n=4)
• Demand-pull funds (e.g. multiple ROCs) (n=9)
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7.1.1 Technology developer capabilities
There was a prevailing view that, whilst the UK typically 
funded wave energy developers to lead on wave energy 
RD&D, the developers alone did not have the full suite 
of capabilities necessary to deliver a commercial device 
(n=8; I1, 10, 14, 16, 19, 21, 25–26). Most developers 
are small companies, many with fewer than ten staff 
(Section 6.5.2.2). As such, they possess a narrow but highly 
specialised spectrum of skills relating to the development 
of wave energy devices, often lacking the full breadth of 
technical and business capabilities required to deliver a 
commercial device. In contrast, the UK was considered to 
have a strong overall marine energy supply chain (Section 
7.1.2). We consider some of the factors supporting or 
undermining developers’ ability to drive forward energy 
technology innovation.
7.1.1.1 Technology developers’ culture of 
internalising majority of activities
There was a view that there was a culture amongst 
developers of choosing to do as much ‘in-house’ as possible 
(n=6 I1, 10, 14, 16, 21, 26). The logic underpinning this 
choice was a combination of external consultants being very 
expensive (I19) and a desire to build up as much capability 
in-house and retain any knowledge generated (I14, 26): 
‘if it’s all done with consultants who don’t stay involved with 
the project, then a lot of that knowledge works away and 
doesn’t stay retained in the company’ (I14 – Developer46 
CFO). 
A view was also put forward that, despite being able to draw 
upon capabilities from offshore wind and oil/gas sectors, 
the UK marine energy supply chain could not cater for all 
of the needs of wave energy developers (n=3; I19, 28, 31), 
giving them no other option but to undertake some activities 
in-house: ‘We did try and spin in the expertise of the supply 
chain … except where there wasn’t a component that 
would do the job, then we had to take it on ourselves’ (I31 – 
Consultant and former developer). One developer explained 
that they had chosen to develop their PTO in-house because 
they were more knowledgeable in this space than the wider 
supply chain (I19).
This view contrasted with those of other respondents 
who believed that developers were lacking some critical 
technical and business-related capabilities (n=5; I10, 23, 26, 
28, 30). For example, with regard to PTOs, one respondent 
explained: ‘they’re not black belts in hydraulic power take 
off systems or linear generator, they’re black belts in 
designing this elegant collector’ (I16 – Researcher and 
former developer). Another example was device assembly 
(I10, 28), citing Pelamis as a company that established its 
own assembly facilities rather than outsourcing this activity 
to specialists. Consequently, the company failed to benefit 
from input offered by assembly specialists at an early stage 
about how to design the device in such a way as to minimise 
the manufacturing costs compatible with high-volume 
manufacturing capabilities. Furthermore, developers were 
also considered to lack the necessary business acumen (n=3 
I23, 26, 30) to bring the device to market.
A negative impact of undertaking so many business 
activities in-house was that developers become 
overstretched, seeing resources diverted away from their 
core focus of developing a commercially viable wave energy 
device (n=4 I10, 23, 25-26). It also meant that they invested 
in staff and facilities to perform these activities, which 
saw them generate large overheads and exposed them to 
significant financial risk. Again, Pelamis was highlighted as 
an example of a company with a very large wage bill and 
their own assembly facility rather than outsourcing some 
core activities. As one respondent explained, they were 
‘trying to do it all themselves … I think Pelamis has come 
apart because of that’ (I4 – Test facility director). 
In reaction to this shortage of capabilities, government 
schemes were established to provide business and 
technical support (n=5; I8, 10, 11, 14, 26). For example, 
both Scottish Enterprise and the Carbon Trust offer high-
value start-up business support (I11, 26), whilst technical 
support is offered by test facility managers at EMEC and 
FloWaveTT during the device testing phase on issues such 
as installation, testing and verification procedures (I10, 
14) (Section 5.1.4): ‘There’s a lot of handholding that goes 
on, a lot of knowledge being imparted that isn’t costed 
into that … [they] know much more about testing than the 
[developers] do’ (I4 – Test facility director). Another example 
was the Marine Energy Challenge set up in 2004 to partner 
developers with leading engineering experts from major 
companies to help them understand how to improve the 
performance of their devices (I8). 
46 The term ‘developer’ is used to refer to wave energy technology developers.
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7.1.1.2 Lack of codified technology learning
There was a common belief that whilst wave energy 
had not yet reached commercialisation, the period since 
2000 had delivered ‘the biggest individual advancement 
of knowledge in the sector ever, by a long, long way’ (I31 
– Consultant and former developer), meaning that ‘we 
know more than we ever knew, about what the challenge 
is … and what type of solution will work’ (I16, Researcher 
– former developer). However, a major concern was that 
much of this learning would not be taken advantage of 
because most knowledge remained tacit and had not been 
codified (n=3; I20, 26, 31), especially following the failure 
of market leaders Pelamis and Aquamarine Power: 
‘A lot of it is in [their] heads … We have to rescue that 
so that we don’t start from scratch again’ (I20 – Senior 
researcher). 
This situation was remarkably similar to the lack of 
codification and transferring of lessons learnt during the 
first phase of wave energy innovation in the 1970s and 
1980s (I20). 
To address this situation, efforts have been made to 
capture knowledge generated since 2000 through a 
variety of knowledge capture mechanisms (n=9; I3, 5, 
10, 12, 15-16, 20, 31, 33), most notably via WES, which 
funded a company (Quoceant) founded by the former 
Pelamis CEO ‘to harvest knowledge that otherwise 
might be lost, [much of] it is sitting in people’s heads’ 
(I20 – Senior researcher). It has also engaged with EMEC 
to develop an online library of reports outlining key 
lessons learnt by the sector over the past 15 years, with 
a specific focus on harvesting knowledge from companies 
such as Pelamis, Aquamarine Power and AWS Energy 
(Section 5.2.3.2.2). Another knowledge capture exercise 
involved the purchase of intellectual property and assets 
from former developers such as HIE and EMEC, each 
purchasing a Pelamis device (Findlay 2016; HIE 2015) 
to ‘forensically examine the components to see what 
wear and tear has occurred and why’ (I10 – Test facility 
director) and the impact on device performance. Despite 
these efforts, concerns were raised around the difficulty 
of codifying ‘know-how’ and the notion that some 
lessons will unfortunately be lost (I19, 26).
7.1.2 Supply chain capabilities
We consider the factors that have supported or 
undermined the development of the UK’s wave energy 
supply chain, focusing on the availability of skills (Section 
7.1.2.1) and niche market formation (Section 7.1.2.2).
7.1.2.1 Availability of skilled workers 
Underpinning the UK’s marine energy supply chain is a 
strong foundation of skills relevant to the wave energy 
sector (n=4 I14-15, 20, 31), in part evidenced by the 
strong training networks (Section 5.3.1.5) and number of 
engineering graduates (Section 6.5.2.1). The CDTs were 
credited with playing a leading role in developing skilled 
personnel for the wave energy sector, with excellent 
applied research skills and a strong understanding of 
how these can be applied in industry given that the EngD 
training model sees students spend 75% of their time in 
industry. Even so, another respondent expressed concern 
about a lack of skills, with many people working in the 
wave industry without a formal offshore engineering 
background (I1). A concern was also expressed that skilled 
staff were being lost to other sectors (e.g. offshore wind) 
because of intermittent investment and government 
support (n=2; I14, 26), often the result of redundancies: 
‘You’re faced with the decision, can I get money raised 
or who do l lay off? If you lay them off, then those skills 
move outside the sector’ (I14 – Developer CFO). 
7.1.2.2 Niche market formation
Following the initial focus on grid-scale generation, there 
has, more recently, been a stronger focus on off-grid niche 
market formation (n=6; 9, 11; 14-15, 24), largely triggered 
by the withdrawal of the energy utilities and a need to 
identify an alternative strategy to grid-scale deployment. 
Furthermore, developers acknowledged that the formation 
of niche markets first could help to accelerate market 
formation (F6) and raise legitimacy (F7) by demonstrating 
operations in a real-world market environment. This 
strategy again drew comparisons with the wind industry 
where numerous variations of wind turbines were tested 
in niche markets, typically agricultural, helping to support 
design optimisation (I12, 24). 
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The niche market focus has, to date, been on island 
communities reliant on expensive oil-fired power 
generation because this typically presents a much more 
expensive form of electricity than grid-supplied electricity, 
meaning that island communities have usually been able 
to absorb a higher cost of electricity than their mainland, 
grid-connected counterparts who can source electricity 
much more cheaply. This has created an opportunity 
for the deployment of renewable technologies such as 
wave energy that would not have otherwise been able to 
compete with mature, grid-scale generation technologies 
such as gas and nuclear: 
‘I can make quite a lot of wave energy devices 
economically viable [with electricity costing] 60p a 
kilowatt hour, but I can’t make many economically viable 
for 5p a kilowatt hour’ (I15 – Senior researcher). 
In addition, despite their modest wave energy resources, 
tropical islands were identified as attractive because 
hydraulic WECs could be adapted to offer desalinisation via 
osmotic pumping and pump cooler sea water onshore to 
provide thermal lift in ventilation systems and reduce air 
conditioning costs (I9). The aquaculture industry was also 
identified as another potential niche market, also reliant on 
expensive oil-fired generation (n=2; I14, 24). 
Finally, a belief existed that the UK’s test facilities had 
played an important role in the development of niche 
markets and the supply chain (n=4; 10, 21, 31-32). For 
example, at the height of marine energy funding testing in 
the late 2000s and early 2010s approximately 300 people 
were believed to be employed as part of the supply chain 
centred around EMEC in the Orkneys, creating a centre of 
excellence for wave energy innovation (I10):
‘[EMEC] was there to help to create a nucleus, a kind of 
focal point for the sector … A whole body of experience 
and knowledge that has built up around that supply 
chain’ (I32 – Senior public servant). 
7.1.3 Entry of market incumbents 
OEMs entered the UK wave energy market in the mid-
2000s, with the utilities following suit in the early 2010s, 
although both subsequently stepped back in recent years 
(Section 5.1.2.1). The utilities were considered to offer 
a very important set of capabilities, most notably that 
they represented the target customer of wave energy 
developers and partnering with them on demonstration 
projects offered vital insights into the type of device they 
desired (guidance of the search (F4)) and ‘what [they] are 
going to have to do to sell these units in bulk to utilities in 
the future’ (I24 – Consultant and former utility director). 
The utilities brought with them much needed financial 
and political capital given that they were multi-national 
companies (I16, 24). 
In parallel the OEMs also entered the market, enticed by 
the interest shown by the energy utilities: ‘You’d brought 
the utility … bringing the customer then brought the 
OEMs’ (I16 – Researcher and former developer). A key 
benefit of OEM involvement is their ‘system integration’ 
role, to improve the performance and reduce the cost of 
the device system (I14), as well as significant expertise 
in manufacturing and financial resources (I24), although 
they could potentially constrain the entrepreneurial spirit 
of some developers because ‘they want to get into full 
manufacture quickly and lock down the design’ (I24 – 
Consultant and former utility director). We consider the 
factors that triggered their entry and subsequent exit from 
the UK wave energy market.
7.1.3.1 Grid-scale potential and market–pull 
mechanisms
The entry of the utilities, such as E.On and Scottish Power, 
by purchasing devices from Pelamis, was attributed to 
their belief that wave energy had the potential to offer 
grid-scale low-carbon electricity generation: 
‘[it] offers a potential scale that a utility desires … it was 
seen as a great opportunity to diversify a renewables 
business, have something else alongside wind energy, 
that could go big’ (I12). 
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Associated with this was the introduction of market–pull 
mechanisms designed to encourage grid-scale market 
formation (F6) (n=9, 5, 7, 10, 15-16, 19, 21, 23, 31), traced 
back to the inclusion of wave energy within the third round 
of the Scottish Renewables Obligation in 1997 (Section 
5.2.3.2.1), which represented ‘a signal … [that] this is 
no longer an academic curiosity; somebody wants this. 
The private sector people have got a future in this’ (I31 
– Consultant and former developer). This signal became 
much stronger with the inclusion of the MSO (Section 
5.2.3.2.1), which ‘brought in the utilities’ (I16 – Researcher 
and former developer), putting an obligation on them to 
ensure a proportion of their electricity supply was from 
marine energy, followed by the provision of multiple 
ROCs for wave energy (Section 5.2.2.2.2). More broadly, 
government support for wave energy was considered to 
‘give confidence to our decision makers that they are doing 
something that is in line with government policy’ (I24 – 
Consultant and former utility director).
The UK Crown Estate’s consenting regime, granting 
developers rights to generate electricity offshore, was also 
considered important, offering a route to market in the eyes 
of the utilities (n=2; I23, 31), ‘creating the market … a prize 
… they could see there’s 300MW potential here at this site 
and 200 on that site’ (I23 – Public estate NDPB). Despite 
attracting market incumbents, there was a feeling that 
these schemes were premature given that the technology 
was not ready for wide-scale demonstration or deployment 
(I14, 33):
‘It doesn’t matter whether it’s 50 ROCs or 5 ROCs for 
wave … There aren’t any projects in the water, so it’s 
almost immaterial’ (I14 – Developer CFO). 
7.1.3.2 Lack of appetite for long technology 
lead time
During the early 2010s, the OEMs and the energy 
utilities began to withdraw from the wave energy sector 
because of a shift towards retrenchment and business 
consolidation following the financial crisis (I15, 33) and a 
lack of confidence in wave energy following slow progress 
against initial expectations (I20, 24): 
‘The utilities lost interest because they realised what we 
all knew, that this wasn’t just around the corner, there 
was a lot, lot more that needed to be done’ (I20 – Senior 
researcher). 
Even so, there were some indications that these incumbents 
still have an appetite to re-invest should the technology 
show further promise through continued RD&D (I16–17, 
24, 32): ‘The message was loud and clear from industry … 
they’re not going to put another penny on the table until 
they can … be certain that it will actually work’ (I32 – Senior 
public servant). Providing this confidence is one of the core 
aims of WES, involving experts in sub-component design and 
performance to offer government and investors’ confidence 
in the technology (I16). 
7.1.4 Government policy learning
Government, predominantly the Scottish Government, was 
considered to have demonstrated a clear ability to learn from 
the successes and failure of past policies and incorporate 
these into future policy design (n=9; I11, 14, 16-18, 23, 25, 
32-33). Examples included the shift from deployment focus 
programmes such as MRDF and WATES to single device 
demonstration schemes similar to MRPF and WATERS 
(see Section 5.2). Another was the unbundling of wave and 
tidal energy halfway through the Scottish Government’s 
MRCF scheme because of a realisation that wave energy 
needed special support. However, the vast majority of these 
lessons came together in the design of WES, including a 
requirement for developers to licence IP and to form multi-
actor consortia, as well as provide them with a 100% funding 
intervention rate to avoid the need for private match funding. 
7.1.4.1 Cross-government networks and 
in-house learning procedures
Learning about the effectiveness of wave energy innovation 
policy was attributed to a combination of internal processes 
and cross-government networks (I11, 18) (Section 5.3.3). 
Nonetheless, concerns were raised that many of these 
important policy changes had come too late, delayed 
because at the time policy weaknesses were identified there 
was still sufficient private sector investment and political 
support for wave energy, meaning that recalibration was not 
considered a priority (I16). Additionally, there was a concern 
that some of the policy failures of the past could be repeated 
(I4, 20). Taking the example of WES again, one respondent 
explained that its design shared some similarities with 
the heavily criticised Intermediate Technology Institute 
(ITI) (Brown et al. 2016), such as its development of sub-
components that were not immediately commercialisable on 
their own (I20) without integration in a larger device system..
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7.2 Institutions
This sub-section examines the institutional and, 
specifically, the government policy-related factors 
responsible for supporting or undermining wave energy 
innovation. Specifically in relation to wave energy RD&D 
support, it examines the presence of a sustained focus on 
early- to mid-stage innovation (Section 7.2.1), long-term 
strategy (Section 7.2.2), high-level support (Section 7.2.3) 
and a rigorous and critical assessment of technologies 
(Section 7.2.4). These are summarised in Figure 48.
An overwhelming emphasis was placed on undertaking 
full-scale device demonstration, with a view to ‘fast 
tracking’ progress to commercial array-scale projects 
before the underpinning early- to mid-stage R&D had 
been performed (knowledge development (F1)), an issue 
also identified in previous studies (RAB 2008; Jeffrey et al. 
2014; Jeffrey et al. 2013; Mclachlan 2010; HoCECCC 2012).
Numerous reasons were identified for the UK going ‘too 
big, too soon’. From a developer’s perspective developers 
were simply reacting to public and private sector funds 
made available to progress the technology as quickly as 
possible, the counter-argument being that funds were 
made available on the basis of developers’ highly optimistic 
claims about the promise of wave energy. Underpinning 
either of these views was a poor understanding of the 
scale of the innovation challenge from both sides and the 
time and funds necessary to overcome it, as well as a lack 
of a rigorous, objective procedures to review the credibility 
of funding proposals. The outcome was that developers 
over-promised in order to secure funds and subsequently 
under-delivered in terms of technological progress (F3) 
and deployment (F6), in turn eroding investors’ confidence 
in wave energy and reducing their levels of investment 
(resource mobilisation (F5)), triggering the collapse of leading 
firms (e.g. Pelamis) and further undermining the sector’s 
legitimacy (F7). 
Whilst the research finds that UK wave energy has been 
consistently and increasingly funded by the public sector 
since 2000 (Section 6.5.1), many respondents highlighted 
that a large proportion of the UK’s budget for wave energy 
RD&D went unspent because developers could not meet 
over-ambitious funding criteria and/or struggled after 
the financial crisis to secure the necessary private sector 
match funding required to access these public funds. 
Finally, wave energy has competed with other forms 
of energy for funding, with grant RD&D programmes 
traditionally bundling wave with tidal energy and long-term 
revenue payments like the CfDs seeing wave competing 
against other renewables like offshore wind. The impact 
of this was that wave energy has struggled to compete 
with more mature renewable technologies on a cost basis, 
seeing these rival technologies crowding wave energy out 
and in turn receiving more funding. To help address these 
various funding issues, an explicitly wave energy focused, 
100% funded, earlier stage innovation programme called 
WES was established, with an objective and transparent 
stage-gated funding allocation procedure.
As identified in previous studies (Andersson et al. 2017) 
a long-term strategy for wave energy innovation was 
considered critical to development of wave energy 
technology. However, the UK lacked such a long-term 
strategy, blamed on a combination of short-term 
public spending review periods and a lack of political 
commitment to foresight reports (e.g. roadmaps), the latter 
a consequence of a lack of detail and consensus building 
contained within these reports. However, these reports 
were still considered important ‘signposting’ exercises 
and helped to operationalise the Government’s high-level 
energy and climate change targets.
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Figure 48: Overview of inducement and blocking mechanisms related to institutions (source: author)
 
NOTE: Blocking and inducement mechanisms in italics are those which emerged during the period since 2000.
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F4 – Guidance of the 
search
• Poor understanding of engineering challenge 
led to premature focus on full-scale 
demonstration (n=13)
• Requirement for private sector match funding 
and investor pressure to reach market (n=6)
• Short-term public spending review period (n=2)
• Lack of commitment to foresight reports due to 
lack of detail and consensus building (n=2)
• Lack of a rigorous, evidence-based and 
objective criteria to award RD&D funding 
against (n=7)
• Small pool of expert, unconflicted, unbiased 
peer-reviewers (n=4)
• Developers overpromising and under-delivering, 
eroding confidence and financial support (n=14)
• Developers unable to meet ambitious criteria 
(n=6)
• Difficulty to secure private sector match funding 
made public funds difficult to access (n=5)
• Competing with more mature technologies for 
RD&D funds (n=5)
• Modest funds split between multiple actors 
(n=4)
• Refocusing on sub-component development 
(n=10)
• Stage-gated funding with transparent, detailed 
and objective criteria (n=3) 
• Industry and testing standards (n=3)
• Technology roadmaps and innovation needs 
assessments (n=4)
• Long-term low-carbon energy targets (n=2)
• Strong lobbying capability (n=7)
• 100% intervention rate funding via procurement 
(n=6)
Sustained early to mid-
stage RD&D support
Long-term strategy for 
wave energy innovation
High level of 
RD&D support
Critical assessment of 
technology
F5 – Resource 
mobilisation
F6 - Market formation
F7 – Legitimation
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7.2.1 Sustained early- to mid-stage RD&D 
support
A major criticism of public support for UK wave energy 
innovation was that there was a premature focus on late-
stage full-scale and multi-device array demonstration in 
open-sea conditions (n=9; I9, 12-13, 16-18, 22, 25, 31). A 
strong consensus existed that the wave energy sector had 
gone ‘too big, too soon’, trying to reach market before the 
necessary underpinning work had been undertaken: 
‘the way it’s been funded to date over the long-term 
… there has been this incessant push towards multi-
megawatt arrays … trying to run before you can walk’ 
(I12 – Consultant). 
This very early focus on full-scale demonstration is 
supported by Figures 7 and 35, which outline how 
demonstration funding formed the basis for UK wave 
energy support during the 2000s, through policies such as 
the UK’s MRDF and MEAD and the Scottish Government’s 
WATES, MRCF and Saltire Prize. 
This haste to commercialise has had various negative 
impacts. Firstly, moving quickly to full-scale device 
demonstration without substantial early- to mid-TRL 
testing meant that lessons from these stages were never 
learnt (knowledge development (F1)). Furthermore, any 
lessons about the technology’s fundamental design learnt 
at the demonstration stage could not easily be acted 
upon because at full scale the device design had already 
become ‘locked-in’ because of the sheer amount of time 
and money invested in it (I14, 16, 28). Additionally, the 
large size and cost of the machines meant developers were 
quite conservative in their approach to testing because of 
the associated costs of device failure (I12, 16), meaning 
that ‘the results are never be as exciting as you would like’ 
(I16 – Researcher and former developer), undermining the 
technology’s legitimacy (F7).
We examine some of the underlying factors responsible 
for this premature focus on commercialisation from both 
government and industry, as well as some of the actions 
taken to address this. 
7.2.1.1 Poor understanding of the scale of the 
engineering challenge
A poor understanding of the scale of the engineering 
challenge (n=13 I1, 5, 8, 11-14, 16, 18, 20, 23, 25, 31) was 
identified as a major factor behind the UK’s premature 
focus on commercialisation: 
‘There’s been a history of wave and tidal of over-
promising and under-delivering … in part … because 
people didn’t quite understand the difficulty of the 
environment’ (I13 – Test facility director) 
This was in part attributed to a failure to transfer many 
of the lessons learnt during the first phase of innovation 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Section 7.1.1.2). Linked to this 
poor understanding was the commonly held belief that 
wave energy could emulate offshore wind’s impressive 
deployment rate (n=3; I3, 12, 31), as illustrated in various 
foresight reports outlining the trajectory for wave power 
(FREDS Marine Energy Group 2004; Ocean Energy Forum 
2016; Carbon Trust 2006; OEE 2013). The issue was the 
incorrect assumption that wave was at a similar stage of 
development to wind just before it enjoyed widespread 
deployment:
‘There has been this incessant push towards multi-
megawatt arrays … that resulted from observing how 
things were done in offshore wind … But we were 
effectively taking mature technology from the Danish 
wind industry’ (I11 – Senior public servant)
Some respondents explained that developers’ focus on 
full-scale demonstration was a response to government 
funds for later stage innovation (n=6; I9, 12, 16, 18, 
22, 25). In parallel, the requirement for developers to 
secure private sector match funding to be awarded public 
funds brought with it intense investor pressure to reach 
commercialisation as quickly as possible (n=6; I11, 14, 16, 
18, 23, 25): 
‘Developers have chased the money that’s been available 
… the money was there for demonstration projects … 
and so the fault doesn’t all just lie at the door of the 
developer … the funding was designed to go too big, too 
soon’ (I16 – Researcher and former developer). 
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However, others emphasised how, from the government’s 
perspective, they were responding to the call from the 
wave energy community that their technology was now 
ready for full-scale demonstration (I14). 
In light of the understanding that wave energy was some 
distance away from commercialisation, the Scottish 
Government refocused their support to an earlier stage 
of innovation on sub-component development (n=10; I5, 
10, 16-19, 21, 24-25, 29, 32), specifically via programmes 
such as WES: 
‘[It] removes the pressure of going, okay, [you] need an 
improvement to your power take off, but you’ve only got 
six months to sort it out and … it better be a reliable one 
because you’re going to put it into a £5m machine’ 
(I16 – Researcher and former developer). 
Some respondents did, however, express concern about 
how the WES programme would eventually deliver a 
single commercial device by integrating the different sub-
components together (n=5; I5, 19; 22, 25 29): 
‘What they’re not looking at is the integration issues. 
Eventually they’ll end up with a catalogue of different 
PTOs, mooring systems etc.’ (I29 – Manager innovation 
NDPB). 
However, informally, WES is actively considering what 
strategy it must take going forward to integrate these 
separate components into a commercially viable wave 
energy device.
7.2.2 Long-term strategy for wave energy 
innovation
A common criticism from the respondents was the UK’s 
intermittent, stop–start funding regime, largely attributed 
to the lack of a long-term industrial strategy for UK wave 
energy (n=12; I10–11, 14, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28, 31–32): 
‘there hasn’t been sustained investment … you can’t 
really grow an industry by funding it in fits and starts’ 
(I18 – Senior civil servant). 
Our analysis of UK RD&D funding found that funding 
had actually been awarded consistently since 2000 and 
increased annually on average (Figure 35). However, there 
was a very high turnover of different wave energy RD&D 
schemes, representing short-term gaps between schemes 
(resource mobilisation (F5)) and a regular shift in the TRL focus 
of these schemes (guidance of the search (F4)) (Figure 7), 
consistent with an intermittent and fast-changing funding 
landscape. 
This negatively impacted upon developers’ abilities to 
formulate a long-term, consistent strategy to develop 
their technology (n=4; I11, 17, 21, 26) (entrepreneurial 
experimentation (F3)), leading to their bidding 
opportunistically for whatever funds were available at 
that point in time and adapting their RD&D strategies 
accordingly: 
‘Developers said … ‘‘We’re jumping from one grant to the 
next … It’s quite difficult to have a consistent strategy 
for developing the technology when you have to change 
direction to get funding”’ (I17 – Senior NDPB manager). 
This fast-changing and short-term policy environment also 
led to increased uncertainty around the technology and 
negatively impacted the legitimacy (F7) of the sector (18, 
24), as well as undermining the UK’s retention of skilled 
personnel (Section 7.1.2.1) and its status as an international 
leader of wave energy technology (I10–11, 13, 19–20, 31), 
analogous to it losing its lead in wind to Denmark (I10, 13). 
We examine some of the factors responsible for this lack of 
long-term, consistent support for wave energy.
7.2.2.1 Short-term spending review period 
The high level of policy turnover was attributed by some 
to the short-term budgetary periods of the UK and 
Scottish Government (n=2; I18, 25), meaning that they 
can only commit funding to specific areas a few years at 
a time.47 This not only meant that government lacks the 
time horizon to plan long-term policies but that the RD&D 
funds are typically drawn down only halfway through 
these spending periods, applying pressure on developers 
to undertake projects in a relatively short period of time 
(I21, 25): 
‘The money pops up for a [five] year window but it’s not 
actually secured and allocated until halfway through 
that’ (I25 – Innovation NDPB manager).
47 The UK Government works to a five-year spending period and the Scottish Government to a three-year period.
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7.2.2.2 Government low-carbon energy targets
In a bid to offer a commitment beyond the short-term 
spending review period, government has issued various 
carbon emission reduction and renewable electricity 
generation targets (n=2; I16, 31) (Section 5.2), considered 
critical to retaining a strong focus on supporting wave 
energy technology innovation. However, some respondents 
questioned whether there was sufficient political 
commitment to these targets and whether they have made 
a tangible difference to wave energy innovation (I8).
7.2.2.3 Technology roadmaps and innovation 
needs assessments
To help operationalise these low-carbon energy targets, a 
host of technology foresight reports were published that 
have informed the UK’s guidance of the search (F4) (n=4; 
16, 25, 28-29) (Section 6.4.1). These were considered 
important in terms of co-ordinating the wave energy 
community’s actions so that actors worked in support 
of rather than against one another. Furthermore, they 
helped to retain a political commitment to wave energy, 
signposting a vision of wave energy’s route to market, 
meaning that:
‘Investors are able to see that there is a clear direction 
that can be followed for commercial exploitation … [it] 
is absolutely essential because it sets out what success 
looks like (I28 – Innovation NDPB Director).
Despite these benefits, a major criticism was that the 
recommendations of foresight reports were often not 
translated into action (n=2; I25, 28) because of a lack of 
detail about the nature and timing of specific actions (I25) 
and an insufficient commitment from government and 
industry to act upon their recommendations, linked to the 
lack of consensus building in formulating them (I28).
7.2.3 High-level RD&D support
Some respondents indicated a concern that, since support 
was initiated in the 1970s, wave energy had not yet 
received sufficient cumulative investment at a global 
level to enable it to reach commercialisation (n=3; I1, 
21, 26) (resource mobilisation (F5)). This is supported by 
our comparison against other now mature renewables 
such as wind and solar PV, which received a significantly 
greater sum of support in the same period (Section 6.5.1). 
Nonetheless, investment in UK-based wave energy RD&D 
expenditure has steadily increased in real term since 2000 
(Figure 35). However, a large proportion of the funds made 
available by the marine energy programmes outlined in 
Section 5.2 went under- or unspent (e.g. MRDF, MRCF). 
Consequently, we examine the factors that could have 
constrained the amount of the budget awarded to support 
wave energy RD&D in the UK. 
7.2.3.1 Developers over-promising to secure 
private sector funds and under-
delivering
Under EU law, all government funding must be state aid 
compliant, in order to avoid this government support 
distorting market competition by giving one or more 
parties an undue advantage over others. One implication of 
this is that UK wave energy RD&D funding schemes have 
limited the intensity or intervention rate of public funding 
programmes, achieved in part by requiring applicants 
to secure private sector match funding alongside public 
funds. Private sector investment was largely forthcoming 
during the 2000s, with one former developer explaining 
that they had ‘spent hundreds of millions of pounds of 
primarily private investment, geared about five or six to 
one with public’ (I31 – Consultant and former developer). 
However, to secure these funds, developers had to present 
an attractive investment case to private investors (e.g. 
OEMs and VCs) – typically for a technology able to enjoy 
wide-scale deployment and reach commercialisation in 
a relatively short period of time (I11, 14, 16). This often 
meant promising 1MW devices (I12) and a route to market 
that would take years, not decades, even if the developers 
were unsure whether these targets were realistic: ‘You tell 
investors what they want to hear, whether it’s the truth or 
not … Investors don’t want a 10-year journey that involves 
a lot of preliminary testing’ (I14 – Developer CFO). 
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The consequence was developers over-promising to secure 
investment and in turn under-delivering (n=14; 3, 5, 9, 
11–13; 14, 16, 18, 20, 23, 31–33), significantly damaging 
investors’ confidence in wave energy (legitimacy (F7)) 
and precipitating a reduction in subsequent investment 
(resource mobilisation (F5)). This subsequently triggered the 
failure of firms such as Pelamis and Aquamarine, further 
undermining the sector’s legitimacy (F7) (n=5; I14-15, 
19-20, 26): ‘With the demise of the larger companies 
that were leading the field, investors think, ‘‘This is too 
difficult’’’ (I14 – Developer CFO).
The situation at the beginning of the 2010s was therefore 
that private sector investment was very hard to secure, 
with multi-nationals retrenching to their core activities 
following the 2008 financial crisis (Section 7.1.3.1) and 
VCs now questioning the technology’s potential (I18, 
33): ‘Venture capitalists had got their fingers burned and 
wanted a way out’ (I33 – Public investment bank director). 
Consequently, public funds became very difficult to secure 
because developers could not secure the necessary private 
sector match funding (n=5 I11, 14, 17, 32-33). As one 
developer explained: 
‘We’ve got a lot of support from government but can we 
find the private money in the quantities required to do it? 
No’ (I14 – Developer CFO). 
This is illustrated by the Scottish Government’s WATERS 
funding scheme, where, by the third round in 2014, ‘it 
was pretty clear that they were really going to struggle 
to raise the type of match funding that they would 
require for a grant’ (I11 – Senior public servant). With the 
realisation that public funds for wave energy RD&D had 
become frozen by the lack of match funding, the Scottish 
Government established its WES programme with a 100% 
intervention rate, negating the need for private investment 
(n= 6, I11, 14-15, 17, 25, 33).
7.2.3.2 Competition with more mature 
renewable energy technologies 
Funding for wave energy was often considered to be 
limited because it was competing directly with more 
mature technology (n=5; I7, 15, 18, 21, 25). As outlined 
in Section 5.2, funding for wave energy has typically been 
bundled with tidal stream energy (Section 5.2), resulting 
in tidal stream capturing 75% more RD&D funding than 
wave energy since 2000 (Figure 35). Some respondents 
attributed this to tidal stream being more mature than 
wave but being bundled together meant that they 
competed for the same funds (I18, 25). A good example 
is the £18m MRCF fund run by the Scottish Government, 
where the most eligible projects that came forward 
were for tidal energy (I25). Consequently, the Scottish 
Government reconfigured the scheme in 2013 with explicit 
sums of money made available only for wave energy 
(I18, 25) because ‘they were at different stages ... two 
completely different industries’ (I18 – Senior civil servant). 
Wave energy has also had to compete against renewable 
energy technologies other than tidal stream as part of 
the CfD market–pull mechanism (Section 5.2.2.2.3). Its 
predecessor, the RO, offered wave energy preferential 
revenue payments. Whilst this did not provide certainty 
over the price wave energy generators would receive, it did 
guarantee that they would receive at least some revenue 
assuming their installation was accredited and generating 
electricity (Section 5.2.2.2.1) (I15). In contrast, the 
introduction of CfDs in 2014 provided certainty around the 
level of subsidy wave energy would receive if successful 
(i.e. ‘strike price’) but offered generators no certainty that 
they would actually secure any subsidy (I7, 15, 21). This 
is because wave must compete on a cost basis against 
other technologies from the same ‘less established’ pot 
(e.g. offshore wind) as part of an auction if there are more 
eligible projects than funding allocated. In the latest round 
of CfD allocation, the lowest strike price for offshore 
wind was at £57.50 per MWh (BEIS 2017b), significantly 
cheaper than wave power (Section 6.3.3).
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To counter this, a minimum of 100MW of marine 
energy was included during the first allocation round, 
guaranteeing eligible wave projects a CfD at £305 per 
MWh. However, no projects received awards and this was 
removed during the second allocation round (DECC 2016a). 
Whilst one respondent welcomed this ‘ring fencing’, they 
explained that, in practice, 100MW of marine energy could 
never compete on cost with multiple GW of offshore wind 
because of economies of scale (I7). 
7.2.3.3 Over-ambitious funding requirements
The premature emphasis on later-stage innovation of 
government policy meant that developers were often 
unable to meet the ambitious funding criteria (n=6; 15-18, 
21, 25), resulting in government budget going unspent: 
‘you allocated all this money and then you can’t spend it, 
because the industry couldn’t meet the hurdles [or] the 
milestones, so we were not able to give them the funds’ 
(I18 – Senior civil servant).
For example, the £42m from the MRDF scheme ring-
fenced for wave energy technology RD&D went entirely 
unspent (Section 5.2.2.2.2) (I16–17, 25), including overly 
ambitious criteria such as requiring developers to have 
demonstrated three months of continuous generation, 
which ‘didn’t reflect the reality of anyone being able to 
put a device in first time and run it successfully [and] 
continuously for a long period. Basically no one could fulfil 
the criteria (I25 – Innovation NDPB manager). The £10m 
Saltire Prize launched in 2008 also went unspent, because 
it required developers to demonstrate a total electrical 
output of at least 100GWh over a continuous two-year 
period, equating to ‘an array of about 20 devices’ (I18 – 
Senior civil servant). Finally, one respondent explained 
that some stakeholders had perceived this lack of funding 
allocation as an indicator that wave energy was not 
progressing as quickly as first hoped but the reality was 
that it was actually symptomatic of inappropriate policy 
design (I15).
7.2.3.4 Decentralised funding model sees 
modest funding split between multiple 
bodies
The UK operates a decentralised model of innovation 
whereby numerous different developers compete for 
funding to develop rival technologies versus a centralised 
model whereby a single government-funded organisation 
such as a government R&D laboratory delivers a 
technological solution (e.g. Fraunhofer in Germany). This 
approach was identified as a factor limiting the level of 
investment in wave energy at firm level. Some respondents 
felt that the UK’s relatively modest budget was being 
split between numerous developers, each of whom were 
progressing their own sub-components and covering their 
own overheads (e.g. staff, premises), resulting in a lack of 
a critical mass of investment in any one organisation to 
develop a viable wave energy device (n=4; I1, 8, 17, 26). 
7.2.3.5 Lobbying capabilities
There was a strong consensus that the wave energy 
industry had helped to implement some supportive 
policies via strong lobbying capability (n=7; 14-16; 18; 
24, 31, 33), helping to improve both resource mobilisation 
(F5) and legitimation (F7). For example, the introduction 
of multiple ROCs was attributed to industry pressure 
via trade associations (e.g. RenewableUK) and individual 
organisations (I24). Other favourable policy changes 
attributed to successful lobbying included wave energy 
being included in the EC’s SET plan (Section 5.2.1.1) and 
the inclusion of a sub-system focus for wave energy 
innovation in the Horizon 2020 work programme 
(European Comission 2016) (I16, 18). 
7.2.4 Critical assessment of technological 
potential
Objective peer reviews of different technological designs 
in accordance with a transparent set of criteria based 
on industry consensus were considered critical to the 
progress of wave energy development, in terms of framing 
the guidance of the search (F4) and lending legitimacy (F7) to 
wave energy. We consider some of the factors supporting 
or undermining this.
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7.2.4.1 Lack of stringent RD&D peer review 
funding criteria
A lack of a rigorous, evidence-based and objective 
criteria to award RD&D funding was identified as a major 
issue (n=7, 1, 6, 8, 14-16, 22), with the view existing 
that some projects were awarded funds despite not 
necessarily exhibiting the greatest potential to reach 
commercialisation. For example, one respondent explained 
that funding had been awarded without the need for 
developers to present relevant evidence to support the 
theoretical performance of their device, such as a peer-
reviewed paper or report (I8). Additionally, it was difficult 
for funders to compare the relative stages of innovation 
for different technologies without appropriate assessment 
protocol and industry standards (I22).
The lack of adequately experienced, unconflicted, unbiased 
experts to peer review funding applications was also cited 
as a cause of the lack of critical assessment (n=4 I1, 6, 
14-15). The first issue was the relatively small pool of 
eligible peer reviewers because of the small size of the 
wave energy community and the trend towards multi-
partner consortia, which increased the number of peer 
reviewers with a conflict of interests. Consequently, peer 
reviews came from a combination of more junior personnel 
or experts within other technology sectors (I14–15). The 
second issue was a lack of objectivity from peer reviewers, 
who were considered insufficiently critical of wave energy, 
either because they wanted to support the growth of 
their community and/or because they had insufficient 
experience of working in other energy technology sectors 
to draw comparisons with their standards of quality (n=2; 
I1, 6). Conversely, some reviewers were considered to be 
biased against some applications because they involved a 
rival technology to the one they were developing (I14).
In a bid to address these issues, a move was set in motion 
to implement a rigorous stage-gating procedure that 
objectively assesses the stage of development of each 
sub-component (n=3; I17–18, 31) as part of the WES 
programme, with clear quantitative objectives for each 
stage of funding: 
‘If you look at the calls that we’ve published, upfront, we’ve 
said what the criteria are … We tell you how we’re going to 
mark them, what marks we’re going to give you for each of 
those’ (I17 – Senior NDPB manager). 
This stage-gated approach to funding ensures that 
promising concepts are guaranteed to access funding at a 
higher TRL, contingent on their meeting stringent stage-
gating criteria: 
‘they don’t need to worry about where’s the next bit 
of funding from. They know that if they meet their 
milestones … then they’ll move to the next stage’ 
(I17 – Senior NDPB manager). 
Another important development was the formation 
of industry standards or guides to help ensure fair 
comparison between different designs (n=3; I4, 10, 
21) developed by a range of actors. These were mainly 
developed by test centres such as EMEC, which 
constructed a suite of 12 guidelines covering issues such 
as testing, cross-device comparison, deployment and 
maintenance (EMEC 2017e) and major research consortia 
such as EQUIMAR, which established a suite of seven high-
level protocols focused on ways to ‘measure and compare 
the dozens of tidal and wave energy devices, proposed 
locations and management systems currently competing 
for funds, so governments can invest in the best ones and 
get marine energy on tap fast’ (Equimar 2013). 
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7.3 Networks
This sub-section examines how networks involving 
private, public and third sector actors have served to 
support or undermine wave energy innovation and the 
underlying factors responsible for these. Section 7.3.1 
considers interactions across industry and science, 
followed by a specific focus on industry–science (Section 
7.3.2), international (Section 7.3.3) and governmental 
(Section 7.3.4) collaboration. The results are summarised 
in Figure 49.
Traditionally, a number of factors constrained the degree 
of actor interaction, critical to both knowledge development 
(F1) and exchange (F2). One responsible factor was the 
emphasis on protecting IP by operating secretively, an 
issue identified in previous research (Winskel 2007; LCICG 
2012; Foxon et al. 2005; Mclachlan 2010). Other factors 
included the UK’s decentralised model of innovation that 
prioritises competition over collaboration and a focus 
on device-level innovation funding, which removed the 
opportunity for actors to collaborate on developing 
common solutions to shared problems (e.g. sub-
components). Again, steps were taken to address these 
issues – for example, WES imposed a requirement on 
awardees to licence their IPs, share lessons and formulate 
consortia in order to be awarded funds.
Industry–science collaboration was considered to be 
relatively weak but improving, critical to not just knowledge 
development (F1) and exchange (F2) but to formulating 
a shared view of priorities for wave energy innovation 
(guidance of the search (F4)). Barriers included a fundamental 
difference in working cultures and timeframes, supporting 
previous research from Winskel (2007), as well as a lack 
of joint industry–science funds offering a compromise 
between these to foster collaboration. Once again, positive 
interventions included cross-innovation chain stage-
gated funding schemes (e.g. WES, Energy Catalyst), which 
opened up funds for joint science and industry projects, 
as well as industrially focused CDTs that saw doctoral 
students on industrial placements.
Similarly, international collaboration was considered to 
be relatively weak, undermined by a belief that the UK 
could tackle the wave energy challenge alone as a leader 
of wave energy and a perceived bias towards domestic 
wave technology. This was countered by funding schemes 
that help support the formation of international networks, 
for example by demanding international consortia (e.g. EU 
Horizon2020) or by opening up UK funds overseas (e.g. 
WES), supporting findings from previous work (Corsatea 
2014; Vantoch-wood & Connor 2013).
The weakest area was cross-government coordination, 
which led to the duplication of funds that had a negative 
impact on resource mobilisation (F5) and the lack of a 
single, unified RD&D strategy across different funding 
bodies and layers of government, undermining the 
guidance of the search (F4), issues previously identified 
by other studies (Jeffrey et al. 2014; HoCECCC 2012; A. 
R. Vantoch-Wood 2012; Mclachlan 2010; Andersson et 
al. 2017). The core issue was UK wave energy funding 
being split across three different layers of government 
(i.e. devolved administration, the UK and the EU), with 
numerous different autonomous bodies operating at 
each government level with distinct but often overlapping 
remits. The lack of a central co-ordinating body made 
for a highly complex and poorly co-ordinated policy 
landscape, despite efforts to improve coordination with the 
introduction of cross-government networks (e.g. LCICG).
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Figure 49: Overview of inducement and blocking mechanisms related to actor networks (source: author)
NOTE: Blocking and inducement mechanisms in italics are those that emerged in the period since 2000.
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medium term projects (n=4)
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with individual objectives and powers (n=4)
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• Bias towards domestic technology (n=3)
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• Funding requirement to licence IP (n=5)
• Consortia funding requirement (e.g. EU) (n=4)
• Sub-system funding for common solutions (n=2)
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funding calls (n=6)
• Cross-innovation chain funding programmes e.g. 
WES
• Doctoral centres and research consortia (n=2)
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7.3.1 Inter-actor collaboration
Transfer of knowledge across industry and science was 
considered critical to knowledge exchange (F2), which in turn 
informed both knowledge development (F1) and the guidance 
of the search (F4). We consider some of the factors that 
have supported or undermined this.
7.3.1.1 Protection of intellectual property 
In the absence of a market to sell their devices, the main 
commodity of wave energy technology developers was 
the intellectual property (IP) of their technology (I32). 
Consequently, there was a culture amongst developers of 
secrecy in order to protect their IP, stifling collaboration 
(n=10; I1, 3, 6, 9–10, 15, 20, 29, 32–33). Consequently, 
little open and honest exchange of lessons learnt took 
place to inform the priorities for future innovation: 
‘They protect IP …  [i.e.] knowledge. They’ve been 
secretive about failures … [so] the same mistakes have 
been repeatedly made because there hasn’t been the 
exchange of information’ (I20 – Senior researcher). 
One example of this came from a former developer, 
who explained that they preferred not to patent their 
technology because it would expose their technical 
advantage to competitors once the patent was granted 
and made publicly available: 
‘You are in effect publishing … you’re telling everybody 
what you’re doing … You’re actually much better … 
securing a loyal workforce who don’t walk the ideas out 
of the building and keeping as much as you can in trade 
secrets ’ (I31 – Consultant and former developer).
Exacerbating this secrecy was investors’ desire that 
developers protect their IP (n=3; I3, 15, 33), which was 
commonplace because of the requirement of public 
funding to be matched by private sector investment 
(Section 7.2.3.1). As one respondent explained: 
‘if a private investor comes along and puts £1m into a 
company that’s already had £10m worth of government 
funding … the price of that £1m investment is, ‘‘You don’t 
talk to anybody else’’’ (I15 – Senior researcher). 
In an effort to address this lack of collaboration because 
of a desire to protect IP schemes such as WES, a condition 
was introduced whereby developers must licence their 
IP and share the findings of their project or WES can do 
so on their behalf (n=5; I3, 15, 17, 26) (Section 5.2.3.2.2), 
representing a radical departure from previous funding 
schemes that imposed no such demands on developers.
7.3.1.2 Decentralised model of innovation
The decentralised model of innovation the UK employs 
prioritises competition over collaboration from a very early 
TRL (n=4; I1,8, 15, 31) (Section 7.2.3.3), leading to wave 
energy developers competing against one another with 
rival technologies, the logic being that market forces would 
see the strongest device design emerge triumphantly. 
This is in contrast to a centralised approach where skilled 
personnel would pool their skills and experience within a 
government R&D lab to collaborate on a single technology. 
Respondents broadly agreed with the need for free-
market competition to avoid championing of sub-optimal 
technologies but argued that the UK placed an emphasis 
on competition at too early a point along the innovation 
chain, again stifling collaboration that is critical at the early 
stages of a technology’s development. As one former 
developer explained:
‘The second phase was everyone for themselves … 
Government desperate to provide support to a bunch 
of private companies competing with each other before 
there was really a competition … It was pretty much, 
squash your neighbours, get to the top whether you 
were the cream or not’ (I31 – Consultant and former 
developer).
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7.3.1.3 Device versus sub-component focus of 
RD&D funding
The majority of funding was committed to the 
development of fully integrated devices (Figure 37), 
meaning that actors were funded to develop fully 
integrated devices. Consequently, little emphasis was 
placed on developing common sub-systems able to be 
utilised in a range of different device designs (n=2; I18, 31), 
such as PTOs, materials or control systems, which could 
have been co-developed by multiple developers. Again, 
the refocusing of efforts at the sub-component stage via 
WES has helped to encourage collaboration because of 
its aim to develop solutions to sub-systems to address 
industry-wide problems (n=2; I17-18). As one policy maker 
explained: 
‘Previously we funded companies to work in isolation 
[but] Wave Energy Scotland look[s] at where there are 
things that they have in common’ (I18 – Senior civil 
servant).
Another model employed to foster industrial collaboration 
in the wave energy sector was the introduction of JIPs. 
Building on the UK’s OWA, the MFA was established in 
2013 (Section 5.2.2.2.2) to support the development of 
common solutions facing the development of marine 
energy arrays. Whilst the MFA encouraged industry actors 
to talk to one another, it was not ultimately deemed a 
success, mainly because the JIP prematurely engaged 
project developers (n=4; 1, 8, 22, 26) (e.g. Dong Energy, 
VattenFall, E.On) to develop common technologies and 
processes (e.g. cabling, foundations, O&M) capable of 
reducing the costs of commercial-scale wave energy arrays 
before a commercially viable wave energy technology had 
emerged. The JIP model continues to be employed for wave 
energy in the form of the Crown Estate’s ORJIP, Ocean 
Energy and a host of other JIPs via the ORE Catapult, 
although the success of these remains to be seen.
7.3.1.4 Funding requirements for multi-actor 
consortia
Some funding schemes encouraged inter-actor 
collaboration by demanding the need for consortia (n=4; 
I1, 15, 17, 32). Examples of predominantly scientific 
funding include the EC’s FPs, which have a requirement to 
fund consortia of multiple organisations across different 
European countries, and Scotland’s WES programme, 
which has almost exclusively funded consortia to date, 
placing emphasis on drawing expertise from different 
sectors. Despite the perceived benefits of multi-actor 
consortia research projects, one respondent highlighted 
the challenges associated with managing large research 
consortia, noting that their own EU project involved 23 
partners across 13 countries (I15). 
7.3.2 Industry–science collaboration
Industry–science collaboration and knowledge exchange 
were overall considered to be weak in the UK wave energy 
sector. This trend is, to some extent, supported by our 
quantitative analysis of UK RD&D funding, which found 
relatively little industry–science engagement across 
projects but identified a clear improving trend following the 
introduction of cross-innovation chain programmes such 
as WES and the Energy Catalyst. A host of factors were 
identified as responsible.
7.3.2.1 Mismatching cultures – working 
between science and industry
A key barrier to collaboration between science and industry 
was the mismatch between the ways the two communities 
worked (n=3; I20, 22, 27). The first issue was that 
academia considered there to be a significant amount of 
fundamental research on wave energy still needed, whilst 
industry sought to commercialise technology as soon as 
possible: 
‘Academia was having to convince their funders that 
the questions were still being uncovered … Meanwhile 
industry … needed to convince their private investors 
that the questions were all answered’ (I20 – Senior 
researcher). 
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Second, universities were incentivised to generate outputs, 
such as research papers and PhDs, via frameworks such 
as the Research Excellence Framework, which do not 
necessarily chime with what industry wants (I27). Third, 
there was considered to be a mismatch in timescales 
to which academia and industry work (n=2; I22, 27), 
with research typically spanning years compared to 
industry’s much shorter timeframe, meaning that research 
outputs were interesting to industry but not generated 
quickly enough. Finally, from the perspective of industry, 
universities were difficult to engage with because they did 
not employ a standardised approach when collaborating 
with industry, meaning that bespoke contractual 
arrangements were required for each university and 
resulting in additional time and costs (I27). 
An associated barrier with the lack of industry–science 
collaboration was the lack of funding for joint science 
and industry projects (n=4; 1, 15, 20, 22). As one senior 
researcher explained, government ‘funded companies to 
put things in the water and they funded universities to 
do underpinning research but they didn’t fund the two 
together’ (I20 - Senior researcher). Another related issue 
was the lack of medium-term funding programmes able to 
give universities and industry a timeframe to which they 
could both work, given that universities took a long-term 
approach and industry a short-term view, something 
the establishment of the OREC sought to address with 
its JIPs (I27). Looking forward, one respondent explained 
that it was essential that policy makers acknowledge 
the differences in the ways in which industry and 
science work when designing schemes to bring the two 
together, highlighting how the ETI had treated universities 
as commercial entities, ‘thereby wiping out their 
attractiveness in the process’ (I20 – Senior researcher), 
because it imposed commercial law constraints on them 
and limited their intellectual freedom.
7.3.2.2 Industry–science networks
Some respondents identified the importance of formal 
networks in facilitating industry–science collaboration 
(n=2; I15, 22). In particular, CDT (Section 5.3.1.5) were 
identified as important, building a strong link between 
industry and universities by offering EngD programmes 
that saw students spend 75% of their time in industry 
(I15). The UK’s Marine Supergen was also identified as 
important, whose annual assembly and advisory group 
include a combination of industry and science attendees 
(I15), although another respondent questioned whether it 
had achieved genuine industry–science exchange:  
‘the exchange of ideas from this sector … and academia 
was far, far less than it ever should’ve been’ (I20 – Senior 
researcher).
7.3.3 International collaboration
Section 6.2.2 identified that international collaboration 
during the period from 2000 remained fairly steady across 
scientific publications, patents and projects, without 
a dramatic increase. This view was mirrored by the 
interviewees, who also identified the potential for much 
more international collaboration (n=4; 1, 19, 28, 31). We 
explore some of the underlying factors below.
7.3.3.1 UK culture of working independently and 
being inward-looking
An important barrier identified was the UK’s perception 
that it was a world leader of wave energy technology 
innovation, meaning that it sought to tackle the wave 
energy challenge alone (n=2; I15, 16). This was reinforced 
by a culture of being inward-looking and failing to learn 
lessons from other countries and bias towards the merits 
of its own technology (n=3; 19, 28, 31). As one respondent 
explained: 
‘Scotland had an inward focus up until recently whereby 
it was all about, it must be invented [and] developed in 
Scotland … The challenge really has been that transition 
in mentality from ‘not invented here’ to embracing 
development worldwide and leveraging it’ (I19 – 
Developer). 
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7.3.3.2 Funding programmes encouraging 
international collaboration
To tackle this inward-looking culture, RD&D funding 
schemes were established to encourage international 
collaboration (n=6, 3, 18-19, 26, 28, 32). For example, 
the EC’s FP supported a significant amount of wave 
energy RD&D (Section 5.2.1.2) but to secure these funds 
a consortium must include at least three different legal 
entities from three different eligible countries (European 
Commission 2017d). Another example is the Scottish 
Government’s WES, open to international applicants as 
it is ‘about getting the best technology, no matter where 
it comes from’ (I32 – Senior public servant). The caveat 
is that testing must happen in Scotland and there was a 
view that some companies were prepared to locate their 
operations in the UK and collaborate with UK firms to 
access these funds: 
‘A lot of these guys have said, “Well okay, we’re based 
in Denmark, in Sweden, in the US, but … We’ll get this 
money, we’ll move to the UK’ (I28 – Innovation NDPB 
director). 
A concern did however exist that Scotland faced a major 
challenge embedding the skills and knowledge generated 
by projects with international partners domestically, given 
the lack of requirement for these companies to remain 
active in the UK after the project (I19, 32): 
‘They pay to go into EMEC and they are gone. Not a lot 
of knowledge is retained in the UK as a result of that 
project’ (I19 – Developer).
7.3.4 Inter-governmental coordination and 
knowledge exchange
A common criticism of the UK’s wave energy innovation 
system was how complex and poorly co-ordinated the 
funding landscape was (n=9; I1, 10-11, 14; 17, 20, 22, 26, 
31). Associated issues included a duplication of resources 
(n=3; I10-11, 14) (resource mobilisation (F5)): ‘It’s all been a 
bit fragmented and perhaps we’ve seen different schemes 
popping up, more or less trying to do the same’ (I11 – Senior 
public servant). This is a view supported by our analysis of 
the UK policy landscape (Figure 7), which sees analogous 
initiatives established in parallel to support the same stage 
of innovation by both the UK and Scottish Governments. 
Examples includes MEAD and MRCF, as well as MRDF and 
WATES, the former supported by both the UK and Scottish 
Governments. This complex, fast-changing and poorly co-
ordinated landscape also saw actors committing significant 
human resources simply to navigate it and identify suitable 
funding schemes, deflecting resources away from knowledge 
development (F1) and entrepreneurial experimentation (F3). As 
one developer explained: 
‘How does a team of three people keep up to date with 
five or six different sources of funding, from DECC, 
[InnovateUK], Scottish Government etc.?’ 
(I14 – Developer CFO)
7.3.4.1 Lack of a central over-arching body for 
energy technology innovation
An important reason for this lack of coordination was the 
lack of a central, over-arching funding body to channel 
and co-ordinate all UK energy innovation (n=2; I14, 26). 
Instead, the UK finds its wave energy RD&D funding split 
across numerous public bodies, operating across different 
geographies (i.e. regional, national, European), each with 
their own distinct set of objectives (n=4; I10-11, 17, 25) 
(Figure 7). In addition, funding agencies and government 
bodies were considered to be sufficiently autonomous that 
they had little imperative to work jointly with other bodies 
to achieve their objectives (I10–11): ‘There is a lot they can 
do themselves. Therefore, why … get embroiled in multi-
partner collaborative structures, which can raise their 
own issues’? (I11 – Senior public servant). It was felt that 
devolution reinforced this dynamic in the UK, especially in 
Scotland (I10, 18, 31), splitting innovation funding powers 
across an even greater number of public bodies. 
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In a bid to improve the degree of co-ordination across 
governing bodies of wave energy innovation a host of 
cross-government co-ordinating networks have been 
established (n=6; 11, 14, 18 21-22, 32) (see Section 
5.3.3). Of these the Wave Industry Programme Board 
was considered to have the most impact on wave energy 
support (see Section 5.3.3.3). As one board member 
explained, the convening of the WIPB led to the formation 
of WES: ‘the culmination of an awful lot of learning’ (I32 – 
Senior public servant). 
There were examples of policy makers communicating 
directly with different layers of government when 
developing their own schemes, such as the Scottish 
Government, who invited a UK Government representative 
responsible for managing an array-focused demonstration 
scheme (i.e. MEAD) to sit on their advisory board for their 
own array demonstration scheme (i.e. MRCF) (I18). One 
respondent linked this desire for greater co-ordination to 
the increased pressure on government to make the most 
of public investment in innovation following public sector 
cutbacks in the aftermath of the financial crisis (I11). The 
overall consensus was neatly summarised by one policy 
maker, who explained that whilst there is: 
‘Still more to be done to provide a real coherent platform 
of different programmes and being clear about who is 
doing what … I think that it’s fair to say that across the 
UK … all the major funding bodies have worked fairly 
close together … that allows cross-learning to go on’  
(I11 – Senior public servant)
7.4 Technology and infrastructure
This sub-section examines how the technological 
characteristics of wave energy (Section 7.4.1) and test 
facility infrastructure (Section 7.4.2) served to support or 
undermine wave energy innovation and the underlying 
factors responsible for these, summarised in Figure 50. 
The research finds that the unique characteristics of wave 
energy technology have, on balance, slowed the innovation 
journey, with developers having to work to tight weather 
windows and operate conservatively in hostile ocean 
environments (knowledge development (F1)) ; entrepreneurial 
experimentation (F3)). Additionally, despite efforts from 
companies such as Pelamis to integrate proven sub-
components, wave energy represents a radically new form 
of energy technology and one that has therefore struggled 
to benefit from advances from other sectors to date, 
negatively impacting upon both knowledge exchange (F2) 
and the technology’s legitimacy (F7). Efforts are now being 
made to broaden the direction of the search and integrate 
expertise from non-energy sectors (e.g. automotive, 
materials science, commercial shipping, defence), primarily 
via WES.
UK wave energy test facilities were considered to be 
amongst the best in the world and underpinned many 
of the advances in wave energy technology (knowledge 
development (F1)) and (entrepreneurial experimentation (F3)), 
echoing previous research (Jeffrey et al. 2014; Mclachlan 
2010; Corsatea 2014). However, concerns were raised 
about the costs of accessing these facilities and the 
in-built bias of some facilities towards certain device 
designs. The biggest barrier raised was the lack of test 
facilities that filled the mid-TRL gap between small-scale 
prototypes and full-scale devices. In reaction to this state-
of-the-art new generation wave tanks (e.g. FloWaveTT in 
Edinburgh) and open-ocean ‘nursery’ test sites offering 
less hostile conditions were commissioned to help fill this 
gap, meaning that today the UK has excellent test facility 
coverage across the innovation chain.
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Figure 50: Overview of inducement and blocking mechanisms related to infrastructure and technology (source: author)
NOTE: Blocking and inducement mechanisms in italics are those which emerged in the period since 2000.
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exchange 
F3 – Entrepreneurial 
experimentation
F4 – Guidance of the 
search
• Facility access costs too high for developers to 
afford (n=3)
• Facilities do not cater for whole spectrum of 
device designs (n=3)
• Lack of innovation voucher scheme to allow 
free use of facilities (n=2)
• Full suite of test facilities across TRLs not in 
place until mid-2010s (n=2)
• Hostile and unpredictable ocean environment 
breeds conservatism (n=7)
• Weather windows constrain test time and result 
in idle assets (n=3)
• Lack of focus on cross-fertilisation from non-
energy sectors (n=3)
• Heterogeneous and complex energy resource 
(n=2)
• Inherently large device size and high capital costs 
of devices (n=2)
• New technical requirement limits opportunities 
for cross-fertilisation (n=2)
• Major investment in world-class facilities (n=5)
• Introduction of mid-TRL facilities (n=4)
• Test facility technology innovation (n=2)
• Transnational innovation voucher schemes enable 
free utilisation (n=2)
• Some synergies with other energy sub-sectors 
e.g. wind, tidal (n=6)
• Culture of utilising proven components from 
other energy sectors (n=3)
• Refocusing on sub-components allows for 
fertilisation from non-energy sectors (n=2)
Nature of the engineering 
challenge
Test facility capabilities 
and access
F5 – Resource 
mobilisation
F6 - Market formation
F7 – Legitimation
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7.4.1 Technological characteristics and cross-
fertilisation
This section considers how the unique characteristics of 
wave energy technology (see Section 2) pose a distinct 
set of innovation challenges compared to other energy 
technologies, both in terms of experimentation (Section 
7.4.1.1), and technological cross-fertilisation (Section 
7.4.1.2).
7.4.1.1 Inherent challenges of wave energy 
RD&D
A strong consensus existed that wave energy poses a unique 
and extremely difficult engineering challenge (n=11; I3, 5, 10, 
12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 28-29, 31). At the broadest level, wave 
energy was considered to present a much more difficult 
engineering challenge than other technologies such as wind 
or tidal stream energy given the multi-dimensional forces at 
play: 
‘Wind and tidal are basically two-dimensional laminar 
flows, and so they’ve ended up with a propeller or a kite as 
the methods of energy capture. Wave is a circular particle 
motion, so it is more complex’ (I14 – Developer CFO). 
The heterogeneous wave energy resource across the 
onshore, nearshore and offshore environments was also 
identified as a challenge, each requiring a different device 
design to maximise resource capture (I3). The dimensions of 
WECs were also considered to be naturally very large, in turn 
making them very expensive, as they needed to match the 
wavelength of ocean waves to operate cost-effectively (n=2; 
I5, 24). 
The most common issue identified was experimenting in 
such a hostile and unpredictable open-ocean environment 
(n=7; 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 29, 31): ‘That’s the nature of the 
waves, you can’t switch them off; they are destructive, and 
that makes it very challenging’ (I12 – Consultant). This hostile 
environment was considered to make experimentation 
very costly for a number of reasons. First, devices must be 
engineered to withstand extreme conditions, constructing 
devices, for example, from high-cost durable materials such 
as steel. Second, the changeable and hostile conditions 
constrain testing to short ‘weather windows’ (n=3; I10, 19, 
23), meaning that experimentation is limited to short periods 
of time and incurs ‘stranded asset’ costs when personnel and 
equipment (e.g. vessels) is idling. Referring to an analogous 
tidal stream installation, one interviewee explained that: 
‘The cable vessel was holed up for six weeks with the cable 
on board, waiting for a weather window to lay it ... [We] 
wasted probably the thick end of eight or nine months and 
£1m’ (I10 – Test facility director). 
Finally, the high-risk ocean environment was considered 
to breed a conservative approach towards device 
demonstration (n=3; 12, 14, 31) in a bid to avoid damage 
to very expensive prototypes. As one former developer 
explained:
‘We just didn’t let them see anything bigger than 10m 
waves. They’re still big waves, but we made a risk-based 
decision not to do it because it was too likely they would 
all would get smashed up’ (I31 – Consultant and former 
developer). 
Again, comparisons were drawn with onshore wind, 
explaining that it had benefitted from much more extensive 
experimentation in the early years than wave energy because: 
‘pioneers were effectively able to build their prototype, 
put it up on a pole, test it the same week and break it. 
That would cost them the price of the materials’ (I12 – 
Consultant).
7.4.1.2 Wave energy characteristically distinct 
from other technologies
Technologies such as tidal stream energy, offshore wind 
and offshore oil and gas, were identified as an important 
source of cross-fertilisation (n=6, I4, 9, 16, 19, 22, 30), a view 
echoed by technology needs assessments (Carbon Trust 
2006; Ocean Energy Forum 2016; FREDS Marine Energy 
Group 2004; OEE 2013), especially in relation to enabling 
technologies (e.g. foundations) and operational methods (e.g. 
installation). However, wave energy was considered to be so 
distinct from other technologies that cross-fertilisation was 
difficult (n=2; I12, 31): 
‘We’ve looked at the benefits that can be applied from the 
outside … but there is a new overall technical requirement 
here’ (I31 – consultant and former developer). 
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In contrast, tidal stream energy was considered to have 
enjoyed a much stronger degree of cross-fertilisation, 
particularly from offshore wind given the analogous 
horizontal-axis turbine design. With reference to tidal 
stream developers, one respondent explained:
‘These guys are able to learn from what’s already been 
done in the wind industry, so there’s a much more 
rapid sense of convergence. They’re standing on the 
shoulders of giants you could say really, whereas in 
the wave industry it’s very hard to find a parallel’ (I12 – 
Consultant). 
Strong efforts to harness learning from other energy sub-
sectors were identified, most notably in the shift away 
from the approach in the 1970s and 1980s of developing 
a suite of bespoke sub-components and integrating these 
into a novel device focusing on integrating existing proven 
components into a novel device during the 2000s and 
2010s (n=3; I5, 9, 31). This in turn helped to improve the 
legitimacy (F7) of wave energy by de-risking it because 
‘the stuff inside is more or less what’s been used in the 
North Sea, in your vacuum cleaner or in your car’ (I5 – 
Consultant). However, one interviewee did explain that 
developers had integrated existing components into 
devices not originally designed for the marine environment, 
and this contributed to underwhelming results or even 
device failures (I10).
Despite these efforts to harness lessons from other 
sectors, there was a view that wave energy did not fully 
take advantage of learning from non-energy sectors (n=3; 
I9, 22, 28), most notably the ICT, automotive, materials, 
science, shipbuilding and heavy manufacturing sectors, 
in part because of the ‘siloed’ approach of the UK to 
developing energy technologies. 
In reaction to this, some technology foresighting 
exercises (SI Ocean 2012; Huckerby et al. 2011) identified 
potential synergies with other non-energy sectors and 
the establishment of WES explicitly sought to bring in 
expertise from these non-energy sectors, organising 
RD&D at sub-component versus device level (I26, 32), 
opening up potential collaboration with experts to 
develop sub-systems with relevance to other sectors 
(e.g. PTOs, materials, controls) (Section 7.3.1.3): ‘WES is 
about getting the best technology, no matter where it 
comes from’ (I32 – Senior public servant). Examples from 
WES include: (1) DuPont, a leading chemical company, 
partnering a project to assess the potential of using high 
performance thermoplastic elastomers for wave energy 
device structures; (2) Griffon Hoverwork, a hovercraft 
manufacturer, testing the use of deformable fabric/
elastomeric structures for wave energy conversion; and 
(3) Romax Technology, a developer of gearbox, bearings 
and driveline systems for aerospace and transport sectors, 
helping deliver a PTO comprising a gearbox and generator 
for wave energy.
7.4.2 Marine energy test infrastructure
This section considers the capabilities of wave energy test 
facilities outlined in Section 5.4.1 and how developers’ 
engagement with these has impacted upon the wave 
energy innovation process, especially with regards 
to knowledge development (F1) and entrepreneurial 
experimentation (F3).
7.4.2.1 Test facility access costs
There was a view that some developers felt the costs 
to access wave energy test facilities were too high for 
developers to cover (n=3; I12, 14, 32): ‘I would say the 
costs of testing at EMEC are very high … So typically 
at the moment it will cost you £300,000 I think to get 
a mooring, if I’m right’ (I12 – Consultant). In contrast, 
other respondents explained that UK developers received 
excellent value for money considering that the alternative 
to establishing communal test facilities was for developers 
to construct their own facilities and cultivate their own 
testing expertise (n=3; I19, 21, 32), such as in Australia, 
where Carnegie Clean Energy had to establish their 
Fremantle wave energy research facility (Carnegie Clean 
Energy 2017): 
‘The cost of the developer doing it themselves is 
probably about £3m to get their own site ready, with grid 
connection … substantially more that it costs them to go 
to EMEC’ (I32 – Senior public servant).
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Associated with the costs of accessing these facilities was 
a criticism of the lack of an ‘innovation voucher’ scheme 
(n=2; I13, 15), providing developers with a pre-determined 
period of test facility time to test their device, such as 
the US wave energy prize, which provided time at a test 
facility as part of their funding award (I13). In the absence 
of such a scheme, UK developers had to secure public 
funds via open competitions and the associated levels of 
private sector match funding in order to cover both their 
device development and testing costs, entailing significant 
amounts of time that could be spent developing their 
technology (I13–14). Consequently, some developers 
struggled to secure the necessary private sector funds 
to utilise test facilities after the financial crisis (Section 
7.2.3.1) (I14). This model was attributed more widely 
to the UK Government’s willingness to provide capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) to establish the test facilities but not 
the operational expenditure (OPEX) (I13, 32), likened to 
‘the batteries aren’t included’ (I13 – Test facility director) 
philosophy, an issue identified in previous research (Skea et 
al. 2013). 
The lack of an innovation voucher scheme was in part 
attributed to the EU State Aid ‘de minimus’ rules48 (Section 
7.2.3.1) which limit the amount of government-funded 
‘test time’ government can offer developers (I13). It was 
also attributed to the fact that the test facilities were set 
up by government as private sector entities to insulate 
government from financial risk, meaning that they were 
not legally incorporated to offer government subsidised 
testing (I14, 32).
Europe-wide voucher schemes for marine energy test 
facilities were established to help address this issue, 
including MARINET and FORESEA (Section 5.3.1.4), which 
provide eligible developers from across Europe with 
free access to facilities in other countries (n=2; I13, 15). 
However, through MARINET, developers cannot access 
infrastructure in their own country of work (Healy 2013) 
(I15), meaning that UK-based companies cannot test their 
devices in UK facilities, which rank amongst the best in the 
world. In contrast, FORESEA does allow UK developers to 
access UK facilities but operates a relatively small budget 
and does not cover on-shore test facilities (e.g. test tanks) 
(FORESEA 2017). 
7.4.2.2 Coverage of facilities across innovation 
chain 
Overall, the UK’s marine test facilities were generally 
considered to be world-class (n=5; I9, 13–14, 22, 29, 32), 
offering wave energy developers unparalleled technical 
support to develop their technologies, both in simulated 
environments via test tanks (e.g. FloWaveTT) and open-sea 
test centres (e.g. EMEC, WaveHub) (Section 5.4.1). Despite 
these strengths a common criticism was the lack of test 
tank facilities to enable onshore testing in simulated ocean 
environments of mid-TRL devices during the 2000s and 
early 2010s, in turn leading to very costly failures during 
open-ocean testing that seriously undermined investor 
confidence in the technology: 
‘People had no choice, [they] went to a … big rectangular 
tank with a one directional wave … then they cut steel 
and built something to go in the water and it broke’ (I13 
– Test facility director). 
To fill the gap between test tanks offering 1:50 scale testing 
and open-ocean facilities offering full-scale testing, more 
advanced onshore facilities were commissioned to larger 
scale testing (n=4; I13-14, 20, 32), such as FloWaveTT 
in Edinburgh in 2014, which offered testing up to 1:10 
scale, and the opening of nursery open-ocean sites, at, for 
example, EMEC in 2011, offering part-scale testing (approx. 
1:4 scale) (Section 5.4.1). The view was that with the 
introduction of these intermediate TRL test facilities, ‘all the 
stepping stones are [now] in place … facilities like FloWave 
are a last step before you step off the beach … EMEC is the 
place you go to next’ (I13 – Test facility director). 
48 State aid is limited to less than €200,000 over three years (BIS 2015a) and aid intensity (i.e. intervention rate) to between 25% and 80%, 
 depending on the organisation’s size (BIS 2015b).
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Despite these new facilities being welcomed, there was a 
view that a significant delay had taken place in delivering 
these intermediate stage test facilities (n=2; I20, 25), 
especially given that these had followed rather than 
preceded full-scale test facilities (Figure 10): ‘So we’ve got 
the TRL 1–4 facilities and infrastructure coming online ... a 
decade after the full scale at sea testing facilities came on 
line’ (I25 – Innovation NDPB manager). To help explain this 
delay, one respondent explained how test facilities such 
as FloWaveTT are themselves an outcome of a technology 
innovation journey that has run in parallel to wave energy 
(Section 5.4.2.1) (I5, 13). As one former researcher who 
had worked with Stephen Salter, a pioneer of wave energy, 
during the first phase of wave energy innovation in the 
1970s and 1980s, explained:
‘[He] quickly realised that he needed to invent some 
other things in order to make the research possible. One 
of those things was wave tanks … If it occurred now, you 
would already have facilities … because we developed 
them’ (I5 – Consultant)
7.4.2.3 Coverage of different device designs
Despite the world-class capabilities of UK test facilities, 
some concerns existed that the test facilities did not suit 
the whole spectrum of technological variants (n=3; I9-10, 
14). For example, WaveHub’s facility offers an underwater 
electrical hub and cable system that requires devices to 
generate electricity offshore rather than pump pressurised 
fluids onshore to then drive a turbine; a process that 
Carnegie, Seatricity and Aquamarine devices employ (I9). 
Another example was the hostility of the conditions to 
which devices were subject at the UK’s test facilities, 
which suited some devices but not others (I10, 14). One 
respondent explained that the two wave regimes of the 
full-scale and nursery sites at EMEC were not best suited 
to their device, highlighting that the full-scale test facility 
offered:
‘very big waves [that] our current device is not built to 
withstand’, whilst the nursery site offered ‘a relatively 
sheltered location [that] gives us the kind of wave 
conditions that we want to test less than 5% of the time’ 
(I14 – Developer CFO) 
As one respondent explained, it was very difficult to design 
a test facility when ‘there was no clear idea of what it 
needed to look like’ (I32 – Senior public servant), given 
that there was no consensus amongst developers about 
what the dominant device design was going to be, meaning 
that design decisions had to be made that were inevitably 
biased towards or against certain device designs (I14).
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8.1 Synopsis
Almost 20 years after the UK’s first wave energy 
innovation programme came to an end in the 1980s, a new 
programme to accelerate the development of wave energy 
technology was launched at the turn of the century. This 
was grounded in the belief that wave energy could play a 
central role in helping to deliver a low-carbon, secure and 
affordable energy system, as well as provide an important 
boost to the UK’s economy through the growth of a 
new domestic industry. However, despite investment of 
almost £200m of public funds in UK-based wave energy-
related RD&D since 2000, the technology remains some 
distance away from commercialisation. In this context, this 
report examines the extent to which this failure to reach 
commercialisation can be attributed to weaknesses in 
both government and industry’s strategy to support wave 
energy innovation in the UK.
By mobilising a Technology Innovation System (TIS) 
analytical framework this report finds that wave energy’s 
failure to reach market can, in part, be attributed 
to weaknesses in both government and industry’s 
approach to supporting wave energy innovation in the 
UK. However, a concerted effort to learn from past policy 
mistakes, led primarily by the Scottish Government, has 
resulted in a major reconfiguration of the wave energy 
innovation system that has helped to address many of 
these issues. Consequently, today, we find an innovation 
support framework that is much better placed to deliver 
a commercial wave energy device. Even so, this newly 
configured system is likely to face severe disruption in 
the face of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the UK 
Government’s shift away from supporting wave energy, 
both of which are likely to have a major impact on the level 
and type of RD&D support on offer for wave energy.
8.2 Key findings
Looking back, one of the most critical barriers to wave 
energy innovation was a fundamentally over-optimistic 
view, on the part of government and industry, of how 
quickly wave energy could be commercialised. As a result, 
the wave energy sector sought to ‘fast track’ wave energy 
technology towards commercialisation, focusing its efforts 
on later stage innovation. This can be illustrated by the raft 
of government RD&D funding schemes and test facilities 
that emerged during the mid-2000s, shortly after the UK 
had re-established its wave energy programme, which 
were geared explicitly towards full-scale demonstration. 
The implication was that, whilst almost £200m has been 
committed to wave energy-related RD&D since 2000 
excluding test infrastructure, and over a third of this 
(£69m) was awarded to support late-stage technology 
demonstration rather than earlier stage R&D.
This strong focus on quickly commercialising wave energy 
was exacerbated by the entry of market incumbents 
from the mid-2000s onwards, including the energy 
utilities, OEMs and VCs, who were attracted by wave 
energy’s potential to deliver grid-scale low-carbon 
electricity generation and be exported internationally as 
it utilised a global renewable energy resource. In a bid to 
secure the private sector match funding they needed to 
access public subsidies, developers presented an over-
optimistic view of how quickly wave energy could reach 
commercial application to market incumbents in order 
to attract investment. In turn, many developers failed 
to fulfil investors’ expectations against the ambitious 
targets, seriously damaging the legitimacy of wave energy 
technology. Examples of slow progress include a lack of 
convergence around a single design, as well as a recent 
decline in the level of installed capacity and the power 
rating of wave energy devices.
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As investors and government lost confidence in the 
technology and the financial climate became more 
challenging following the 2008 financial crisis, funds were 
withdrawn. This is especially true in the case of the UK 
Government, which saw its funding fall by over a third in 
2016 from its peak in 2011. These factors presented wave 
energy developers with an increasingly difficult financial 
environment within which to operate. Consequently, 
both Pelamis and Aquamarine Power, the two market 
leaders at the time, ceased trading between 2014 and 
2015 respectively, further damaging the legitimacy of the 
sector. From this point, the UK Government began to step 
back from wave energy, leading to its share of funding 
dropping from an average of 47% between 2000 and 2016 
to just 31% in 2016. In contrast, the EU and the Scottish 
Government continued to increase their share of support 
for the technology. 
Crucially, the failure of leading developers also triggered 
a major structural reconfiguration of the wave energy 
innovation system, informed by the lessons learnt since 
2000 about which policy approaches were deemed 
successes and failures. This included the introduction of 
new test infrastructure to enable mid-TRL testing (e.g. 
FloWaveTT), transnational free access to test facilities (e.g. 
MARINET), centres for industry–science excellence (e.g. 
OREC), doctoral training networks (e.g. IDCORE) and cross-
innovation chain funding programmes (e.g. EC). 
The most significant change has been the introduction of 
WES by the Scottish Government, designed to explicitly 
address many of the weaknesses associated with previous 
government policy. For example, a requirement was placed 
on developers to licence IP and a sub-component focus 
was brought in to promote collaboration, with investment 
made in knowledge capture to learn lessons from the 
past, and a stand-alone stream for wave energy funding 
set up to avoid the sector being crowded out by more 
mature technologies. A 100% intervention rate was also 
introduced to avoid the pressures associated with wave 
energy developers having to secure before private sector 
investment. Together, these structural changes to the UK 
wave energy innovation system demonstrate a clear ability 
and willingness from government to act upon lessons 
generated from evidence-based policy learning.
Whilst some key policy-related issues continue to face 
wave energy innovation, such as lack of policy co-
ordination between funding bodies across different 
layers of government (i.e. devolved administrations, 
the UK and EU) and lack of a clear long-term strategy 
to deliver a commercial device, our analysis finds that 
this reconfiguration of the UK’s support for wave 
energy created a system much better placed to deliver 
a commercial technology than before. For example, a 
measurable improvement across some key innovation 
indicators has already been detected, such as the degree 
of technology cross-fertilisation and industry–science 
collaboration. However, time lags between cause and 
effect mean the overall impact of this reconfiguration on 
the UK’s wave energy innovation performance will not be 
evident for a few years, especially for indicators such as 
installed capacity and cost of electricity. This emphasises 
the importance of ongoing monitoring of the UK’s wave 
energy innovation performance. 
Given that it will take time for the impact of this innovation 
system reconfiguration to take effect, the focus for policy 
makers should be on consolidating this newly configured 
innovation system and avoiding a major overhaul until 
it has had time to take effect. This will, however, be 
challenging given that Brexit could halt the UK’s access to 
EU RD&D funding programmes, which has accounted for 
a third of UK wave energy RD&D funding since 2010. This, 
coupled with the UK’s recent shift towards supporting 
RD&D for technologies other than wave energy, means 
that Scotland faces the very real possibility of leading the 
development of wave energy alone. Should this situation 
arise, it is unlikely to deliver the critical mass of financial 
and political support required to commercialise wave 
energy, especially when we consider the relatively small 
RD&D budget the Scottish Government controls and the 
billions of dollars of global investment it has required to 
commercialise other enewable energy technologies such 
as wind energy and solar PV. 
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8.3 Policy recommendations
In light of the research’s key findings, we present ten 
policy recommendations to help improve the effectiveness 
of the UK’s future support for wave energy innovation 
and help accelerate the technology’s journey towards 
commercialisation.
1. Retain access to EU innovation funding post-Brexit 
– Brexit poses a major risk to EU wave energy funding, 
accounting for 27% (£53m) of all wave energy-related 
RD&D committed since 2000, and in 2016 EU funding 
(£6.3m) was greater than that from the UK Government 
(£6m). It is essential that the UK retains access to 
EU innovation funds following Brexit negotiations, 
especially EU Framework Programmes (FPs) (i.e. 
Horizon2020). Exiting from the EU will also remove 
the UK’s primary platform for international RD&D 
collaboration, making it necessary to identify alternative 
ways to collaborate internationally to achieve the 
critical mass of resources and expertise necessary 
to commercialise wave energy, possibly via new 
international platforms such as Mission Innovation.2
2. Allow time for new UK wave energy innovation 
policy landscape to take effect – The UK wave 
energy innovation system has undergone a major 
reconfiguration over the past few years and the 
effects of this have not yet been fully felt. This new 
configuration must be given time to take effect before 
its efficacy is critiqued and decisions made to engage in 
any additional wide-scale restructuring. 
3. Develop a long-term Scottish wave energy strategy 
in a new political order – With the UK Government 
significantly reducing its support for wave energy and 
the threat of EU funds being withdrawn after Brexit, 
the Scottish Government could find itself acting alone 
in developing wave energy technology. Consequently, 
a strategy must be put in place that presents a credible 
path towards delivering a commercial wave energy device 
in Scotland that is resilient to the potential withdrawal 
of UK Government and/or EU funds. This should situate 
the development of wave energy in the context of a 
wider portfolio of energy technologies that the Scottish 
Government has identified as playing a key role in the 
future as part of its recent energy strategy (Scottish 
Government 2017c) and outline the steps required to 
integrate the various sub-components developed by the 
WES programme into a single, commercial device. 
4. Improve co-ordination of UK energy innovation 
policy landscape – There are still significant 
opportunities to improve the degree of co-ordination 
of wave energy RD&D support both within and across 
different levels of government. It remains to be seen 
how effective the UK’s newly formed EIB and UKRI 
will be in co-ordinating energy RD&D investment 
at UK level. It is recommended that, to ensure co-
ordination with bodies operating at different levels of 
government, these new networks engage closely with 
both the devolved administrations (e.g. the Scottish 
Government) and the EU. Furthermore, a top-down 
body responsible for wave energy at UK level, similar 
to Scotland’s WES model, could also improve co-
ordination of wave energy RD&D.
5. Share and synthesise lessons from past and present 
wave energy innovation programmes – Outputs 
from publicly funded later stage wave energy RD&D 
projects have not traditionally been made available 
for public consumption because of issues around 
IP protection and private sector match funding. In 
contrast, the Scottish Government’s WES programme 
and the EU’s FPs require awardees to share their key 
findings via project reports, enabling the wider sector 
to learn lessons from past projects and avoid making 
the same mistakes. It is critical that this approach is 
applied across all future publicly funded wave energy 
RD&D programmes in the UK and efforts should also 
be made to capture knowledge generated from past 
public RD&D projects, expanding upon WES’s current 
knowledge capture exercise. 
6. Acknowledge that support for wave energy has 
been historically low and intermittent – Since 1974, 
ocean energy has been allocated approximately 
$1.8bn3 of IEA members’ public energy RD&D 
budget versus $25bn for solar PV and $7.5bn for 
wind energy. Furthermore, funding for wave energy 
has been much more intermittent than most other 
energy technologies, split across two phases during 
the 1970s and 1980s and the 2000s and 2010s, 
increasing the likelihood of significant knowledge 
depreciation between these periods of concentrated 
investment. In this context, key policy decisions should 
49 Through Mission Innovation, 22 countries and the EU are taking action to double their public clean energy R&D investment over five years. 
 In addition, Mission Innovation members encourage collaboration among partner countries, share information and co-ordinate with businesses 
 and investors.
50 Includes all forms of ocean energy, not just wave energy.
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be made against the backdrop that wave energy has 
not enjoyed the same level or consistency of RD&D 
support in comparison to more mature renewables 
such as wind and solar energy.
7. Avoid competition for subsidies with established low-
carbon energy technologies – Emerging technologies, 
such as wave energy, can be out-competed for 
subsidies on a cost basis when in direct competition 
with significantly more mature technologies. Specific 
examples include separating wave energy from the 
same EMR CfD allocation as significantly cheaper 
technologies such as offshore wind energy and 
avoiding wave energy becoming bundled into wider 
marine energy RD&D programmes where it must 
compete with more mature technologies such as tidal 
range and tidal stream.
8. Avoid need for private sector match funding to 
support wave energy RD&D – The need to secure 
private sector investment to be awarded public 
grants has placed intense pressure on wave energy 
developers to ‘fast track’ their innovation timeline and 
avoid knowledge exchange in a bid to protect their IP. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis and wave energy’s 
slow progress saw private sector funds become more 
difficult to secure, in turn making access to public 
funds difficult. State aid compliant procurement 
frameworks such as WES can avoid the need for private 
sector match funding, offering a 100% intervention 
rate. Opportunities should be explored to apply this 
procurement model more widely, not just for wave but 
for other energy technologies.
9. Support wave energy niche market formation  
– A shift towards demonstrating wave energy devices 
in niche markets (e.g. off-grid islands, aquaculture) 
enables developers to learn valuable lessons through 
‘learning by doing’ in both real-world ocean and 
market environments, as well as providing both 
government and investors with greater confidence in 
the technology’s prospects. When wave energy is ready 
for full-scale demonstration, funds for wave energy 
RD&D should facilitate deployment in ‘real-world’ 
niche markets. However, funds should be awarded to 
developers that present an evidence-based roadmap 
that outlines how their technology can progress beyond 
small-scale niche application and towards wide-scale 
deployment.
10. Enable easy access to wave energy test facilities 
– Access to the UK’s world-class test facilities has 
required developers to secure public sector funds via 
open competitions, and the corresponding levels of 
private sector match funding. This process involves 
significant time and effort, channelling developers’ 
resources away from RD&D. To ensure developers 
can quickly and easily access these facilities, a state 
aid compliant UK-wide ‘innovation voucher’ scheme 
should be established to enable ‘free at the point 
of use’ access to those that have passed through 
preliminary stage-gated phases of development 
with independently verified positive results, building 
upon lessons learnt from the Europe-wide est 
infrastructure access schemes such as FORESEA and 
MARINET.
8.4 Wider lessons to support 
energy technology innovation
We draw a number of broader lessons from the case 
of UK wave energy innovation in order to improve our 
understanding of how energy technology innovation 
unfolds and how it can best be supported. This will help 
to inform both the design of energy innovation policy and 
development of innovation theory. 
1. Innovation systems can become destabilised and 
reconfigured – Traditionally, TIS evolution has been 
considered to follow a broadly linear and positive 
development trajectory, incorporating two main 
phases: formation and growth (Bergek, Jacobsson, et al. 
2008a). The case of wave energy highlights how a TIS 
may indeed follow a non-linear and more challenging 
development path involving distinct phases such 
as: (1) disintegration, in the face of destabilising 
forces such as the failure of market leaders and the 
withdrawal of government funds; (2) reconfiguration of 
structural elements potentially in a concerted effort to 
improve the efficacy of the TIS in reaction to system 
failures; and/or (3) stagnation, where a prolonged 
period of little investment results in low levels of 
activity, possibly inducing knowledge depreciation, 
but where investment is sufficiently high to preserve 
some key aspects of the TIS (e.g. research institutes, 
test facilities).
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2. Test infrastructure innovation co-evolves with 
energy technology innovation – To date, the role of 
infrastructure in the technology innovation process 
has normally been characterised as one enabling 
technology deployment – for example, via integration 
with existing electricity networks (Gallagher et 
al. 2006). However, this research identifies the 
key role test facilities play in enabling technology 
innovation. Furthermore, the research finds that test 
infrastructure is subject to a process of innovation 
similar to that of the technologies of which it enables 
testing (e.g. wave energy). Crucially, test infrastructure 
also co-evolves with the technologies it is designed to 
test. Devices are designed with test facility capabilities 
in mind, whilst test facilities are designed around the 
key characteristics of emergent device designs.
3. Technology innovation relies on policy innovation – 
The research finds that government reflected upon 
and learned lessons from the successes and failures 
of past wave energy policy, using these to inform the 
design of its current policy framework. Paramount 
to successful energy innovation policy making is the 
iterative process of policy design, experimentation, 
‘learning by doing’ and subsequent refinement based 
on lessons learnt, which represents its own discrete 
form of innovation (Petmesidou & Gonz 2015; 
Mintrom 1997). This process of policy innovation 
is reliant upon the presence of personnel with the 
capacity and appetite to develop innovative policies 
(i.e. policy entrepreneurs) (Petmesidou & Gonz 2015), 
as well as intra- and inter-organisational networks 
that enable knowledge exchange and a culture that 
rewards policy innovation rather than discouraging it. 
4. Devolution creates a complex but diverse innovation 
system – Whilst research has considered how 
innovation policy unfolds in regions subject to 
multiple layers of governance (Sotarauta & Kautonen 
2007; Kuhlmann 2001) little work has examined 
how devolution impacts upon the evolution and 
performance of an energy innovation system. The 
case of wave energy is inextricably linked with 
devolution in the UK both upwards to the EU and 
downwards to devolved administrations such as the 
Scottish Government. On the one hand, devolution 
has led to a complex, multi-level energy innovation 
governance framework that has created difficulties 
in terms of co-ordination and policy landscape 
navigation. On the other, it has created diversity, 
meaning that the UK Government’s move away from 
wave energy has not entirely dictated the fortunes of 
wave energy, with support continuing to flow from the 
EU and Scottish Government. Furthermore, Scottish 
Government, the smallest and most agile of the three 
governments, demonstrated the strongest ability to 
learn from past policy performance and translate this 
into action.
5. Innovation relies on the capture and codification 
of tacit knowledge – The case of wave energy 
identifies that, too often, tacit knowledge (i.e. ‘know-
how’) was lost when companies ceased trading, 
personnel moved on or knowledge was stockpiled 
due to confidentiality issues. Successful technology 
innovation relies on tacit knowledge being codified 
and, wherever possible, shared. However, it should 
be acknowledged that some tacit knowledge cannot 
easily be codified, making it difficult to transfer or 
‘sticky’ (Hippel 1994; Brodbeck & Polanyi 1960). 
Finally, codification can help protect against 
knowledge depreciation during periods of relatively 
low RD&D funding (Wilson & Grübler 2014), as was 
the case for UK wave energy during the 1980s and 
1990s.
6. Competition and collaboration must be balanced 
according to stage of innovation – The case of wave 
energy supports the need for a balance between 
competition and collaboration or closed and open 
innovation (Chesbrough 2003). It points to the need 
for a stronger emphasis on collaboration during 
the earlier TRLs to ensure technology developers 
do not operate in isolation but instead benefit from 
knowledge sharing and the pooling of human and 
financial resources. As the technology moves closer 
to market, the emphasis may gradually shift towards 
competition in a bid to encourage convergence 
around a single optimal device design. Even so, it 
is important that areas for collaboration are clearly 
demarcated and built on sectoral consensus, 
with suitable platforms put in place to facilitate 
collaboration (e.g. JIPs). 
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7. Regional innovation clusters offer a locus for market 
formation – A growing body of literature points 
to the importance of ‘regional innovation clusters’, 
which constitute a geographical concentration of 
key structural elements underpinning innovation 
(e.g. actors, institutions, networks, infrastructure), 
facilitating key innovation functions such as 
knowledge exchange and market formation (Muro 
& Katz 2010). The wave energy case study supports 
this view in the examples of the EMEC and the 
University of Edinburgh, which have formed centres of 
excellence with their own entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Consideration must therefore be given to where 
and how regional energy innovation clusters will be 
established and opportunities to build these around 
test facilities, which already see a high concentration 
of actors, resources and infrastructure (e.g. grid 
connection).
8. Protected spaces help to shield emerging 
technologies from competition against mature 
technologies – To avoid emerging technologies 
becoming ‘crowded out’, it is essential that they are 
not in direct competition with more established 
technologies for the same RD&D funding. This finding 
supports the view outlined in the socio-technical 
transitions and strategic niche management literature 
that emerging technologies should be protected by 
the formation of ‘sheltered spaces’ such as niche 
markets (Schot & Geels 2008), enabling gradual 
technological maturation through ‘learning by 
doing’ and ‘learning by using’, as well as improving 
stakeholders’ confidence in the technology via 
successful real-world deployment.
9. Characteristics of technology influence its 
innovation journey – The case of wave energy 
points to the unique technical challenges it has 
faced, such as the need to test in a very hostile 
ocean environment and the lack of synergies 
with established technologies. It is critical that, 
when comparing the progress of different energy 
technologies, their respective characteristics are 
acknowledged because these will shape the pace 
and nature of their development trajectory. This 
echoes research by Nemet (2014) who identified 
how smaller, modular energy technologies (e.g. 
solar PV) tended to benefit from a faster rate of 
learning versus large, site-assembled technologies 
(e.g. nuclear) because they underwent a much larger 
number of iterations due to their lower costs and 
build times.
8.5 Recommendations for future work
We highlight a number of priorities for future research, 
beginning with wave and marine energy-specific work, 
before turning to research on energy technology innovation 
more broadly. 
8.5.1 Wave and marine energy innovation
First, in light of the major structural changes to the UK’s 
wave energy innovation system, it is important that the 
UK’s innovation performance is closely monitored over 
the coming years to assess whether these changes 
have resulted in a net positive or negative impact on 
performance. Quantitative assessment is the first step 
in measuring changes in innovation performance, and 
should be complemented by qualitative research to identify 
the factors underlying these changes and the extent 
to which they are coupled with the observed structural 
developments. 
Second, this report has adopted a sectoral-level focus 
and future research would benefit from comparing and 
contrasting a host of detailed firm-level case studies of 
wave energy developers , both past and present. This 
would offer valuable insight into how and why developers 
took the strategic decisions they did within the context of 
wider sectoral developments (e.g. political, economic).
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Third, the research has drawn some valuable comparisons 
between the progress of both wave and tidal stream 
energy in the UK. Future work would usefully examine, 
in similar detail to this report, how and why the 
UK’s tidal stream sector has grown. It would offer a 
complementary focus to wave energy as tidal stream is 
generally considered to be at a more advanced stage, and 
would offer useful insights into the challenges facing a 
technology closer to commercialisation, such as securing 
large-scale project finance and array deployment.
Finally, this report has focused explicitly on UK wave 
energy RD&D, with little attention paid to developments 
internationally. It is essential that, to identify best practice 
wave energy innovation policy, this study of the UK’s wave 
energy innovation system is compared with those of other 
countries. This should involve an international quantitative 
assessment of wave energy performance, followed by 
a series of mixed-method country case studies which 
examine why some countries are performing better than 
others in both absolute and relative terms, in turn helping 
to inform policy design. This would build upon the excellent 
work conducted by the EC’s Joint Research Council 
(Magagna et al. 2016; Magagna & Uihlein 2015)
8.5.2 Energy technology innovation
This study has examined the development of just one 
energy technology within one country. However, to identify 
best practice energy innovation policy, it is essential that 
a systematic comparison of a range of different energy 
technology case studies across different countries is 
conducted, utilising a standardised methodology to enable 
cross-case comparison. Building upon the methodology 
employed in this study, and the valuable work conducted 
by Wilson and Grübler (2014), this should mobilise 
a mixed-method approach with a robust analytical 
framework that adopts a long-time horizon to ensure that 
long-term trends in energy technology innovation are 
accounted for.
Second, another valuable strand of research would be 
to utilise quantitative energy innovation indicator sets 
(see Bento & Wilson 2016; Hillman et al. 2011; Hu et 
al. 2017) to offer a cost-benefit analysis of innovation 
policy frameworks, comparing innovation inputs (e.g. 
RD&D investment) and outputs (e.g. levelised cost of 
electricity, unit cost, installed capacity) and/or outcomes 
(e.g. CO2 emission reduction, job creation). If this economic 
assessment was conducted internationally, it might be 
possible to identify the countries with the most effective 
innovation systems for certain energy technologies, as 
demonstrated by Hannon and Van Diemen (2016) for 
ocean energy, in turn presenting a focus for more detailed 
case study research. It is essential that any such analysis 
goes beyond this study, taking into account both public 
and private RD&D investment, utilising private RD&D 
investment available from datasets such as Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance.
SECTION 8 
Conclusions and policy 
recommendations
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Interviewee 
number 
Position Organisation Former role Date
1 Senior researcher University Engineer at wave tank manufacturer 03/03/2015
2 Director Wave energy technology developer - 01/04/2015
3 Researcher University Engineer at energy utility 01/04/2015
4 Senior researcher University - 01/04/2015
5 Director Consultancy University researcher 16/04/2015
6 - - Senior public servant 16/04/2015
7 Manager Renewable energy trade association - 21/04/2015
8 Director Multi-national oil and gas company Energy innovation NDPB manager 13/05/2015
9 Manager Wave energy technology developer - 13/05/2015
10 Director Marine energy test facility Former engineer at oil and gas company 05/08/2015
11 Senior public servant Government development agency - 09/09/2015
12 Managing director Consultancy Engineer at energy utility 11/09/2015
13 CEO Marine energy test facility Engineer at technical consultancy 14/09/2015
14 CFO Wave energy technology developer Finance director 14/09/2015
15 Senior researcher University - 14/09/2015
16 Senior researcher University Engineer at wave energy technology developer 14/09/2015
17 Director Energy innovation NDPB - 16/09/2015
18 Senior civil servant Government - 16/09/2015
19 CEO Wave energy technology developer Environmental consultant 16/09/2015
20 Senior researcher University - 18/09/2015
21 Managing director Consultancy Director at wave energy technology developer 18/09/2015
22 Manager Energy innovation NDPB Employee of energy utility 18/09/2015
23 Manager Public estate agency - 18/09/2015
24 Director Consultancy Director at energy utility 19/09/2015
25 Manager Energy innovation NDPB Manager at energy utility 19/09/2015
26 Manager Energy innovation NDPB - 19/09/2015
27 Director Energy innovation NDPB - 19/09/2015
28 Director Energy innovation NDPB Engineer at OEM 23/09/2015
29 Director Energy innovation NDPB Consultant in defence sector 23/09/2015
30 CEO Wave energy technology developer Entrepreneur 23/09/2015
31 Managing director Consultancy Director of wave energy technology developer 28/09/2015
32 Senior public servant Government development agency - 02/10/2015
33 Director Government investment bank - 02/10/2015
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Appendix B – Breakdown of technology innovation chain
Technology 
innovation activity TRL description TRL Description of wave energy-relevant RD&D activities
Basic research
Experimental or theoretical 
work undertaken primarily 
to acquire new knowledge of 
the underlying foundations of 
phenomena and observable 
facts, without any particular 
application or use in view.
1
Basic principles observed and reported - Lowest level of technology 
readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into applied 
research and development.
2
Concept and/or application formulated - Once basic principles 
are observed, practical applications can be invented. Applications 




undertaken to acquire new 
knowledge. It is, however, 
directed primarily towards 
a specific, practical aim or 
objective.
3
Analytic proof of concept and small-scale experimental - Active 
research and development is initiated, including analytical, 
engineering and laboratory studies to physically validate analytical 
predictions of separate elements of the technology.
4
Functional proof of concept - Basic technological components 




Systematic work, drawing 
on knowledge gained from 
research and practical 
experience and producing 
additional knowledge, directed 
to producing new products 
or processes or to improving 
existing products or processes.
5 Component/sub-system/system integration, testing and validation - Basic technological components are integrated to 
establish that they will work together so the system can be tested in 
a simulated environment.
6
Prototype model test facility - Validation. Representative model 
or prototype system, well beyond that of TRL5, tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s 
demonstrated readiness.
Demonstration
Design, construction and 
operation of a prototype 
of a technology at or near 
commercial scale with the 
purpose of providing technical, 
economic and environmental 
information to industrialists, 
financiers, regulators and 
policy makers.
7
Open-water system test and validation - Prototype near, or at, 
planned operational system. Represents a major step up from 
TRL6, requiring demonstration of an actual system prototype in an 
operational environment.
8
System demonstration/operational verification - Technology has 
been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. 
In almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of true system 
development.
Deployment System ready for full-scale commercial deployment. 9
Actual system proven through successful operations - Actual 
application of the technology in its final form and under mission 
conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and 
evaluation.
Test infrastructure - - Full-scale test centre infrastructure to facilitate the testing and verification of technologies in an open-ocean environment.
Knowledge 
exchange - -
Initiatives to promote knowledge transfer specifically focused on 
supporting the development of the sector (e.g. research networks).
Training - - Initiatives to promote training specifically focused on supporting the development of the sector (e.g. CDTs)
 
 
NOTE: Generic TRL descriptions are taken from the Frascati Manual (OECD 2015) and the wave energy-specific activities relating to each TRL from 
Jeffrey et al. (2014).
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Appendix C – List of major UK-eligible public funding 













Early Marine Renewable 
Energy Programme 
(NERC MREP)
UK NERC and 
DEFRA












Early Small Business 
Research Initiative 
Greenius
UK InnovateUK Sustainable 
development












Early to mid Carbon Trust Applied 
Research




Early to mid Marine Energy 
Challenge (MEC)




Early to mid Marine Energy 
Accelerator (MEA)




Early to mid Innovation Vouchers UK InnovateUK Economy 
wide































Early to late Energy Catalyst UK Innovate UK; 
EPSRC; DECC/
BEIS 

























List of major UK-eligible public funding 
programmes for wave energy innovation
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Mid to Late New and Renewable 
Energy Programme

























Mid to late Energy Entrepreneurs 
Fund




Late Wave and Tidal 












Marine energy 2013 2016 Demand 




Late Infrastructure for 
Offshore Renewables 
(I4OR)
UK InnovateUK Offshore 
renewable 
energy




Late Ocean ERA-NET EU European 
Commission

































































Marine Energy Array 
Demonstrator (MEAD)













Commercial Saltire Prize Scotland Scottish 
Government
Marine energy 2008 2017 Demand 
pull – prize
£10m
































Commercial Green Investment 
Bank (GIB)
UK - Sustainable 
development





Commercial Electricity Market 
Reform Contracts for 
Difference (EMR CFD)

















NOTE: 1 - Unadjusted for inflation; 2 - Budget is actual expenditure up to summer 2017. 
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Appendix D – List of major wave energy test tanks
































Narrow tank University of 
Edinburgh 10 0.3 0.6 1 0.2 - 2 1:100 No 1974 1974
Wide tank University of 










University - - - - - - - - - 1987 1987
Narrow tank City University - 0.9 0.5 - - - - - - 1988 1988
Narrow tank Heriot Watt 
University - - - - - - - - - 1988 1988
Narrow tank Heriot Watt 
University - 0.75 0.9 - - - - - - 1991 1991
Wave basin E HR Walling-
ford 54 27 1.2 - 0.3 0.14 1.25 1:50 Yes 1993 1993
Narrow tank City University - 0.4 0.7 - - - - - - 1994 1994
Narrow tank Heriot Watt 
University - 0.5 1.2 - - - - - - 1994 1994
Towing tank qinetiq 270 12.2 5.4 2 0.37 Towing 1 - No 1932 1995
Narrow tank Queen’s 
University 
Belfast
- 0.35 1 1 - - - - - 1995 1995
Wave basin Heriot Watt 
University 12.4 12 3 24 - - 2.5 - - 1996 1996
Narrow tank Applied 
Research and 
Technology
18 3.5 1 1 - - - 1:40 - 1996 1996
Narrow tank UCL - 0.45 0.5 2 - - - - - 1997 1997






18 4.8 0.8 6 0.55 - 1 1:20 Yes 2002 2002
Narrow tank University of 








lege London 62 2.8 2.15 4 0.3 - 2 1:50 No 2003 2003
Coastal flume Imperial Col-
lege London 23 0.6 0.8 1 0.3
0.6-






















6 2 - Yes 2005 2005
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Towing tank University of 

















































radius) 6 1.2 48
0.22 at 












2 168 0.7 1.6 1 1:10 Yes 2014 2014
F³ – the Fast 
Flow Facility
HR Walling-

















60 3.7 1.8 - 0.18
Towing
2 - - 2016 2016
Towing tank University of 
Southampton 138 6 3.5 12 0.7
Towing 2 - Yes 2017 2017
Wide flow tank Imperial Col-
lege London 26.9 6 1 8 0.3
0.05-












55 5 7 - 1.2 - - - - N/A N/A
OEC tank test Orion Energy 
Centre 20 6 1.5 - 0.45 - - 1:20 - N/A N/A
NOTE: 1 Formerly UK Coastal Research Facility
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Appendix E – List of major wave energy foresight reports
Date Title Organisation Country 
level
Author type Time 
horizon




1999 Energies from the sea – 





UK Government 2020  n None set
5–8
2001 DTI technology roadmap – 
wave energy
DTI UK Government 2010  n None set 3–6
2002 The energy review – 








UK Government 2050  n None set
2003 Our energy future – 
creating a low carbon 
economy
DTI UK Government 2020  n Large arrays (10MW+) 
from 2015 5–9
Status and research and 
development priorities: 




on behalf of 
DTI
Global Government N/A  n None set
3–6












UK Government 2050  n 220GW globally of wave 5–8





UK Government 2020  n 1.4-4.5GW by 2020
5–9
2005 Scotland’s renewable 




2020  n None set
5–9





2020  n Large arrays (10MW+) 
from 2010
 n 600MW by 2015
 n 3GW by 2020
7–9
Future marine energy Carbon Trust UK Government-
affiliated
2020  n 1–2.5GW across Europe 
installed by 2020 for 
wave
5–9
2007 Meeting the energy 
challenge
DIT UK Government 2020  n None set 7–8




2020  n Small arrays (up to 
10MW) from 2008
 n Large arrays (10MW+) 
from 2012
 n 2GW by 2020
7–9
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Date Title Organisation Country 
level
Author type Time 
horizon




2009 Marine energy road map FREDS Scotland Government-
affiliated
2050  n 150MW marine by 2013 
(medium scenario)
 n 1GW by 2020 (medium 
scenario)
7–9




UK Government 2020  n 1.5GW by 2020 (includes 
tidal range) 7–9
The UK low carbon 
transition plan: national 




UK Government 2020  n Large arrays (10MW+) 
from 2014 7–9
Research priorities 
for renewable energy 










N/A  n None set
3–8
2010 Marine energy action plan 
2010
DECC UK Government 2030  n Small arrays (up to 
10MW) from 2010
 n Large arrays (10MW+) 
by 2014
 n 1–2 GW marine by 2020
7–9
Marine energy technology 
roadmap
ETI & UKERC UK Government-
affiliated
2020  n Small arrays (up to 
10MW) from 2013
 n Large arrays (10MW+) 
from 2017
 n 1–2 GW marine by 2020
 n 10–20 GW by 2050
7–9
2011 2020 route map for 




Scotland Government 2020  n No clear marine target
5–9
Accelerating marine 
energy. The potential for 
cost reduction – insights 
from the carbon trust 
marine energy accelerator
Carbon Trust UK Government-
affiliated
N/A  n 0.3GW by 2020 global
 n 46.5GW by 2050 global
5–8
UK renewable energy 
roadmap
DECC UK Government 2020  n 200–300 MW (0.9 TWh) 
by 2020 7–9
Wave and tidal energy in 
the Pentland Firth and 
Orkney waters: how the 
projects could be built
Crown Estate UK Government-
affiliated
2020  n 1.6GW by 2020 (Orkneys 






2030  n Large arrays (10MW+) 
from 2014
 n 188 GW by 2050 across 
Europe
7–9
2012 Marine energy action plan FREDS Scotland Government-
affiliated
N/A  n None set 7–9
Technology innovation 




2050  n Small arrays (up to 
10MW) from 2015
 n Large-scale arrays 
(10MW+) from 2017
 n 40–50TWh/year of 
electricity for wave
 n 4GW wave/2.5GW tidal 
by 2050 (medium)
5–9
UK renewable energy 
roadmap (update)
DECC UK Government 2020  n 27GW by 2050 (includes 
range) 7–9
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Date Title Organisation Country 
level
Author type Time 
horizon




2013 2020 route map for 
renewable




Scotland Government 2020  n None set
5-9
UK renewable energy 
roadmap (update)
DECC UK Government 2020  n No target outlined and 
cast doubt on 2011 
roadmap marine target
5–8
Energy research and 
training prospectus: wind, 





N/A  n None set
1–6
Wave and tidal energy in 
the Pentland Firth and 
Orkney waters. Delivering 
the first phases of 
projects
Crown Estate UK Government-
affiliated
2020  n Small arrays (up to 
10MW) from 2015
 n 100 MW in Pentland 
Firth and Orkney waters 
by 2020
5–8






N/A  n Small arrays (up to 
10MW) from 2016
 n ~60MW by 2020 7–9
Overcoming research 








N/A  n 3.6 GW by 2020 and
 n leap to nearly 188 GW 
by 2050 in Europe 
(includes all ocean 
energy)
5–9




N/A  n None set 3–8





2050  n Small arrays (up to 
10MW) from 2015
 n Large-scale arrays 
(10MW+) from 2020
 n 200–300 MW by 2020 
in UK
 n 100GW by 2050 across 
Europe by 2050
7–9
2014 Marine energy technology 
roadmap 2014
UKERC & ETI UK Government-
affiliated
2050  n Large arrays (10-100 
MW) from 2019
 n 200–500 MW by 2020
 n 10–20GW by 2050
7–9





N/A  n None set
1–8





2050  n 10 small arrays (up to 
10MW) by 2020
 n 100GW by 2050 across 
Europe (may include 
tidal range) 
1–9
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Date Title Organisation Country 
level
Author type Time 
horizon




2015 2020 route map for 
renewable




Scotland Government 2020  n None set
3–6





Scotland Government N/A  n None set
7–9
Wave and tidal supply 
chain development plan: 
supply chain capability 








N/A  n None set
7–9
2016 Energy research and 
training prospectus: follow 






N/A  n None set
1–6
Transforming the 




Europe Government N/A  n None set
5–8




N/A  n None set 3–8
Ocean energy strategic 







2050  n Small arrays (up to 
10MW) by 2025 (wave)
 n 850MW by 2020 (ocean)
 n 10MW by 2020 (wave)
 n 100MW by 2025 (wave)
 n 100MW by 2020 (tidal 
stream)
 n 100GW (350TWh) by 




List of major wave energy 
foresight documents
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